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Abstract 
 
The principle aim of this thesis is to provide an account of the nature of 
health. The starting-point is that health is a normative concept: health 
implies a standard or norm in relation to which an organism’s state is 
evaluated. Many philosophers take this to imply that health must be 
defined in subjective terms. They either think health consists in a certain 
type of subjective experience (e.g. Canguilhem, Fulford), or that health 
is relative to subjective values and goals (e.g. Nietzsche, Korsgaard, 
Nordenfelt). I argue that subjective definitions of health fail to capture 
the essential properties of health and attempt to show that health is 
something normative and yet entirely objective. This would imply that 
there are normative facts in the world, and to support this claim I turn 
to debates in contemporary meta-ethics. I develop a meta-ethical theory 
according to which a subset of non-moral goods is grounded in 
objective features of living beings, and argue that this meta-ethical 
theory opens the possibility for an objective account of health.  
I then proceed to develop a theory of health that aims to capture 
what it means for any living to be healthy. I argue that the concept of 
health latches onto organisms’ capacities (or dispositions): the greater an 
organism’s range of capacities (or quantity of dispositions), i.e. the more 
it is capable of doing, the healthier it is. The norm relative to which an 
organism’s range of capacities is measured in evaluations of health, I go 
on to argue, is the maximum range of capacities possible for the species. 
Accordingly, an organism is healthy if it is capable of performing all 
species-specific activities. A closer analysis of this claim yields the 
formal definition that health consists in a multiplicity of potential 
activity vis-à-vis factual limitations set by the species. This definition of 
health is defended against various objections and potential counter-
examples. In the context of human health, I attempt to show this 
definition of health captures both physical and mental dimensions of 
health; that it establishes a direct link between health and individual 
autonomy; and that it supports a Nietzschean account of ‘the great 
health’—the idea that being able to give up the concern for one’s health 
constitutes a superior kind of health. In the conclusions, I reflect on 
whether this conception of health could function as an ethical ideal, and 
consider the form that a health-based ethics could take.   
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Introduction 
 
 
1. Health as a Philosophical Question 
 
Although health is something close and familiar to us all—something 
that we constantly and unthinkingly talk about, invest in, assign value 
to, and presume we understand well enough in a common and 
everyday way—health is at the same time quite distant and removed 
from us, something that constitutes a silent background condition for all 
our actions, that makes itself conspicuous only in its absence, and that 
escapes our grasp whenever we reflect on it and try to understand what 
it means to be healthy. Ask any number of people for a definition or 
general characterisation of health—even medical professionals, 
psychologists, public policy makers, health insurers, and people in 
rehabilitation who invest all their energy into the restoration of their 
health—and it will become clear that health is taken to mean a wide 
variety of things and that the concept is used with little consistency or 
consideration. Behind the countless health development programs 
around the world, the trillions spent and earned in the global healthcare 
industry, and the daily efforts that most of us make to preserve our own 
health, lurks the unsettling truth that the nature of health itself is 
clouded in obscurity and that we do not have a shared or coherent 
conception of it. The central ambition of this thesis is to provide an 
account of the nature of health, both its physical and mental aspects, 
and to render transparent what it means for a human being, or any 
other living being, to be healthy.  
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The question what health is and what its most central features are 
is a conceptual question that philosophy can make important 
contributions to; it is not, in any case, a purely empirical question, best 
left to the empirical sciences. Health and disease, as well as related 
concepts like illness, disability, disorder, and dysfunction, are of course 
the subject-matter of well-established and rapidly advancing sciences 
like biology, physiology, medicine, psychology, epidemiology, etc. But 
we cannot simply go out into the world, do experiments on a class of 
beings, and discover what health itself consists in, in the way that it is 
possible to discover that a heart attack is an injury to the heart muscle 
following a blockage of coronary arteries, or that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus, or that water is H2O. Health is a more fundamental 
concept, the meaning of which must be presupposed by empirical 
disciplines to determine the mechanisms and causal pathways by which 
it is lost and gained—but a meaning that cannot be discovered by any 
such empirical means. Determining the nature of health is a more 
fundamental project, which, in a sense, precedes the empirical study of 
the processes and mechanisms that influence it.1 
                                                             
1 Heidegger describes the philosophical task of determining the meaning of such 
basic concepts rather well: “Basic concepts determine the way in which we get an 
understanding beforehand of the area of subject-matter underlying all the objects a 
science takes as its theme, and all positive investigation is guided by this 
understanding. Only after the area itself has been explored beforehand in a 
corresponding manner do these concepts become genuinely demonstrated and 
‘grounded’. But since every such area is itself obtained from the domain of entities 
themselves, this preliminary research, from which the basic concepts are drawn, 
signifies nothing other than an interpretation of those entities with regard to their 
basic state of being.” Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and 
Edward Robinson (New York: Harper San Francisco, 1962), 30/10. 
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We could of course wonder whether we really need a more 
rigorous and theoretically justified conception of health, as medical and 
psychiatric practice seems to get by just fine without one. Our everyday 
understanding of health seems sufficiently clear to guide many different 
kinds of health development programs, it is specific enough to identify 
the most loathsome health injustices in the world, and it seems to be 
concrete enough to know whether we ourselves are healthy or ill. What, 
then, is there to be gained by analysing our notion of health and calling 
into question our everyday conceptions of it? Is health not a concept 
that is simply ‘spoken of in different ways’ and better left that way?  
This question touches on the most important incentive for the 
present enquiry and draws attention to the real-life significance of its 
subject-matter. The influence and consequences that beliefs about health 
have—not just on medical and psychiatric practice, but also on society 
at large and the way we go about living our lives—are not to be 
underestimated. Without a clear, scientifically informed, and rigorous 
understanding of the nature of health, the domain of health runs the 
risk of becoming a free-for-all where healthcare professionals, state 
institutions, religious and political groups, pharmaceutical and 
insurance companies, corporations, and the advertising industry can 
designate acts, behaviours, and conditions as healthy or unhealthy in 
ways that further their own interests in maximising power and profit. 
The most famous examples of cases in which health-related terminology 
has been abused are politically motivated disease categories like 
‘drapetomania’ (a ‘disease’ causing black slaves to flee from captivity) 
and categories used in the Soviet Union like “sluggish schizophrenia” 
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and “reformist delusions.”2 But poorly informed beliefs about health 
can also be damaging in more subtle and concealed ways, especially 
once they are internalised and subconsciously exert an influence on our 
ways of thinking, valuing, and acting. In the course of this thesis I will 
attempt to demonstrate that several common and widely held ideas 
about health are not just distorted and misguided, but even harmful to 
our health if we act on the basis of them—if, that is, the alternative 
theory of health I will develop is indeed plausible and, at least in 
outline, accurate. The motivation for analysing the nature of health and 
questioning our everyday conceptions is therefore not merely a matter 
of striving for theoretical clarity and exactness, but first and foremost an 
effort to promote the development and enrichment of human health 
itself—inside as well as outside medical contexts. 
The conceptual task must nevertheless take the diverse, inchoate, 
and potentially self-undermining intuitions that we have about health 
as its starting-point. This raises important methodological questions, 
however, for how can we move from common-sense intuitions and 
everyday conceptions of health to the most important and essential 
features of health itself?—especially if the aim is also to criticise several 
key aspects of our common-sense intuitions about health and to 
displace a number of wide-spread beliefs about it.  
Here I should emphasise that this thesis does not contain a 
conceptual analysis of our ordinary concept of health. In traditional 
ways of doing conceptual analysis, common-sense intuitions about a 
concept function as a kind of non-negotiable data. The conceptual 
                                                             
2 K.W.M. Fulford, A.Y. Smirnov and E. Snow, “Concepts of disease and the abuse 
of psychiatry in the USSR,” The British Journal of Psychiatry 162 (1993): 801. 
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analysis consists in devising the best and most coherent interpretation 
of this data, and leaves little space for criticising the intuitions that are 
being analysed. The method of analysis that I will employ, by contrast, 
takes ordinary conceptions and intuitions as—what some have called—
“defeasible guides” for the identification of the most important and 
central features of health.3 On this alternative method of analysis, 
ordinary conceptions and intuitions serve merely as tools for bringing 
the subject-matter into view so that a more theoretically and 
scientifically informed understanding can be developed of it. Intuitions 
and ordinary conceptions of health will therefore guide the analysis, but 
may also be discarded if they lead nowhere interesting and criticised if 
they conflict with a more rigorous and theoretically adequate notion of 
health. So even though counter-examples will be used to undermine 
existing definitions of health, they are not immediate disproofs of these 
definitions, but rather, defeasible reasons to think that the definitions do 
not latch onto the properties we should be interested in. 
The most paradigmatic cases for health and unhealthiness can of 
course be found in the medical domain. Since the clearest cases of 
health-loss are the disease categories of medicine and psychiatry, it is 
these categories that will function as the main guides to the essential 
features of health. Because disease categories form such paradigmatic 
cases of unhealthiness, I shall also begin by looking at theories of health 
and disease derived from such cases, i.e. the theories of health put 
forward in the philosophy of medicine and psychiatry.  
                                                             
3 I have taken guidance here from the methodological remarks included in: Laurie 
A. Paul and Ned Hall, Causation: A User’s Guide (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013), 2-4 and 24-38.    
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A final methodological point is that although examples and 
common-sense intuitions serve only as defeasible guides for identifying 
the properties constituting an organism’s health, there are limitations to 
how many common-sense intuitions and examples can be discarded 
and left unaccounted for. A theory of health must still remain 
recognisable as a theory of health, and not unwittingly end up 
becoming a theory of some other phenomenon. Certain paradigmatic 
cases of health and unhealthiness must be agreed with and, for the most 
part, remain non-negotiable. So even though the chosen method of 
analysis allows for a more critical engagement with common-sense 
intuitions and ordinary conceptions of health, especially compared to 
traditional forms of conceptual analysis, there are limitations to how 
critical a theory of health can be while remaining a theory of health. This 
is all to say, that I will not just investigate common-sense intuitions and 
everyday usages of the concept health, and that the analysis will not be 
limited by these intuitions and usages—but that the investigation still 
aims to identify the essential features of our concept of health. 
 
 
2. The Objective Turn 
 
One theme that runs as a constant thread through this thesis and to 
which it returns time and time again, is the question whether health is 
an objective property of living beings or whether health is inherently 
tied to subjective experience, attitudes, and desires. The idea this thesis 
opposes most strongly is the increasingly common belief that health is a 
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subjective notion and something that in its very being depends on 
individual and cultural values. A few comments are required to place 
this central concern in a larger context, and to clarify in advance which 
contribution this thesis seeks to make.  
From the 1960’s onwards there has been a growing awareness that 
medical and psychiatric classifications are not merely descriptive of 
people’s conditions, but that diagnostic categories also contain a 
normative dimension. Diagnosing someone with a medical or 
psychiatric disorder, or simply judging people to be unhealthy, means 
making a value-judgement about their state of being—a value-
judgement based on implicit norms of how someone should be. Critics 
considered this to be deeply problematic, especially in the context of 
mental health. Anti-psychiatrists were quick to accuse psychiatry of 
being nothing other than a form of behavioural police and an 
instrument of social control, and criticised it for infringing on individual 
freedom and rights to self-determination. Although this normative 
dimension was exposed and problematised first in the context of 
psychiatry, by now there seems to be a more widely shared recognition 
that all medical categories contain a normative aspect. When attention is 
drawn to the normativity of diagnostic categories and judgements about 
health, this is usually done with the intention to caution healthcare 
practitioners not to impose values and ideas about how someone should 
be onto their patients, and instead, attend to the desires and wishes of 
the patient him or herself. As a result, however, the meaning of health 
and illness has slowly but steadily been subjectified and relativised to 
people’s subjective feelings, desires, and values. 
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Even though critics were right to dispel the presumed value-
neutrality of diagnostic categories and medical practice more generally, 
and successfully brought to light the moral and political dimensions 
that have shaped past and present healthcare practices, the idea that 
subjective values determine what health is, is most problematic and 
something that, by now, is itself in need of critique. Subjective values 
and desires are shaped and influenced by a wide variety of factors, 
including market forces, cultural traditions, religious beliefs, beauty 
ideals, and so on—factors that aren’t necessarily conducive to human 
health. Once health is viewed as essentially dependent upon individual 
values and desires, we deprive ourselves of the more objective point of 
view from which these values and desires could themselves be judged 
as conducive or inimical to health. The urgency of the critique of the 
subjectification of health does therefore not consist in purely theoretical 
motives (although the subjective view is also theoretically untenable), 
and certainly not in any perceived necessity to restore authoritative and 
paternalistic forms of healthcare, but instead, and above all, in the need 
to establish a grounding determination of health by which the manifold 
and often contradictory, and indeed often erroneous and self-defeating 
practices of health can begin to orient themselves. The ambition of this 
thesis is not to return to any value-free and naïvely scientistic ideas of 
health, however, but to look ahead and explore whether health can be 
conceived of as at once normative and objective, in such a way as to 
constitute a standard against which all subjective values and desires, 
including subjective accounts of health itself, can be assessed in terms of 
their health-promoting or health-inhibiting properties.  
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3. The Ethical Significance of Health 
 
Another aspect of the thesis worth drawing attention to from the outset 
is its attempt to expose and examine the ethical significance of health. 
On the one hand, health seems to be an entirely medical affair: we lose it 
when we fall ill and regain it when we recover, either with the help of 
medical interventions or due to our own powers for recovery. On the 
other hand, care for our health also plays an important role in our 
everyday life and often influences our beliefs about how we should act, 
also without there being any signs of illness—think for instance of 
hygiene measures, the preparation and consumption of foods, cleaning 
oneself, getting enough sleep, wearing warm enough clothes, and so on. 
These practices may hardly be ‘ethical’ in any meaningful sense, but if 
we take mental health into consideration, a much larger portion of our 
choices and activities appears to be governed by a concern for health—
and with an expansive view of mental health virtually all our actions are 
in some way related to, if not directly aimed at, our health. Health is not 
just the subject-matter of medicine and psychiatry, then, but also plays 
an important role in practices of, and our thoughts about, living well.  
The idea that the concept of health has ethical significance—not 
just in terms of fair and equal distributions of healthcare, but actually as 
part of a conception of how to live a good life—may strike us as rather 
strange, in part because we have become accustomed to speaking about 
health only in medical contexts. In antiquity, by contrast, it wasn’t 
strange at all to think that cultivating physical and mental health was an 
integral part of ethical life. We could think for instance of Aristotle’s 
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remarks about good health being a requirement for eudaimonia, or the 
central argument of Plato’s Republic that it is profitable to exercise justice 
because virtue is “a kind of health and beauty and good condition of the 
soul.”4 But the ethical importance of health was recognised more widely 
by the ancient Greeks and ingrained in their culture. In Mirage of Health, 
René Dubos points out that the Greeks had multiple gods of health: 
Asclepius, Hygeia, and Panakeia.5 While Asclepius personified the 
medical and curative dimension of health and Panakeia the healing 
power of drugs, Hygeia symbolised good health more generally, and 
represented the virtues of a sane life—a life lived according to reason. 
These gods correspond to three different dimensions of health: health as 
recovery from disease; health as healing with the help of drugs; and 
health as a way of living wisely. Dubos writes:  
 
For the worshipers of Hygeia, health is the natural order of 
things, a positive attribute to which men are entitled if they 
govern their lives wisely. According to them, the most 
important function of medicine is to discover and teach the 
natural laws which will ensure to man a healthy mind in a 
healthy body. More sceptical or wiser in the ways of the 
world, the followers of Asclepius believe that the chief role of 
the physician is to treat disease, to restore health by correcting 
any imperfection caused by the accidents of birth or of life.6  
                                                             
4 Plato, Republic, in Plato, The Collected Dialogues, ed. Edith Hamilton and 
Huntington Cairns (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2005), 444e. 
5 René Dubos, Mirage of Health: Utopias, Progress, and Biological Change. (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1987), 129-131. 
6 Dubos, Mirage of Health, 131. 
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Dubos points out that also in antiquity the cult of Hygeia 
progressively gave way to that of Asclepius, relegating Hygeia to a 
more subordinate role. 7 Hygeia was eventually depicted as Asclepius’s 
daughter, sister, or wife, but always as subservient to him. The reason 
why Asclepius dethroned and supplanted Hygeia, and the reason why 
the ethical dimension of health that Hygeia represented finally waned 
altogether (and why ‘hygiene’ now means little more than ‘cleanliness’), 
Dubos suggests, is that “men as a rule find it easier to depend on healers 
than to attempt the more difficult task of living wisely.”8 
Nowadays, the concept of health is confined almost entirely to its 
medical usage, and has completely cast off the ethical dimension that 
Hygeia symbolised. At the same time, the idea that health implies rules 
of behaviour and a way of living is still very much alive. In fact, we 
currently seem to be more concerned about our health than ever before. 
We can’t seem to get enough of all the information about diets, exercise 
regimes, the right posture, required supplements, how much to rest and 
sleep, but also about which positive thoughts to entertain, how to cope 
with emotional set-backs, and so on—all with an eye to maintaining our 
physical and mental health. Yet, despite this near obsession with being 
healthy, it is still a predominantly medical and therapeutic notion of 
health that informs and governs our practices of health. That is to say, 
living a healthy life nowadays means nothing more than avoiding, 
almost at all costs, the possibility of falling ill—and in the event we do 
so after all, to recover as quickly and efficiently as possible. 
                                                             
7 Dubos, Mirage of Health, 130.  
8 Ibid.  
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In addition to the attempt to establish a grounding notion of 
health, this thesis explores the question whether healthiness could 
function as a kind of ethical ideal, and whether a more accurate and 
potentially richer understanding of health could take us beyond the cult 
of Asclepius and Panakeia to which we still belong. These wider ethical 
concerns remain peripheral to most of the investigation, however, since 
they should not convolute the task of establishing an account of health 
that is defensible on its own terms—one that is not shaped and 
informed, in any case, by an anticipation of any potentially interesting 
or desirable ethical consequences. It is therefore not until the concluding 
sections, when all the relevant terms have been grounded, that the 
ethical significance of health—or the relative lack thereof—will be 
addressed and examined.  
 
 
4. The Role of Nietzsche 
 
Although this thesis follows its own trajectory of enquiry and freely 
engages with all the philosophical traditions, sub-disciplines, and texts 
it considers relevant to its own progression, the philosopher whose 
work occupies a more central place, and to whom reference is made on 
multiple occasions, is Friedrich Nietzsche. In the tradition of Western 
philosophy there have been few for whom the question of health was as 
important as for Nietzsche, and few who thematised health as a subject 
of philosophical enquiry as persistently or profoundly as he did.9 His 
                                                             
9 There has nevertheless been a remarkable lack of interest in Nietzsche’s thoughts 
about health, also in specialist Nietzsche scholarship—the only notable exception 
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numerous aphorisms on health support several of the chief claims 
defended in this thesis, but also contain some of the most forceful 
objections to them—making it a natural and in many ways obvious 
choice to employ him as the main interlocutor. 
Nietzsche makes four important contributions to the thesis. First, 
he demonstrates the full consequences of affirming the normativity of 
health while at the same time taking all values to be projections of 
subjective attitudes—viz. that health itself becomes something entirely 
relative to subjective attitudes and values, in such a way that we end up 
with an irreducible plurality of conditions referred to as health. The 
unsustainability of this view provides the main motivation for rejecting 
the idea that all values are rooted in subjective attitudes, and forms the 
incentive to develop an alternative theory of values. Second, Nietzsche 
also provides important clues for how to overcome value subjectivism, 
viz. by suggesting that life gives rise to values, in such a way that things 
can be of value for living beings without the mediation of subjectivity. 
Third, Nietzsche provides powerful arguments against the idea that 
health can be defined as absence of pain and suffering, or as the 
experience of pleasure and happiness—a definition of health that, as we 
shall see, continues to receive wide support. And fourth, Nietzsche 
argues that giving up the concern for one’s future health results in a 
superior state of health, better known as ‘greater health’. These four 
aspects of his thought will prove to be very instructive and play an 
important role in the direction this work ultimately takes.  
                                                                                                                                                           
being Mark Letteri, “The Theme of Health in Nietzsche's Thought,” Man and World 
23 (1990): 405-417.  
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That said, this thesis does not contain a systematic exposition of 
everything that Nietzsche has to say about health, or about any other 
topic for that matter. Usage of his work will be highly selective and 
intentionally neglects parts of his corpus that could oppose, further 
qualify, or even contradict what is said in the aphorisms that are being 
singled out. The aim is not to reconstruct or defend Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of health; but rather, to use specific elements of his work to 
support the claims I think we have good reasons to accept also without 
his consent. Given that Nietzsche refers to his own work as “an 
inexhaustible well into which no bucket descends without coming up 
filled with gold and goodness,” I hope the reader is willing to forgive 
me for using his work so selectively and for pulling up only a few 
lumps of gold.10 
Perhaps one point of interpretation needs to be added here, as I 
shall not have the opportunity to return to it in the main body of the 
text. Some commentators consider Nietzsche’s frequent allusions to 
health and disease merely as metaphorical expressions of his generally 
unsupported normative views, and understand them as symptomatic of 
the biologism that dominated the intellectual climate in late 19th-century 
Europe. Gregory Moore, for instance, writes that “Nietzsche’s recourse 
to biological and medical idiom is both a reflection and an ironic 
distortion of this pervasive biologism, and can only be truly appreciated 
once the contemporary force and significance of his metaphor is 
                                                             
10 Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo: How One Becomes What One Is, trans. Walter 
Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967), preface §4. Translation modified.  
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reconstructed.”11 I take the direct opposite line of interpretation and 
treat Nietzsche’s employment of medical terms, and health especially, 
as literally as hermeneutically permissible. I understand Nietzsche’s 
focus on health to be a direct consequence of his efforts “to translate 
man back into nature”12 and to “‘naturalise’ humanity in terms of a 
pure, newly discovered, newly redeemed nature.”13 Nietzsche 
pioneered the idea that moral values and practices oppose what is in 
fact most valuable for human life, namely qualities like health, strength, 
and self-mastery. He thought this catalogue of ‘life-affirming’ values 
could be supported by a careful study of our natural constitution. I 
therefore take him to be dead serious when he writes that “every table 
of values, every ‘thou shalt’ known to history […] needs a critique on 
the part of medical science,”14 and that “the sciences of physiology, 
medicine, sociology” are “to construct anew the laws of life and action” 
and to provide “the foundation stones of new ideals.”15 We would sell 
ourselves short by reading these passages merely as metaphorical 
expressions of an outdated biologism, and miss out on the important 
contribution that Nietzsche’s texts can make to our understanding and 
appreciation of the value of health.  
                                                             
11 Gregory Moore, Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), 1. 
12 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil: Prelude to a Philosophy of the Future, 
trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Random House, 1966), §230. 
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Random House, 1974), §109. 
14 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), §1.17. 
15 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), §453. 
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5. Outline of the Thesis 
 
The thesis is divided into six chapters that together aim to provide a 
comprehensive theory of health. The opening chapter examines existing 
definitions of health and by exposing their deficiencies aims to create 
the space for a better account. The second chapter engages with meta-
ethical issues and prepares the ground for an objective theory of health. 
The third chapter gradually builds up a novel theory of health, which is 
defended against a number of potential objections in the fourth chapter. 
The fifth chapter draws out the implications for human health more 
specifically, and the final chapter aims to show the merits of my 
theoretical proposals in light of two alternative conceptions of health 
that share several important features.  
Chapter One examines five theories of health (those of Christopher 
Boorse, Jerome Wakefield, Bill Fulford, Georges Canguilhem, and 
Friedrich Nietzsche), which together cover the full spectrum from 
purely objective to purely subjective definitions of health. I argue that 
each of the definitions fails to capture the defining properties of health, 
and go on to formulate desiderata for a more adequate account. The 
central problem I identify in the chapter is a fundamental assumption 
held by each of the authors, viz. that norms are essentially subjective—
which implies that if health is a normative concept, it must be defined, 
at least in part, in subjective terms. The chapter shows, on the one hand, 
that health is clearly a normative concept, while on the other hand, that 
the more health is defined in subjective terms the harder it becomes to 
provide an adequate definition of it. This has two implications: first, 
that we need a definition of health that captures both its normativity 
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and its objectivity, and hence, second, that we must reject the 
assumption that all norms are rooted in subjectivity and instead begin 
to take seriously the meta-ethical possibility of objective, mind-
independent norms.  
Chapter Two takes up this latter challenge and presents a realist 
theory of value that allows health to be regarded as at once normative 
and objective. Via a close engagement with the work of Peter Railton, 
Philippa Foot, and Christine Korsgaard, the chapter builds up a theory 
of values according to which one subset of values is grounded in the 
constitution of living beings. I argue that the functional organisation of 
living beings gives rise to normative differentiations, so that certain 
values are indeed grounded in objective features of life. Although this 
theory offers a way of thinking about normativity that breaks with the 
subjectivist tradition, it also places a requirement on health, viz. that 
health must be defined without recourse to subjective factors. It 
therefore not only enables a normative and objective theory of health, it 
simultaneously requires one.  
Chapter Three draws the desiderata of the first two chapters 
together and develops a universal theory of health on the basis of these 
criteria. It begins by advancing a critique of probably the most obstinate 
conception of health, the idea that health consists in conditions for self-
preservation. Out of this critique emerges my proposed account, the 
idea that the concept of health latches onto an organism’s range of 
capacities (or dispositions). After making a case for the prima facie 
plausibility of a capacity approach to health, the approach is further 
specified, resulting in a formal definition of health: ‘a multiplicity of 
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potential activity vis-à-vis factual limitations’. This definition of health 
is then analysed in piecemeal fashion, not only to show its naturalistic 
status (for which I briefly survey the metaphysics of dispositions), but 
mainly to support the principal claim that the concept of health, indeed, 
latches onto the multiplicity of dispositions of organisms: a multiplicity 
that is diminished in the event of disease and reduced to zero at the 
moment of death, but also a quantity that in the absence of disease 
permits of increase, signifying ‘positive health’. 
Chapter Four addresses five objections to the proposed theory of 
health. In addition to providing rejoinders to each objection, the chapter 
seeks to apply the theory of health to the domains from which the 
objections derive their force in order to further demonstrate its 
conceptual strength. This exercise is carried out by means of a series of 
thematic excursions into the role of pain and suffering in health, the 
impact that processes of specialisations have on health, the 
(in)significance of wealth and social advantage for health, and the 
relationship between health and technology.  
Chapter Five draws out the consequences of the proposed account 
for human life and attempts to provide a first, general characterisation 
of human health. The chapter is organised around three distinctive 
features of human beings: the limitlessness of human potential, 
individual autonomy, and our ability to pursue final goods. The main 
claims of the chapter are that human beings can never be fully or 
completely healthy (it is always possible to become healthier); that a 
high degree of individual autonomy implies a greater level of health; 
and that the ability to adopt and pursue final goods is of crucial 
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importance to human health. The chapter ends with a reflection on a 
Nietzschean paradox, viz. that being able to give up on one’s future 
health constitutes a superior kind of health—‘the great health’.  
Chapter Six offers a reconstruction of two alternative capacity 
approaches to health: Lennart Nordenfelt’s ‘action-theoretic approach’ 
and Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities approach’. I 
argue that Nordenfelt’s account is both incoherent and inadequate, and 
show how my own account avoids the problematic consequences of his 
view. With regard to Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, I 
highlight the most important commonalities and divergences, and make 
a suggestion as to how their approach could benefit from some of my 
theoretical proposals. 
In the conclusion I provide a summary overview of the main 
claims defended in the thesis and develop several themes further, 
including, and most importantly, the ethical ramifications of the thesis. I 
sketch out the general contours of a possible future health-based ethics, 
clarify the necessary limitations of its claims, and consider to what 
extent it might be construed as a rehabilitation of the eudaimonic ethics 
of the ancient Greeks.  
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Chapter 1  
 
 
From Purely Objective to Purely Subjective  
Theories of Health 
 
1. Normative and Descriptive Theories 
  
A central concern in the philosophical literature on health is the 
question whether health and illness are descriptive concepts or 
normative concepts. Bill Fulford has called this the “values in/values out 
debate.”1 As we shall see, a crucial assumption amongst philosophers of 
medicine and psychiatry is that if health and illness are normative 
concepts they cannot be defined in objective and scientific terminology 
alone and a subjective element of one kind or another becomes 
indispensable in their definition. The core assumption in debates over 
health, shared by virtually all contributors, is that if health and illness 
are normative notions their definition must involve subjective factors 
like feelings, desires, preference, goals, social norms, etc. If health and 
illness are descriptive concepts, on the other hand, descriptive of some 
part of empirical reality, then it is standardly presumed they can be 
objectively defined, i.e. without any dependency on, or reference to, 
subjective and cultural factors.  
                                                             
1 K.W.M. Fulford, “Nine Variations and a Coda on the Theme of an 
Evolutionary Definition of Dysfunction,” Journal of Abnormal Psychology 108:3 
(1999): 412.  
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This chapter discusses five theories of health prominent in the 
philosophical literature. In presenting these accounts of health together 
with their most important shortcomings, I aim to show a progression 
towards subjectivism and ultimately scepticism directly following from 
the recognition that health and illness contain a normative element. 
Objective accounts of health and disease are criticised in the literature, 
rightly so, for relying on norms without admitting so. When health and 
illness are understood as containing a normative element, however, in 
combination with the assumption that values are subjective, health and 
illness themselves become something essentially subjective, i.e. concepts 
that must be defined at least partially in subjective terms. When the 
subjectivist view is pushed to its logical extreme, however, health and 
illness become subjective a way that renders them wholly undefinable. 
The logical progression I aim to bring out is therefore one of increasing 
subjectification of health and illness: a subjectification that follows from 
the recognition that health and illness are normative concepts; a 
subjectification that is inevitable if all normativity is considered a matter 
of subjective preference; and a subjectification that, when followed to its 
logical extreme, leads to the point of scepticism where health and illness 
become wholly undefinable. 
I will open this discussion with the account of health defended by 
Christopher Boorse, who argues that health can be defined in strictly 
objective and naturalistic terms, excluding all normative language. 
Criticisms of Boorse’s account have led to the formulation of hybrid 
theories, like those defended by Jerome Wakefield and Bill Fulford, 
which refer to facts and values as distinct ingredients in the meaning of 
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health and illness. Problems with these hybrid theories naturally lead to 
the account of health formulated by Georges Canguilhem, who thinks 
health and illness are entirely normative concepts and therefore 
definable only in terms of qualitative subjective experience. The final 
account of health I shall consider is the one advanced by Friedrich 
Nietzsche in his so-called middle period. In this period of writing 
Nietzsche argues that health is nothing but a normative ideal and 
therefore undefinable in any form of generality.  
 In presenting these five accounts of health the ambition is not to 
conclusively prove one theory to be false or another to be correct, but 
rather to create the space for an alternative and better theory of health. 
In the course of this thesis I shall return to the theories of health 
presented here and further demonstrate why they fall short compared 
to the alternative account that I shall develop. This chapter mobilises 
several important accounts of health, renders their presuppositions 
explicit, and highlights their most important problems—all of which 
serves to define, specify, and delimit the problem-horizon for the rest of 
the thesis. And this problem-horizon will consist of two fundamental 
questions: first, whether there can be objective truth about normative 
matters, especially in the context of health and illness—and if so, what 
grounds such objective normative truths; and second, what the nature 
of health is, especially given the problems inherent to the accounts of 
health discussed in this chapter. Presenting the respective theories of 
health as a progression from purely objective to purely subjective 
accounts aims to illustrate how these two questions are interrelated and 
must be addressed in conjunction.  
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2. Boorse: The Bio-Statistical Theory of Health 
 
Christopher Boorse is best known for defending the thesis that health 
and disease are descriptive concepts. What constitutes health and 
illness, he argues, can be understood in naturalistic and purely scientific 
terminology alone.2 By means of a reductive analysis Boorse attempts to 
define health and disease in strictly naturalistic and value-free terms, or 
“theoretical” terms as he prefers to call them.3 If this reduction can be 
executed successfully then all the traditional scientific virtues pertain to 
judgements about health and disease: assessing health and illness will 
be a strictly empirical matter; judgements can be falsified or supported 
by empirical observation alone; and medical diagnoses would be 
objective and universally valid. In a series of papers published in the 
1970’s Boorse defines health positively as “normal functioning” and 
negatively as “absence of disease.”4 These two definitions are intended 
to be equivalent, as ‘disease’ is itself defined by Boorse as ‘functional 
abnormality’, and ‘absence of functional abnormality’ is of course 
definitionally equivalent to ‘functional normality’.  
                                                             
2 For the discussion of Boorse’s views I rely on the following sources: Christopher 
Boorse, “On The Distinction Between Disease and Illness,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 5 (1975): 49-68; Christopher Boorse, “What a Theory of Mental Health 
Should Be,” Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 6 (1976): 61-84; Christopher 
Boorse, “Health as a Theoretical Concept,” Philosophy of Science 44:4 (1977): 542-573; 
Christopher Boorse, “A Rebuttal on Health,” in What is disease?, ed. James M. 
Humber and Robert F. Almeder (Totowa, New Jersey: Humana Press, 1997), 1-134. 
3 Boorse, “Theoretical Concept,” 542. 
4 Boorse, “Theoretical Concept,” 542; 550. 
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Whether this account of health succeeds in being a value-free 
account of health depends on how Boorse defines the notions 
‘normality’, ‘abnormality’, and ‘function’. ‘Normality’ is defined by 
Boorse in statistical terms, whereby some central region of a distribution 
of functional outcomes of an internal part is demarcated and designated 
as normal. A ‘function’ is defined by Boorse as matter organised in such 
a way that it contributes to the realisation of a goal, whereby the 
functions of organs and body parts of living organisms are 
“contributions to individual survival and reproduction.”5 When the 
definition of normality and functions of organs are combined we get a 
definition of ‘normal function’: “the statistically typical contribution by 
it [each internal part] to individual survival and reproduction.”6 And if 
disease is the analytic opposite of normal functioning, the definition of 
disease is “[a kind of internal state that] reduces one or more functional 
abilities below [statistically] typical efficiency.”7 And finally, if health is 
the absence of disease, health is a state in which internal parts function 
at normal efficiency, so that each internal part gives its statistically 
typical contribution to individual survival and reproduction.  
Boorse is adamant that normative elements play no role in this set 
of interrelated definitions. In his papers from the 1970’s Boorse argues 
that values only come ‘in’ at the level of illness, which he defines as a 
state in which a disease, as defined above, comes to have effects that are 
subjectively experienced as incapacitating and distinctively bad.8 
                                                             
5 Boorse, “Theoretical Concept,” 556. 
6 Boorse, “Theoretical Concept,” 555. 
7 Boorse, “Theoretical Concept,” 562. 
8 Boorse, “Distinction Disease and Illness,” 61.  
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Twenty years later, however, he revisits this claim and argues that 
illnesses are just systemic diseases and therefore equally value-free 
notions.9 In either case, health and disease are claimed to have been 
defined in strictly value-free terms.   
Over the last three decades philosophers and medical theorists 
have criticised Boorse’s theory for a wide variety of reasons, some of 
which he addressed in an extensive rebuttal.10 The three concepts on 
which the bio-statistical theory hinges—‘normality’, ‘functions’, and 
‘efficiency’—have all been criticised for involving values and falling 
short in adequately distinguishing health from disease.  
Beginning with the problems to do with ‘normality’, Kingma has 
drawn attention to the fact that normality of functioning only applies 
within a specific reference class, for instance someone’s age or sex.11 
This is a key aspect of the biostatistical account of health and Boorse 
explicitly endorses it in all his papers.12 A high heart rate may be normal 
for teenagers but pathological for elderly, just as some blood values are 
normal for women but abnormal for men: the reference class determines 
what is normal and abnormal and so whether someone is healthy or 
diseased. Problems emerge with the determination of the relevant 
reference classes, as Kingma points out. She argues that there are no 
empirical facts that determine what should count as a reference class 
other than prior value-judgements about what indeed constitutes an 
                                                             
9 Boorse, “Rebuttal on Health,” 11. 
10 Boorse, “Rebuttal on Health,” 16-99. 
11 Elselijn Kingma, “What is it to be healthy?” Analysis 67 (2007): 128-133. 
12 See e.g. Boorse, “Theoretical Concept,” 555. 
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appropriate reference class.13 Identifying a reference class must precede 
judgements about health and disease if Boorse’s bio-statistical theory is 
to hold up, but Kingma points out that the only way to determine the 
relevant reference classes is on the basis of a value-laden pre-
understanding of what should count as health and disease in the first 
place—which, she argues, renders the theory both circular and 
dependent on values after all. Someone is unhealthy when an internal 
part functions abnormally vis-à-vis a reference class, but the reference 
classes themselves are set by prior values that ultimately still determine 
when an internal part is functioning normally or abnormally, and so 
whether one is healthy or diseased.  
Kingma’s concern is therefore that the fixing of reference classes 
proceeds on the basis of prior normative commitments. If we take a step 
back, however, we can recognise that the very set-up of Boorse’s 
account is normative in a more straightforward way. For a concept or 
judgement to be normative is for it to evaluate something relative to a 
norm or standard: normative concepts, by definition, measure the 
proximity to or distance from a norm. The norm, on Boorse’s theory, is 
normality—or more precisely, a region demarcated as normal. The mere 
description or measurement of some functional outcome does not tell 
whether one is in a state of health or disease, also not on Boorse’s 
account; it is the comparison of the measurements vis-à-vis a norm, i.e. 
                                                             
13 She wonders why being female counts as a reference class for Boorse whereas 
being myopic or being a heavy drinker does not. Against a reference class of 
myopic people being myopic would be normal, just as against a reference class of 
heavy drinkers liver problems wouldn’t be abnormal. The fact that we choose our 
reference classes shows that prior intuitions about what is healthy are effectively 
still doing the work, instead of statistical deviance vis-à-vis a reference class.  
27 
the region demarcated as normal, that determines whether an organ is 
functional or dysfunctional and whether the organism is healthy or 
diseased. The fact that on Boorse’s account judgements of health are 
made relative to a norm already renders the bio-statistical account 
normative: the norm indicates what is good, viz. functioning in a 
statistically normal way. Without going into the details of how the 
reference classes are fixed, Boorse’s theory is straightforwardly 
normative: it invokes norms and compares states with respect to them.   
What Kingma criticises Boorse for, I suspect, is therefore another 
worry. The real concern she articulates is not just that Boorse’s account 
is normative, but that the relevant norms are dependent on subjective 
preferences and values. That is, she argues that Boorse’s norms are 
ultimately subjective norms. Depending on what one subjectively deems 
healthy the reference classes are fixed, which determines the statistically 
normal, which sets the norm, and which decides between health and 
disease but in a way that was already subjectively decided. The problem 
Kingma identifies is therefore not the normativity of Boorse’s account as 
such, but the fact that the norms it invokes ultimately depend on 
subjective decisions. If the norms in relations to which condition are 
assessed were objective norms, i.e. norms obtaining independently of 
such decisions and commitments, I think she would retract her objection 
and consider the account objective, despite its inherent normativity.14 
                                                             
14 This will play an important role in the formulation of the account of health in 
Chapter Thee, which intends to be at once normative and objective. A requirement 
for such an account is that the norms in relation to which conditions are assessed 
do not depend on subjective preferences or personal values. This possibility will be 
further examined in the context of Philippa Foot’s work, in §2.4 of Chapter Two. 
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While Kingma’s critique focuses on the normativity of the normal, 
or rather the subjective values involved in defining what is normal, 
others have pointed out that normality is inadequate to distinguish 
health from disease to begin with, regardless of whether normality 
functions as a norm. A problem with defining disease as statistical 
abnormality, as Wakefield points out, is that many conditions can be 
statistically normal while uncontroversially involving a disorder or 
disease.15 Wakefield lists conditions like lung irritation from pollution, 
atherosclerosis and dental caries: conditions that are statistically normal, 
hence healthy on Boorse’s view, although unmistakably disorders. 
Wakefield drives the point home by imaging the world after a nuclear 
war: it is possible for all living beings to be diseased after nuclear a war 
despite the fact that their functions contribute to survival in a 
statistically normal way.16 Defining disease as deviance from 
statistically normal functional outcomes presupposes that normal 
functional outcomes are by definition healthy. Wakefield’s objection is 
that there is no necessary connection between abnormal functioning and 
disease, as there are numerous examples of disorders and diseases that 
are statistically normal whilst being clear-cut disorders and diseases.  
A further problem with normality, identified by Nordenfelt, is that 
diseases like infectious diseases are characterised by symptoms that are 
statistical and species-normal responses to environmental threats, like 
viruses and bacteria. Nordenfelt argues that infectious diseases are 
                                                             
15 Jerome C. Wakefield, “The Concept of Mental Disorder: On the Boundary 
between Biological Facts and Social Values,” American Psychologist 47:3 (1992): 377.  
16 Wakefield, “Mental Disorder,” 378. 
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statistically normal responses directed at self-preservation.17 On 
Boorse’s theory they should therefore not qualify as diseases, as the 
responses are statistically normal as well as conducive to survival. And 
since infectious diseases are obviously diseases and instances of 
lessened health, he deems Boorse’s bio-statistical theory inadequate.  
And finally, many commentators agree that statistical normality as 
the defining feature of mental health is hugely problematic. The idea that 
psychopathology can be equated with abnormal behaviour received 
perpetual criticism throughout the 20th century because of its normative 
implications, as well as the moral and political incentives that may lie 
behind this equation. I shall not restate or further elaborate these 
criticisms, but it is not difficult to see why many have considered it 
deeply problematic to call someone diseased when mental functions do 
not produce statistically normal behaviour.18 Nor is it hard to see why 
the equation of abnormal behaviour with psychopathology could be 
used to legitimise political control of social deviancy. In light of these 
criticisms, someone sympathetic to Boorse’s account of health could 
either endorse a radical discontinuity between mental and physical 
health, or argue that only gross dysfunctions of cognitive systems are 
mental disorders, as opposed to the much larger variety of conditions 
currently recognised as such.19 Or, indeed, one could follow Thomas 
                                                             
17 Lennart Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health: An Action Theoretic Approach, 2nd 
revised & enlarged edition (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995), 31. 
18 See for a recent restatement of these concerns: Stephan James Barlett, Normality 
Does not Equal Mental Health: the need to look elsewhere for standards of good 
psychological health (Santa Barbara California: Praeger, 2011). 
19 This is Boorse’s own view, see: Boorse, “Theory of Mental Health,” 61–84. 
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Szasz and deny the existence of mental health and diseases altogether 
on the basis of a bio-statistical theory of health and disease.20   
In addition to problems related to the theory’s reliance on 
normality, important concerns have been raised about its dependence 
on functions. Boorse recognises that a functional system implies an 
intention, goal, or purpose for it to be a functional system. But many 
think that fulfilment of a goal or purpose would be something positive, 
just as dysfunction, or failure in fulfilling a purpose, would be 
something inherently negative. Prima facie it seems that reducing health 
and disease to statistically typical functioning of internal parts does not 
reduce normativity in the way Boorse claims it does, precisely because 
functions imply values. Fulford has argued this point repeatedly in his 
publications but bases his critique on the linguistic analysis of ordinary 
usage of the term ‘function’.21 The argument can also be made 
independently from ordinary language use, however, by stating that a 
function just constitutes a source of values. The idea that functions 
imply values—not just in our ways of speaking but also in the world 
itself—goes back at least to Aristotle.22 If the function of a knife is to cut, 
                                                             
20 Thomas Szasz, “The Myth of Mental Illness,” American Psychologist 15 (1960): 113-
118. 
21 Fulford writes for instance, “to describe something as one’s purpose while at the 
same time denying that one evaluates it (in some sense and mutatis mutandis) 
positively would indeed be self-contradictory. Hence evaluation is prima facie 
strictly entailed by ‘purpose’, it is part of the very meaning of the term.” K.W.M. 
Fulford, Moral Theory and Medical Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989), 106.   
22 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford 
Translation, ed. Jonathan Barns (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1995), 1097b25-30 
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its good lies in cutting: it would be a good knife if it were to cut well. 
Insofar as it is a cutting-thing everything that promotes the knife to cut 
well is good for the knife. This understanding of the relationship 
between functions and values has recently been reinvigorated and 
defended by Christine Korsgaard.23 She writes that “when something 
has a function, its good ‘resides’ in its function” and “functional 
systems, by their very nature, have a good.”24 In Chapter Two (§2.5) I 
shall return to this aspect of functions and argue in agreement with 
Korsgaard that functions give rise to values.  
Fulford gives two further arguments for the idea that functions are 
not value-free.25 The first is that he thinks value-free explanations must 
be causal explanations. There is a contrast between causal explanations 
and functional explanations, and Fulford insists that only the former are 
properly value-free. Fulford claims that only explanations in the form of 
a web of chemical interactions—without functions, goals, and levels of 
efficiency—are properly value-free; but from this level one cannot 
derive a meaningful conception of health and illness. Boorse, on the 
other hand, retorts that function statements are value-free because 
biological explanations often utilise functional explanations, at micro- 
and macro-level: genes are understood and explained by reference to 
                                                             
23 Christine M. Korsgaard, “Aristotle’s Function Argument,” in The Constitution of 
Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 128-150. 
24 Korsgaard, “Function Argument,” 144; Christine M. Korsgaard, “On Having a 
Good,” Philosophy: The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 89: 3 (2014): 20. 
Accessed March 12, 2014. doi: 10.1017/s0031819114000102. Page numbering refers 
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25 K.W.M. Fulford, “Teleology without Tears: Naturalism, Neo-Naturalism, 
and Evaluationism in the Analysis of Function Statements in Biology (and a Bet on 
the Twenty-first Century),” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 7:1 (2000): 77-94. 
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the proteins they encode for, the heart is explained by pointing to its 
role in the blood-circulation, hands are explained in terms of their 
capacity to grab and hold things, and so on. We should note, however, 
that biology’s use of functional explanations only implies that functions 
are naturalistic: they figure in scientific explanations. This does not 
necessarily imply they are value-free. Recently philosophers have 
argued that there is no reason why value-laden terms cannot figure in 
our best scientific explanations.26 Fulford’s argument, I suggest, can 
therefore be maintained in light of the fact that biology uses functions in 
its explanations. 
The second argument Fulford provides is that variations in 
functioning do not necessarily lead to the idea of a dysfunction, only to 
the idea of different functionings.27 Even if talk of functions were free of 
values, ‘dysfunction’ implies a value judgement. Fulford points out that 
there is an intelligible difference between ‘merely altered’ and ‘reduced’ 
functioning, just as there is a difference between ‘statistically diverging 
functioning’ and ‘failure in function’. The boundary between normal 
and pathological on a distribution of functional outcomes is not 
                                                             
26 In recent meta-ethical debate some have argued that values figure in our best 
explanatory theories and should therefore be considered as real, mind-
independent properties of things and acts. The main proponent of this view is 
Nicolas Sturgeon. See especially: Nicolas Sturgeon “Moral Explanations,” in Essays 
on Moral Realism, ed. G. Sayre-McCord (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 
1988), 129-255; Nicolas Sturgeon, “Harman on moral explanations of natural facts,” 
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Philosophy 24 (1986): 115-42.   
27 Fulford, “Teleology without tears,” 82. Fulford coins the term ‘diffunction’, as 
opposed to ‘dysfunction’ to express the difference between merely different 
functioning and dysfunction.  
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determinable via mathematical calculations, Fulford insists, but 
depends on the goals that are being served by functions, goals that 
bring in the valuative element. Survival and reproduction, I think 
Fulford is driving at, are the values on which Boorse’s account of health 
and disease ultimately rests; those are the purposes of all organic 
functions and hence the positive values imported into the theory of 
health and illness. And again, Fulford seems to be right about this.  
A theory of health that remains relatively close to Boorse’s bio-
statistical theory but that contains an explicit valuative element is the 
hybrid account developed by Wakefield. While Wakefield retains the 
alleged objective elements of Boorse’s theory, values are incorporated 
into the definitions of health and disorder as well. In doing so, however, 
Wakefield also inserts a subjective element into the definition of health 
and disease, which will prove to be most problematic.  
 
 
3. Wakefield: Harmful Dysfunctions and Teleology  
 
Although Wakefield does not make any explicit claim on the nature of 
health, he appears to concur with Boorse that health consists in an 
absence of disease. But unlike Boorse, Wakefield takes disorder, disease 
and illness to be hybrid concepts: concepts comprising a valuative 
component and a descriptive component. The descriptive component in 
his account of disease, disorder and illness is ‘dysfunction’ and the 
value-laden component is ‘harm’: disorders, diseases, and illnesses are 
defined as harmful dysfunctions. Wakefield focuses his analysis on 
34 
mental disorders, but his claims pertain equally to physical disorders, as 
well as disease and illness more generally. 
The descriptive element of a disorder is a ‘dysfunction’, which, 
like Boorse, Wakefield thinks is “a purely factual scientific concept” and 
free of values.28 But rather than statistical deviance from normal 
functioning, Wakefield thinks dysfunctions must be defined on the basis 
of evolution theory. Dysfunctions are by definition a failure of a 
mechanism to perform a particular function. The particular function an 
organ is meant to perform, Wakefield argues, is “what it is naturally 
supposed to perform,” or, as he writes, “the functions they were 
designed to perform.”29 The function an organ is naturally supposed to 
perform and for which it was ‘designed’, he continues, is the function 
the organ was selected for in the course of evolution. So he thinks a 
dysfunction is a failure of a naturally selected mechanism; that is, a 
mechanism that increased the survival and reproductive success of 
organisms under selective pressures.  
Wakefield claims that evolution theory not only makes it possible 
to determine the ‘natural’ function of an organ—the failure of which 
would render it dysfunctional—he also thinks evolution theory makes 
functional accounts of disorders qualify for causal explanations. Recall 
Fulford’s critique of Boorse that functional explanations of disease are 
not descriptive and value-free explanations because they fall short in 
                                                             
28 Wakefield, “Mental Disorder,” 383. 
29 Ibid. See also Jerome C. Wakefield, “Aristotle as Sociobiologist: the ‘function of a 
human being’ argument, black box essentialism, and the concept of mental 
disorder,” Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 7:1 (2000): 20. 
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being causal explanations.30 Wakefield picks up on Fulford’s challenge 
and argues that evolution theory provides a teleological explanation of 
functions, which he thinks constitutes a genuinely causal explanation. 
Put simply, in teleological explanations a thing’s existence is causally 
explained by its effects.31 In Wakefield’s words, in teleological 
explanations “a description of an effect of a mechanism is cited in 
explaining that kind of mechanism.”32 Evolution theory can help explain 
the existence and persistence of particular mechanisms in organisms on 
the basis of the effects these mechanisms have and how these effects 
proved advantageous under pressures of natural selection. Wakefield 
therefore argues that “an explanation of a mechanism in terms of its 
natural function may be considered a roundabout way of referring to a 
causal explanation in terms of natural selection.”33 The way in which 
teleological explanations of natural functions are causal explanations is 
of course not in the physico-chemical and narrow materialistic sense 
that Fulford demanded for a strictly value-free and causal biology. 
Nevertheless, Wakefield thinks teleological explanations of natural 
functions are causal explanations and that their status as causal 
explanations reinforces the idea that functions and dysfunctions are 
value-free and descriptive notions.  
                                                             
30 Fulford, “Teleology Without Tears,” 79. 
31 For a formal definition of teleology we may turn to Kant: “we find ourselves 
capable of subsuming the idea of the effect under the causality of its cause as the 
underlying condition of the possibility of the former.” Immanuel Kant, Critique of 
the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 5:367. 
32 Wakefield, “Aristotle as Sociobiologist,” 21. 
33 Wakefield, “Mental Disorder,” 383. Emphasis added. 
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In addition to failures of naturally selected mechanisms Wakefield 
thinks a second criterion is required for disorders, as he recognises that 
there can be failures in naturally selected mechanisms without 
amounting to a disorder. Conditions like albinism, reversal of heart 
position, and fused toes are dysfunctions but not harmful and therefore 
not a disorder.34 To be considered a disorder the dysfunction must cause 
harm, which he defines as “a deprivation of benefit to the person as 
judged by the standards of the person’s culture.”35 Wakefield says 
surprisingly little about the harm requirement other than stipulating 
that it is a necessary condition for disorder. But it is unmistakably clear 
that the moment the valuative element explicitly enters his account of 
health, i.e. the moment a dysfunction is harmful, he thinks cultural 
values and standards come into play. Wakefield presupposes that the 
relevant values are social and cultural standards rather than values 
arising out of emotions, subjective experience, personal preference, 
practical rationality, or any other possible source of value. As a result, 
Wakefield accepts that a dysfunction can be a disorder in one society 
and fail to be one in another. And, importantly, this is a substantive 
claim on the nature of disorders itself, rather than an empirical 
observation on how disorders are identified differently across cultures: 
this is what Wakefield claims disorders are. Cultural variation in the 
identification of disorders is therefore legitimate and justified on 
Wakefield’s view. Cultural relativity is incorporated into the nature of 
disorder itself, and by the same token, into the nature of health.  
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Criticisms of Wakefield’s account of disorder generally come in 
three different forms. The first point of criticism is similar to the 
argument that Fulford levelled against Boorse and that I already 
endorsed: dysfunctions imply values. Fulford himself has published a 
detailed linguistic analysis of Wakefield’s use of dysfunction and 
concludes once again that the concept dysfunction has valuative 
meaning.36 More recently, McNally writes—clearly echoing Fulford’s 
concerns—that “to say that a mechanism is dysfunctional is not only to 
specify its state. It also implies that things are not as they ought to be, 
and ought-statements are inescapably normative. […] Statements about 
dysfunction imply departures from a normative standard, and these 
involve values as well as facts.”37 So the objection put forward by 
Fulford, McNally, and others is that ‘dysfunction’, like ‘disorder’ on 
Wakefield’s view, should be considered a hybrid concept.  
A second form or criticism is directed at Wakefield’s claims that an 
organ’s natural function is the function evolution selected it for and that 
only failures of this particular function constitutes a disorder (when 
deemed harmful by society). Various commentators have pointed out 
that many useful features of organs and body parts have arisen as side-
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effects of the functions they were originally selected for in the evolution, 
side-effects that often proved adaptively advantageous only later on. 
Stephen J. Gould and Elisabeth Vrba dubbed these side-effects 
“exaptations.”38 In their influential paper, Gould and Vrba write that 
while adaptations are features selected for their current role, exaptations 
are “features that now bestow fitness but were not built by selection for 
their current role.”39 Gould and Vrba give the example of feathers, 
which originally evolved for insulation and only later enabled the 
evolution of flight.40 Lilienfeld and Marino use this notion of exaptation 
to criticise Wakefield for restricting natural functions of parts and 
organs to the functions they were originally selected for, even though 
they may now serve altogether different functions.41 So their objection is 
that, for instance, feathers are also dysfunctional when they fail in 
fulfilling their function in flight, not just when they fail in their 
thermoregulatory function—even though the latter is the function the 
mechanism was originally selected for and thus their ‘natural’ function 
on Wakefield’s score. Nevertheless, Murphy and Woolfolk point out 
that Wakefield’s account could be saved from this criticism fairly easily, 
viz. by restricting Wakefield’s thesis to “the most recent action of natural 
selection.”42 ‘Natural function’ would then refer to the function that 
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science of form,” Paleobiology 8:2 (1982): 4-15. 
39 Gould and Vrba, “Exaptation,” 4. 
40 Gould and Vrba, “Exaptation,” 7. 
41 Scott O. Lilienfeld and Lori Marino, “Mental disorder as a Roschian concept,” 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology 104:3 (1995): 411-420. 
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most recently proved selectively advantageous and adaptive. Rather 
than the original function organs and body parts were selected for, 
Murphy and Woolfolk argue that Wakefield’s revised theory should 
state that the function organs and body parts currently have in survival 
and reproduction constitutes their natural function. Failure of this 
current role in survival and reproduction would then constitute a 
dysfunction—which, together with the harmfulness requirement, would 
make for a disorder and thus a reduction of health. 
More problematic, however, are functions of parts and organs that 
have no adaptive advantage at all, in the past or the present. In another 
influential paper, Stephen J. Gould and Richard Lewontin compare non-
adaptive functions and traits to the spandrels arising as architectural by-
products when domes are mounted on rounded arches—spaces that 
were subsequently used for artistic purposes.43 Traits and functions that 
are not adaptive but merely creative utilisations of available parts have 
subsequently been called ‘spandrels’: “adventitious by-products of the 
development of other traits, but [that] themselves have never possessed 
any adaptive function.”44 Murphy and Woolfolk criticise Wakefield’s 
thesis by arguing that also failures in spandrels could give rise to 
disorders and pathology.45 Not just failures in natural functions—
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functions that are adaptive or exaptive—but also failures in functions 
that never had any selective advantage at all can constitute a mental or 
physical disorder, they argue. In reply to this objection Wakefield insists 
that “failed spandrels in and of themselves, when they do not imply any 
failure of designed function, do not imply disorder.”46 Wakefield claims 
no single example can be pointed to that would exemplify a mental 
disorder following a failed spandrel. And if there were examples of 
disorders constituted by spandrel failure, he predicts they will 
inevitably be by-products of failures in naturally selected functions. Yet, 
I suggest that if we look at physical organs, like human hands for 
instance, we can observe that Murphy and Woolfolk’s objection holds 
and indeed undermines Wakefield’s thesis. Human hands can fulfil 
many functions: gripping, holding, manipulating, breaking, inspecting, 
touching, supporting, exploring, and so on. First of all, it is not clear 
how to identify which function human hands were selected for, either in 
our distant evolutionary past or under more recent selective pressures. 
But supposing we could identify one or more functions as the ‘natural 
function’ of human hands, e.g. gripping, it is indefensible to claim that 
only when hands fail in their gripping function (and deemed harmful by 
a society) we can speak of a disorder. Our hands also have a great 
number of spandrels, including playing the piano, typing on a 
keyboard, buttoning up shirts, and so on. If a concert pianist were not 
able to play the piano due to phalangeal inflammations, or if a writer 
could no longer type or hold a pen as a result of uncontrollable tremors, 
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as long as their hands could fulfil their ‘natural’ gripping function the 
incapacities would not amount to disorders on Wakefield’s thesis—no 
matter how debilitating they are. Examples like these, I suggest, show 
that Murphy and Woolfolk are correct in their claim that failure in 
spandrels could be genuine disorders and health-reductions. Not just 
failure in adaptive or exaptive functions, but also failure in spandrels 
can constitute a disorder.47  
The third and final line of criticism states that the harmful 
dysfunction analysis underpinned by an evolutionary account of 
functions does not apply straightforwardly to mental functions and 
psychopathology, despite the fact that the approach was developed 
precisely for this end. Murphy and Woolfolk point out that Wakefield 
assumes that “the mind is a collection of discrete, multifarious 
mechanisms that make distinctive contributions to overall functioning”: 
mechanisms that have been favoured by natural selection “for 
generating useful behaviours in response to environmental 
challenges.”48 Murphy and Woolfolk question whether we can identify 
mechanisms in such an atomistic fashion, especially without an 
established evolutionary science of the mind. And even if mental 
mechanisms could be identified, how could we determine their natural 
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function in such a way that when it fails we can speak of a psychological 
dysfunction? Murphy and Woolfolk argue that in Wakefield’s theory 
pathological and non-pathological behaviour are still identified and 
differentiated by common sense, but supplemented with the a-priori 
conviction that evolutionary psychology, once complete, will vindicate 
our distinctions and common-sense judgements and demonstrate that, 
indeed, our judgements were based on failures in neatly isolated and 
purpose-designed mental functions. Murphy and Woolfolk argue that 
Wakefield’s account involves at best an enormous empirical bet, but at 
worst simply presumes an evolutionary vindication of most, if not all, 
value-laden prejudices that inform our understanding of 
psychopathology. And, even worse, as they point out, the problem of 
spandrels also applies to the mental realm: why would only the mental 
functions selected by evolution be candidates for disorders, supposing 
we could indeed isolate and identify them, especially since it is so 
evident that the spandrels of our mental functions have so much value 
for us, thoroughly shape our lives, and in many ways make human 
beings what they are? 
Although these three criticisms dominate the literature on 
Wakefield’s harmful dysfunction account of disorder, they exhibit a 
remarkable lack of concern about the way that Wakefield thinks social 
and cultural standards, and only these standards, determine the ‘harm’ 
factor. Apparently commentators deem it uncontroversial that if some 
culture or society does not recognise a major and deeply incapacitating 
dysfunction as a disorder, it is indeed, as a matter of fact, not a disorder. 
Wakefield’s account implies that dysfunctions should not be recognised 
as disorders if social standards indicate they should not be identified as 
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such. He makes an ontological claim about what a disorder is: 
dysfunctions are not disorders if a culture does not recognise them as 
such, and hence one is not diseased and just healthy if a society does not 
recognise one’s dysfunctions as a disorder. To pick an unfortunately all 
too common example: if a society does not recognise post-traumatic 
stress after sexual assault as a genuine disorder, people suffering from 
mental and physical dysfunctions after such a trauma simply have no 
disorder on Wakefield’s view and should be judged as healthy. 
Commentators are evidently concerned about spurious claims to 
objectivity—more so, in any case, than scrutinising the implications of a 
relativistic account of disorder and health. But a definition of health and 
disorder with cultural relativity built into it is extremely problematic 
and could be criticised with countless paradigmatic counter-examples. 
If a culture regards lung-cancer as a normal cause of death rather than a 
genuine disorder, lung-cancer would be no disorder and individuals 
suffering from it would be healthy. The moment cultural relativity is 
built into the definition of disorder, disease, and health itself, the 
objective point of view is abandoned from which it can be determined 
whether someone is healthy or not, regardless of social and cultural 
standards. Recognising disorders, disease, and health as partly 
informed by social norms, drives Wakefield towards a cultural 
relativism that is, especially in paradigmatic cases of unhealthiness, 
unsustainable. Yet, there are theorists who proceed even further along 
this path and who think that, since dysfunctions also imply norms, 
subjective factors must also play a role in the determination of when an 
organ or functional part is dysfunctional, thereby rendering health and 
illness relative to subjective factors in an even stronger sense. One of 
those theorists is Bill Fulford.  
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4. Fulford: The Two Feet Principle and Ordinary Doing 
 
Fulford argues for an even greater importance of values in the meaning 
of medical concepts: all medical concepts contain a valuative and 
descriptive component, he claims, including the notion of a dysfunction. 
As we could already infer from his critique of Boorse and Wakefield, 
Fulford thinks that values pervade the medical and psychiatric 
vocabularies all the way down, only to stop at the level of brute, 
physical, cause-effect relations—i.e. the level of chemistry and physics. 
Even when we think we describe a certain medical condition or state of 
health without passing value judgements—when diagnosing a heart-
attack or bone fracture for instance—Fulford claims values are still 
involved; they are just ‘hidden’ and ‘implicit’ since everyone would 
simply agree that a cardiac arrest or a broken clavicle means being in a 
bad state.49 Only when values diverge do we become aware of their 
presence, Fulford argues, which he thinks is more likely to occur in 
psychiatric practice than during orthopaedic surgery—hence his 
suggestion that psychiatry can lead the way in exposing the normative 
dimension of medical concepts and practice.50 
Whereas Wakefield posits ‘dysfunction’ as the factual component 
of the hybrid concept ‘disorder’, Fulford asserts that all medical 
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Fulford, Moral Theory and Medical Practice, 54 and 61; K.W.M. Fulford, “Fact/Values: 
Ten Principles of Value Based Medicine,” in The Philosophy of Psychiatry; a 
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concepts contain valuative and descriptive components. But these two 
components cannot always be disentangled and separated in linguistic 
form; value-laden terms cannot always be split up into value terms and 
non-value terms. Fulford follows R.M. Hare in the belief that all value 
terms, also the most generic like ‘good’ and ‘bad’—‘thin’ ethical 
concepts, as Bernard Williams would say—convey factual information 
as well as valuations. Fulford’s idea is that illness, disease, dysfunctions, 
as well as all medical and psychiatric diagnoses express values together 
with facts in a way that can be logically but not always linguistically 
disentangled. Fulford calls this the “two foot principle”: the idea that in 
medicine and psychiatry “all decisions stand on two feet, on values as 
well as on facts, including decisions about diagnosis.”51 
Dysfunction is typically used as the most rudimentary concept in 
medical theory, as we saw in Wakefield and Boorse. If functions and 
dysfunctions are valuative, Fulford thinks all the other concepts based 
on the notion of a dysfunction are equally valuative. Fulford speaks of a 
‘cascade’ of medical concepts, running from dysfunction, to disorder, to 
disease, to illness—in ascending order of how overtly value-laden the 
concepts are. If the dysfunctions are already valuative, the other 
concepts further down the cascade are bound to be valuative as well.   
Although Fulford acknowledges that dysfunctions are causally 
primary in the cascade towards illness, he argues that illness comes 
“logically primary” in the cascade and that “logically” the cascade runs 
the other way, that is, from illness to disease, to disorder, to 
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dysfunction.52 What Fulford means precisely by ‘logical primacy’ is not 
easy to pin down, but what he subsequently calls the ‘reverse view’ 
plays a pivotal role in how he thinks evaluations of health are to be 
conducted. The logical primacy of illness, the most overtly value-laden 
term, over other concepts is often spelled out by Fulford in terms of 
certain epistemic order; we generally know we are ill first and discover 
the underlying diseases and dysfunctions only later.53 But Fulford’s 
claim is stronger: he actually claims that the meaning of disease and 
dysfunctions depends on that of illness; or to be more precise, he claims 
the meaning of disease and dysfunctions is “derived” from the meaning 
of illness.54 The stronger point Fulford makes is that the meaning of the 
concepts dysfunction, disorder, and disease depends on the meaning of 
illness; he claims that the meaning of disease and dysfunction depends 
on a directly accessible experience of something being wrong, i.e. feeling 
ill. Without the experiential element of feeling ill we fail to properly 
understand the meaning of disease or dysfunction, as these concepts 
ultimately derive their meaning from the experience of illness, Fulford 
thinks. So although dysfunctions causally give rise to disease and to 
illness, what it means for a dysfunction to be a dysfunction is for it to be 
something that gives rise to the experience of illness. And what makes a 
dysfunction something bad is for it to give rise to the concrete feeling of 
something going bad, i.e. the feeling of being ill. Fulford’s ‘reverse view’ 
                                                             
52 Fulford, Moral Theory and Medical Practice, 70. 
53 Fulford writes for instance that “knowledge that something is wrong normally 
precedes the question what is wrong, let along questions about possible causes of 
what is wrong.” Ibid.  
54 Ibid. 
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implies that dysfunctions should not be recognised as dysfunctions if 
they never give rise to an experience of illness. He writes that 
dysfunctions and diseases first have to be “marked out as illnesses by the 
value judgement expressed by ‘illness’.”55 And this marking out of the 
relevant conditions occurs at the level of experience: we must become 
aware of it as something bad in our subjective experience first.  
The way Fulford employs the ‘reverse view’, if I understand him 
correctly, is by taking illness as a gateway criterion for all the other 
medical concepts, in meaning as well as in diagnostic practice. Only 
when someone feels ill, or is likely to feel ill in the future, can we ‘mark 
out’ the conditions that causally give rise to illness and consider those 
conditions as diseases or dysfunctions. Rather than detecting 
dysfunctions and diseases independently from the experience of illness, 
Fulford’s guiding thought is that there must be illness first, or at least an 
expectation of illness, before we can even speak of underlying 
dysfunctions and diseases—let alone legitimately diagnose and treat 
them. The logical primacy of illness therefore has important practical 
implications: the subjective point of view and actual experience of 
feeling ill must be given priority in diagnostic and therapeutic practice.56  
Crucial in Fulford’s analysis is therefore the meaning of illness 
itself, as illness is posited as the ‘root concept’ in medicine and what I 
have called the ‘gateway criterion’ for all other medical concepts. 
Fulford argues that illness consists in the experience of a particular kind 
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of failure, viz. the failure of what he calls “ordinary doing.”57 He writes 
that “illness is indeed no less than the experience of failure of ‘ordinary’ 
doing in the absence of obstruction and/or opposition.”58 Fulford 
specifies ordinary doing in terms of “intentional doing” (reflexes and 
tremors do not count); “latent full doing” (one does not feel it as there is 
no obstruction); and as what one “expects” one can do (not being able to 
do something one didn’t expect to be able to do does not make one feel 
ill).59 Fulford thinks that a failure in doing something one would 
“ordinarily just get on and do” constitutes the meaning of illness and 
the bearer of negative value.60 Only if there is an experience of failure in 
ordinary doing—or presumably, when this experience of failure is likely 
to occur in the future—is someone ill and would medical professionals 
be allowed to proceed with the identification of the underlying diseases 
and dysfunctions that are causally responsible. 
Healthiness and what is positively valuable, I think we can safely 
infer from this, consists in the continuation of ordinary doing—or more 
precisely, an experience of such continuation. The latent full performance 
of ordinary acts and ‘just getting on’ implies the absence of illness and 
therefore constitutes the meaning of health, on Fulford’s view. 
From these conceptual claims Fulford derives a number of 
practical implications in his more practice oriented papers. From the 
idea that medical concepts contain a valuative and descriptive content 
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Fulford concludes that evidence-based medicine (EBM) should be 
employed in tandem with value-based medicine (VBM).61 The latter 
consists of a number of principles directed at drawing attention to the 
values involved in diagnosis and treatment, and instructs a 
prioritisation of the subjective values of the person whose health is 
being assessed and influenced. Fulford claims that “values differ widely 
and legitimately, from person to person, for the same person in different 
contexts or at different times, from culture to culture, and at different 
historical periods.”62 He stipulates that diversity of human values is 
irreducible and legitimate, which he takes to imply that we should give 
priority to the “actual values of particular individuals” in diagnosis as 
well as treatment.63  
Fulford’s analyses and practical instructions reveal several 
important assumptions that need to be brought to the surface. The first 
is that he thinks values are rooted in subjective experience. Illness qua 
value term refers to subjective experience of a certain kind, viz. 
experiencing failure of ordinary doing, and insofar as disease and 
dysfunctions are valuative they too derive their meaning from this 
subjective experience. Fulford is therefore a subjectivist about values: 
rather than objective features of things or people it is subjective 
experience, and subjective experience alone, that renders conditions 
good or bad. The second assumption is value relativism. What is 
valuable can differ per person and culture, he claims, and this diversity 
is considered to be legitimate. And the third assumption consists in an 
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unreserved liberalism: people’s personal values are to be given priority 
over all other values—and, we should add, whatever they may be.  
Fulford’s work has not received many direct and targeted 
criticisms as far as I am aware, but a number of problems are worth 
pointing out. The first is a striking inconsistency between, on the one 
hand, his claim that illness consists in failure of ordinary doing and that 
the negative value of medical concepts derives from an experience of 
precisely this failure; and on the other, that individual values must be 
attended to and given priority in diagnostic practice and treatment. This 
creates an ambiguity, as failure of ordinary doing can be established 
objectively and independently from people’s values and preferences. 
The idea that all medical concepts are partly normative does not entail 
that distinctly personal values and preferences are relevant, let alone that 
personal values should enjoy any priority in diagnosis or treatment, 
especially since the source of negative value that Fulford himself 
identifies, failure of ordinary doing seems to be determinable 
independently from any such personal or cultural values. Fulford jumps 
from the recognition that medical concepts are valuative to the 
conclusion that subjective values and preferences are of the utmost 
importance in medical practice, even though his own analysis identifies 
the experience of failure of ordinary doing as the source of negative 
value in medical concepts. This ambiguity makes it difficult to criticise 
Fulford’s position: do the values in medical judgements relate to failures 
in ordinary doing or is it personal and individual values that are 
ultimately decisive? Especially the latter view gives rise to numerous 
counter-examples and has hugely problematic implications, but the 
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ambiguity of Fulford’s position makes it difficult to level them against 
him, as he could retort that the counter-examples do not necessarily 
involve failure in ordinary doings.   
A second point of critique, which will prove very important for 
the theory of health I will develop in Chapter Three, targets Fulford’s 
claim that only failures in ordinary doings constitute illness and function 
as a gateway to other medical concepts. Although an experience of 
failure in ordinary doing may reveal and confront a subject with a 
problem and limitation to her health, this does not imply that 
obstructions and disabilities that do not result in an experience in 
failures of ordinary doing cannot be constitutive of dysfunctions or 
diseases. If one has an exceptionally lazy and generally under-
challenging life-style, one may not feel ill and experience no 
breakdowns in ordinary doing at all, while still suffering from severely 
debilitating diseases or dysfunctions. Denying the reality of diseases 
and dysfunctions because they do not result in an experience of failure 
in ordinary doings, seems too strong to maintain. Moreover, if Fulford 
were right, changing one’s ordinary doings and adapting one’s 
expectations could, by itself, bring about a changeover from illness to 
health. A tennis player with a chronic knee injury who decides to expel 
playing tennis from his ordinary doings and expectations will no longer 
experience any failure in ordinary doing, hence no longer be ill, and 
hence no longer have a dysfunctional knee! The experience of a failure 
in ordinary doing is therefore simply too constrictive to mark out 
genuine health-reductions. 
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A third criticism relates to Fulford’s vision of evidence-based 
medicine (EBM) next to value-based medicine (VBM). If all medical 
concepts are already partly valuative, and especially if these values 
depend on personal preferences and values, what remains of EBM? 
Which facts are still available and relevant in judgements on health, in 
diagnosis as well as treatment? All mental and physical disorders and 
function statements are value-laden on Fulford’s analysis, which makes 
them relative to subjective values and preferences—if, indeed, values 
are personal and legitimately diverse rather than derived from failure in 
ordinary doing. Stating that the fact/value distinction converts into an 
EBM/VBM distinction oversimplifies his own analysis considerably and 
neglects the fact that all diagnostic categories in EBM already contain 
valuative dimensions. It is therefore insufficient to suggest EBM and 
VBM can be positioned side by side as two complementary and co-
productive methods of diagnosis and treatment. Fulford’s recognition 
that all medical concepts are value-laden combined with the assumption 
that all values are ultimately subjective and legitimately diverse, 
effectively undermines EBM in ways that he does not seem willing to 
recognise and acknowledge. His vision of an unaffected and fully 
objective EBM balanced out in practice by the maxims of VBM appears 
therefore most problematic and implausible.  
A fourth criticism is directed at Fulford’s claim about the logical 
primacy of illness and the derivative nature of dysfunctions and 
disease. If his claim is simply that we typically know we are ill before 
we know what causes it, this merely expresses a temporal order of 
knowing that is completely irrelevant to the meaning of the respective 
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concepts. Knowing that a shop is closed only after I check whether it is 
closed does not make my checking logically primary to the shop’s being 
closed, nor does my checking have any bearing on what it means for a 
shop to be closed. The stronger claim that Fulford makes is that illness 
restricts the extension of the other concepts so that dysfunctions aren’t 
dysfunctions unless they result in an experience of illness at some 
moment in time. Problems with this stronger claim are, first, that 
dysfunctions and diseases are then limited to creatures that can indeed 
have the relevant subjective experiences (organisms without a nervous 
system could not be dysfunctional or diseased, if Fulford’s is right), and 
second, dysfunctions that do not lead to the experience of illness would 
not be dysfunctions, also within the human domain. There are, 
however, plenty of diseases and dysfunctions that do not cause an 
experience of illness, most obviously dysfunctions and diseases that are 
instantly fatal. Dysfunctions immediately resulting in death do not 
result in an experience of illness but surely should be regarded as 
dysfunctions—even as the worst of their kind. The reliance on a 
subjective experience of a certain kind makes Fulford’s account prone to 
counter-examples of dysfunctions and diseases that clearly are 
dysfunctions and diseases without ever giving rise to the experience of 
failure in ordinary doing.  
The latter three points of criticism can perhaps best be illustrated 
with an example. Consider a person who meets all criteria for 
schizophrenia, including relatively ‘hard’ associated phenomena like a 
demonstrable loss of grey matter in the temporal and frontal lobes. 
Consider further that this person has not experienced any significant 
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failures in ordinary doing due to rich social support and the fact that he 
has an undemanding daily occupation. On Fulford’s view this person 
does not meet the conditions for illness, and because illness is logically 
primary the person cannot be said to have schizophrenia. Nevertheless, 
if all objective criteria for schizophrenia are present, medically sound 
judgement should probably yield the diagnosis of a well-functioning 
schizophrenic, or, perhaps, a schizophrenic who happens to enjoy great 
social support. Denying the reality of schizophrenia seems to disregard 
the significance of the objective factors and the limitations in 
functioning that actually obtain, even though they are not exposed and 
experienced as breakdowns of ordinary doing. Restricting dysfunctions 
and diseases to conditions in which a failure of ordinary doing is 
experienced seems too strong a claim to maintain and shows how EBM 
is effectively subordinated and undercut by Fulford’s values-first 
approach. The idea that values must come first causes an inherent 
instability in Fulford’s account, it seems to me, since facts and objective 
determinations of someone’s condition are subordinated to subjective 
values and experience. As long as someone does not experience a failure 
of ordinary doing there is no illness: the ‘value foot’, then, presses too 
heavily on the ‘fact foot’, effectively disabling the ‘fact foot’ to come off 
the ground in cases where it quite clearly should.  
To recap, in Fulford’s hybrid theory of medical concepts values 
take on a more prominent role than in Wakefield’s account. And in this 
acknowledgement of a greater role of normativity we witness that 
medical concepts become more subjectified. Not only are medical 
conditions ‘marked out’ by subjective experience, the plurality of values 
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also makes the application of medical concepts dependent on subjective 
experience of failure in ordinary doing, or, indeed, relative to subjective 
values and preferences more generally. At the same, time Fulford tries 
to retain a factual element: facts involved in the meaning of medical 
concepts and EBM in the practice of medicine and psychiatry. What the 
relevant facts are and how EBM can be preserved in light of the 
subjectification and relativisation of medical concepts remains 
mysterious. Insofar as Fulford’s more valuative theory of health and 
illness indeed purports to be a hybrid theory, it proves to be an unstable 
hybrid, practically as well as conceptually, as the valuative dimension 
overrides and suppresses the factual dimension, giving it the character 
of an ‘all normative’ view.  
One way to resolve the instability of Fulford’s two feet principle is 
by taking one foot away and defining health and illness indeed wholly 
in valuative terms. Instead of seeing facts and values as two necessary 
conditions jointly sufficient for health and illness and all the other 
medical concepts, the idea would be to define health just as meeting 
certain norms and illness just as a departure from these norms. 
Assigning an even greater importance to normativity in the definition of 
health and illness, however, especially in combination with the 
presupposition that values are essentially subjective, will inevitably 
draw health and illness further into the sphere of subjectivity. This 
double move—health and illness becoming wholly valuative as well as 
entirely subjective—can be witnessed most clearly in the work of 
Georges Canguilhem. 
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5. Canguilhem: Normality and Organic Silence 
 
Even though Canguilhem’s work does not follow chronologically from 
the theories in philosophy of medicine and psychiatry discussed so far, 
there is an important sense in which it makes for the next logical step 
given the shortcomings and instability of the hybrid accounts we have 
looked at.64 Canguilhem develops an account of health and pathology in 
opposition to the account advanced by the French 19th century 
physiologist and historian Claude Bernard. In Canguilhem’s words, 
Bernard thought that “disease is the exaggerated or diminished 
expression of normal functioning.”65 The account of health Canguilhem 
criticises is therefore similar in form to Boorse’s bio-statistical theory, 
though preceding it by almost a century. Prefiguring Fulford’s work, 
Canguilhem questions whether “the concept of disease [is] a concept of 
an objective reality accessible to quantitative scientific knowledge?”66 
Like Fulford, Canguilhem’s answer is negative, precisely because 
quantitative scientific analysis omits the normativity he deems essential 
to health and pathology. He claims that health “is a normative concept 
defining an ideal type of organic structure and behaviour; in this sense 
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it is a pleonasm to speak of good health because health is organic well-
being.”67 Canguilhem claims that health and illness are entirely 
normative concepts: any scientific facts are merely derivative from what 
is essentially a good or bad state of organic being. 
We have to be more precise here though, as it is one thing to claim 
that health is a normative concept but quite another to claim that it 
cannot be reduced to non-normative facts about an organism. Boorse 
also thinks that health is something good and desirable, but that health 
can be reduced to statistical normality of functional outcomes. 
Canguilhem denies this possibility and thinks health and illness cannot 
be reduced to naturalistic items: health and illness are irreducibly 
normative. He writes: 
 
A simple summary of quantities, without biological value, a 
simple fact or system of physical and chemical facts [...] cannot 
be called health or normal or physiological. Normal and 
pathological have no meaning on a scale where the biological 
object is reduced to colloidal equilibria and ionized 
solutions.68 
 
The irreducibility of the normativity of health and illness comes out 
clearest in the way Canguilhem thinks about normality. He claims it is 
not just inadequate to distinguish health from pathology on the basis of 
what is statistically normal, but that statistical normality is itself 
normative. He states that “to define the abnormal as too much or too 
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little is to recognise the normative character of the so-called normal 
state.”69 In other words, the normal is normative in the sense that it 
expresses particular organic norms. We could say, therefore, that 
Canguilhem inverts Boorse and Bernard’s account of the relationship 
between health and normality: “the norm is not deduced from, but 
rather expressed in the average.”70 Instead of reducing normativity to 
normality, normality and statistical averages are viewed as an 
expression of an irreducible normativity. Canguilhem’s claim is 
therefore identical to the argument I levelled against Boorse: the normal 
functions as the norm, i.e. the normal is itself normative. 
This is not the only inversion we can find in Canguilhem’s work. 
He argues that health is not characterised by normality at all but by an 
ability to diverge from normality, averages, and constants. “What 
characterizes health,” he writes, “is the possibility of transcending the 
norm, which defines the momentary normal, the possibility of tolerating 
infractions of the habitual norm and instituting new norms in new 
situations.”71 Canguilhem’s conception of health is therefore one that is 
characterised by flexibility, malleability, adaptability, and the power to 
recover from illness. He calls this “the margin of tolerance” and levels of 
“biological luxury” that belong to an organism.72 “Healthy life,” he 
writes in a later essay, “is a life of flexion, suppleness, almost softness.”73 
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Pathology, on the other hand, is the kind of process that decreases the 
‘margins of tolerance’ and levels of ‘biological luxury’—or as we might 
call it now, the degree of ‘plasticity’—and makes an organism 
dependent on normal functioning in a stable and familiar environment. 
As one commentator notes: “only when the organism can no longer 
react creatively to new elements of its surroundings, when it loses its 
potential to set new norms, does it falter. At that point it loses its order 
and turns into chaos—which, for the organism, implies death.”74  
This characterisation of health and pathology could still be 
considered objective and descriptive: there are facts about whether an 
organism can cope from environmental infractions and changes, and 
more generally, whether it can function in an abnormal way without 
losing its internal integration and coherence. If health consists in ‘the 
margins of tolerance’, Canguilhem too would have reduced health to a 
set of natural facts. This is clearly not the case however, as what renders 
the margins of tolerance characteristic of health, and what ultimately 
grounds the distinction between health and pathology on Canguilhem’s 
view, are qualitative experiences of a certain kind. Canguilhem asserts that 
“the life of the living being, were it that of an amoeba, recognizes the 
categories of health and disease only on the level of experience, which is 
primarily a test in the affective sense of the word, and not on the level of 
science.”75 So rather than the margins of tolerance and ability to diverge 
from normality, it is on the level of qualitative experience that health is 
to be differentiated from illness. When Canguilhem writes that 
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“pathology implies pathos, the direct and concrete feeling of suffering 
and impotence, the feeling of life gone wrong,” what he means is that 
pathology is essentially a matter of the concrete feeling of suffering and 
impotence: this feeling is the necessary and sufficient condition of 
pathology.76 He writes unequivocally that “the origin of pathology must 
be sought in the experience men have in their relations with the whole of 
their environment.”77 And similarly, that “it is particularly the sick 
man’s point of view which forms the basis of truth.”78 
If pathology is essentially a feeling of suffering and impotence in 
relation to a certain environment, then health is bound to consist in a 
qualitatively different kind of experience and to be distinguished from 
pathology precisely in terms of such experiences. To characterise this 
different kind of experience Canguilhem turns to a saying of the French 
surgeon René Leriche, who defines health as “life lived in the silence of 
the organs.”79 Canguilhem adopts this definition as the most basic 
definition of health. Health is thus reduced to a qualitative experience of 
a certain kind, an experience of “organic silence,” which he defines as “a 
state of unawareness where the subject and his body are one.”80 Health 
is defined as an experience of not being opposed and impeded in one’s 
activities; a state where one is not aware of one’s body as material object 
but where the body functions silently, without resistance; a state where 
one’s body directly answers to one’s wants and intentions. 
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Canguilhem’s account of health therefore shows strong similarities with 
Fulford’s view that health consists in ‘latent full ordinary doing’. But 
given that Canguilhem’s theory is ‘all normative’, this is what the 
concept health can be reduced to: there is nothing more to health, or 
over and above it, than an experience of organic silence. Fulford, by 
contrast, insists on defending a hybrid view according to which health 
and illness are reduced to the experience of latent full ordinary doing in 
addition to certain physical facts about one’s being.  
In any case, ‘the margins of tolerance’ and ‘levels of biological 
luxury’ are ultimately indicative of health because they generate the 
kind of experience that Canguilhem identifies as the essence of health. 
Canguilhem writes that “man does not feel in good health—which is the 
definition of health—except when feeling not only normal—adapted to 
one's milieu and its demands—but normative, capable, that is, of 
pursuing new norms of life.”81 So the ability to diverge from the normal, 
to cope with environmental infractions, and to institute new norms in 
new environments is indicative of health, ultimately, because they give 
rise to a particular kind of positive subjective experience. In short, 
plasticity and adaptability are characteristic of health because they 
enhance the experience of organic silence and the feeling of being more 
than normal.  
The moment health and pathology are taken as wholly normative, 
then, we can witness that these concepts are drawn completely into the 
sphere of subjectivity. The reason why Canguilhem considers it 
impossible to define health in terms of physical and chemical facts, like 
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Fulford, is because it neglects the experiential dimension that makes 
health something good and illness something bad. Canguilhem’s thesis 
that the goodness of health and badness of pathology require subjective 
experience as their ground reveals that he thinks goodness and badness 
have their source in subjective experience. Rather than tying health to 
social standards, as Wakefield does, Canguilhem agrees with Fulford 
that the goodness of health and badness of illness rely on a subjective 
experience of a specific kind: frustration, irritation, suffering, impotence 
in the case of illness; and organic silence and unity between mind and 
body in the case of health.82 
There is relatively little critical literature on Canguilhem’s account 
of health. Commentators mainly celebrate Canguilhem’s work for its 
anti-reductionist account of health, his emphasis that health and 
pathology are grounded in the experiential dimension of lived reality 
rather than in objective science, and his argument that a capacity to be 
abnormal characterises health more than its opposite. Nevertheless, it is 
obvious where its weakness lies, since we already found the same 
weakness in Fulford’s account. The weakness of Canguilhem’s account 
is that numerous conditions can be pathological without giving rise to 
an experience of irritation, frustration, and suffering—just as one can 
experience complete organic silence while actually subsisting in a 
deeply pathological condition. In Chapter Four (§1.3) I shall provide a 
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more comprehensive critique of the idea that pathology can be defined 
in terms of an experience of pain and suffering and that health consists 
in an absence of pain and suffering. In short, and just by way of 
anticipation, the main problem is that pathological conditions like 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, cancers, and even a fatal heart 
attack do not necessarily involve an experience of suffering, irritation, 
resistance, and feelings of mind-body discord. With the help of 
pharmaceuticals one could even eradicate all subjective experience of 
suffering and impose a lasting experience of organic silence, without, 
however, thereby making someone healthy. And conversely, one can 
suffer for a great number of reasons while actually being relatively 
healthy. Once health and illness are defined wholly in subjective terms, 
the objective point of view from which people can be judged healthy 
and unhealthy regardless of their subjective experience has been closed 
off. Although Canguilhem may be right that a state of health is 
generally accompanied by a silence of the organs and that pathology 
usually involves an experience of suffering and frustration. But making 
these experiences their defining features is inadequate in light of clear-
cut pathological conditions that do not give rise to the relevant feelings 
and all instances of good health in which there are experiences of 
suffering or frustration present.83  
One further step can be made on the continuum from purely 
objective to purely subjective accounts of health. Although Canguilhem 
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reduces health to the having certain types of subjective experience, he 
thinks the relevant subjective experiences can still be generally 
characterised: being healthy means for every human being to have the 
same kind of qualitative subjective experience. From this idea, however, 
it is a relatively small step to assert that health and illness are merely 
subjective notions and undefinable in any form of generality. Health 
and illness would then be entirely relative to whatever a subject or 
culture deems healthy and unhealthy. This latter claim we find 
defended by Nietzsche. Although Nietzsche’s work falls well outside 
the contemporary debates in the philosophy of medicine and 
psychiatry, there is an important sense in which several of his 
aphorisms, when grouped together, amount to a position that completes 
the progression from purely objective to purely subjective accounts of 
health. In a few aphorisms Nietzsche shows the most extreme 
consequences of recognising health and illness as normative concepts 
while supposing that normativity is rooted in subjective experience and 
individual preference; viz. complete scepticism about the very 
possibility of defining health and illness.  
 
 
6. Nietzsche: Scepticism and Individualism  
 
Tuning to Nietzsche’s thoughts on the nature of health and illness 
immediately presents a hermeneutical dilemma. Nietzsche‘s published 
works and notebooks contain a great number of claims on what he 
deems beneficial and detrimental to human health, many of which I will 
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return to and explore further in the course of this thesis. These claims 
suggest that Nietzsche operates with a concept of health that is at least 
somewhat unified and stable across individuals and cultures. 
Nevertheless, in the passages where he explicitly discusses the nature of 
health he claims the notion is undefinable, relative to individuals, and 
irreducibly pluralistic. That is, in those passages Nietzsche provides a 
critique of the very idea of ‘health’: a good purported to be similar for 
everyone and that can be characterised in general terms.84   
Here I shall not attempt to harmonise both aspects of his thinking 
into a larger systematic whole. But in order to do justice to both aspects 
of his thinking about health I shall distinguish between, what I will call, 
Nietzsche’s ‘official view’ and his positive assertions about health more 
generally. The ‘official view’ is the critical view we find in the passages 
where he explicitly discusses the nature of health and denies it can be 
defined in any way, i.e. the sceptical view.85 In the published works it 
can be found most clearly in a passage from The Gay Science: 
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There is no health as such, and all attempts to define a thing 
that way have been wretched failures. Even the determination 
of what is healthy for your body depends on your goal, your 
horizon, your energies, your impulses, your errors, and above 
all on the ideals and phantasms of your soul. Thus there are 
innumerable healths of the body; and the more we allow the 
unique and incomparable to raise its head again, and the more 
we abjure the dogma of the ‘equality of men’, the more must 
the concept of normal health, along with a normal diet and the 
normal course of an illness, be abandoned by medical men. 
Only then would the time have come to reflect on the health 
and illness of the soul, and to find the peculiar virtue of each 
man in the health of his soul. In one person, of course, this 
health could look like its opposite in another person.86  
 
This passage reveals why Nietzsche takes a sceptical view towards 
health and why he considers all attempts to define it as ‘wretched 
failures’: people are not sufficiently equal and similar in the relevant 
respects. People have different goals, horizons, ideal, and thoughts 
about what is valuable. Since health is a kind of ideal, Nietzsche 
presumes it must be relative to the vicissitudes of individual goals, 
horizons, energies, and values. Nietzsche sees health not as an ideal 
over and above individual values and goals, or as a good independent 
of such values and goals, but as a good that is instrumental to the 
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realisation of one’s own goals and ideals. The last sentences of the 
quoted passages suggest Nietzsche thinks that health consists in finding 
and realising one’s unique virtues—which, given the presumed variety 
and inequality of people, will result in quite different forms and ways of 
being healthy. Defining health as the same state for everyone should 
therefore be resisted; individual values, goals, and virtues determine 
what health is for each individual and what it is not.  
Nevertheless, at a higher level of abstraction, the concerns 
Nietzsche expresses could quite easily be overcome. If health were 
defined as an ability to realise one’s goals, for instance, or an ability to 
optimise one’s energies and impulses, or to find and cultivate one’s 
unique virtue, people could be radically different and live entirely 
differently lives while, in fact, being healthy in terms of the same notion 
of health. What is healthy would differ per person, but that would not 
challenge the more abstract claim that being healthy means precisely the 
same thing for everyone. In order to maintain that health itself cannot 
be defined and that all attempts to do so are wretched failures, 
Nietzsche would therefore need a stronger argument. In his notebooks 
of the same period we find Nietzsche arguing the same point:  
 
Health cannot be defined as something fixed [fest]. An ideal of 
the state in which everyone can do best what he likes to do 
most: but a wild person, or salon hero [Salonheld] or 
intellectual will wish entirely different states!87  
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in 15 Bänden, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1988), 
§9.8 [62]. My translation.  
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In this passage Nietzsche affirms health both as an ideal and again as a 
state that cannot be defined due to differences between individual 
types. But he also suggests a simple definition of health that would 
transcend individual diversity and capture health in a unitary form: a 
state in which people can do what they would like to do. Although this 
definition is obviously over-simplistic and inadequate as an account of 
health, it would incorporate individual diversity and apply equally to 
everyone, including the different types that he lists. Despite this, in a 
note from a few months later Nietzsche writes: 
  
 It is only sensible to speak of ‘health’ and ‘illness’ with an eye 
to an ideal that has to be reached. But the ideal is always 
something most changing, even in the individual (compare 
that of a child to that of a man!)—and the knowledge 
necessary to reach it is almost entirely absent.88  
 
This passage contains a better reason for Nietzsche’s scepticism. Not 
only is health a normative ideal and therefore, on his view, relative to 
individual goals, desires, and ideals—the very goals, desires, and ideals 
are changeable, also within the lifetime of one and the same individual. If 
we cannot know what people’s goals and ideals are—not even our 
own—we also cannot know whether we are healthy or not. Although 
health could still abstractly be defined as, say, having the ability to 
identify and pursue one’s goals, values, and peculiar virtue—we cannot 
know whether we are healthy or not and so scepticism would ensue.  
                                                             
88 Nietzsche, KSA, §9.11 [112]. My translation.  
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The subjectivist view taken to its logical extreme, therefore leads to 
the nihilistic view: the idea that there is no such thing as health, just a 
plurality of conditions that are called ‘health’ that have very little, if 
anything, in common. When recognising the normativity of health and 
illness, Fulford and Canguilhem argue health and illness must be rooted 
in subjective experience, but qua experience they think both concepts 
can be characterised in universal form. When Nietzsche recognises 
health and illness as normative notions, he thinks their meaning 
becomes subjective not just in an experiential sense; health itself is seen 
as relative to individual desires, goals, and values. As desires, goals, and 
values diverge widely between people, and because we often cannot 
know our own goals and values, we end up with a general scepticism 
concerning the nature of health. The only remaining possibility would 
be to follow in Nietzsche’s footsteps and criticise the very idea of a 
unitary notion of health and to reproach anyone who attempts to define 
it that way. 
With Nietzsche’s scepticism we have completed the logical 
progression from purely objective to purely subjective accounts of 
health and brought out the most extreme consequences of affirming 
health and illness as normative concepts. I shall not engage in a critique 
of Nietzsche’s view here, as the next chapters are, in a sense, nothing 
other than an attempt to overcome the sceptical impasse that Nietzsche 
manoeuvred into. 
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7. Desiderata: Two Main Challenges 
 
The increasing importance assigned to subjective factors in the 
definitions of health directly results from the recognition that health and 
illness are normative concepts and the widespread assumption that all 
normativity is rooted in subjectivity: according to Wakefield values 
depend on social and cultural standards; Fulford claims values depend 
either on experiences of latent full ordinary doing and/or on whatever 
people personally deem valuable; Canguilhem argues that values 
depend on absence or presence of suffering; and Nietzsche claims that 
values depend on people’s own goals, ideals, and unique virtues—at 
least in the passages I considered. 
The assumption that there is no truth about values outside of what 
subjects experience as valuable is probably as old as philosophy itself 
and, as we could see, deeply influences philosophical debates on the 
nature of health. Boorse makes the painstaking effort to construct a 
strictly value-free theory of health and illness precisely because of the 
fear that if he were to accept that health and illness are normative 
concepts he would have to allow culture- and subject-relative elements 
into his definitions and thus give up on the objectivity of disease 
categories and health-evaluations more generally. 
The assumption that all values are rooted in subjective feelings, 
personal preferences, or cultural standards can also itself be called into 
question, however, and as I will try to demonstrate, should be called into 
question when reflecting on the nature of health. If—and this is just 
hypothetical, for now—there are values and norms that do not depend 
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on subjective feelings, or preferences, or desires, i.e. if there were mind-
independent norms and values, the possibility arises to recognise the 
normativity of health without having to define health in terms of, or as 
essentially dependent upon, or as relative to, those subjective factors. 
That is, if the norms inherent to health and illness do not depend on 
subjective feelings, individual values, cultural standards, and so on, 
then health would not have to be defined in those terms and the 
problematic counter-examples to the definitions given above could be 
avoided—while, at the same time, endorsing the normativity of health 
and illness, about which the subjectivists appear absolutely right.  
If the norms inherent to health and illness are indeed objective, 
this would break down the whole debate presented above. Fulford’s 
critique of Boorse’s bio-statistical theory would not amount a critique at 
all: exposing the normative aspects of definitions of health and illness 
would not have any bearing on their correctness, objectivity, or 
universal applicability. It would allow for a conception of health that is 
normative but that avoids the problematic consequences of cultural and 
subjective relativism that I pointed out in the context of Wakefield’s and 
Fulford’s definitions: whether people are healthy or ill would not 
depend on cultural standards, experience of failure in ordinary doings, 
or personal preferences, but instead, be an objective normative fact 
about their condition. Given the clear benefits of such a theory, the most 
important desideratum of the debate described above is unmistakable: 
we need a theory of health that does justice to the normativity of health 
and health-related concepts as well as to their objectivity; i.e. we need a 
theory of health that is at once objective and normative.  
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Now, the idea of objective normative facts is of course deeply 
controversial and the possibility of such facts is intensely debated in 
contemporary meta-ethics. It is within the context of these meta-ethical 
debates, and therefore at a higher level of abstraction, that I think we 
must assess whether there is indeed a coherent and plausible way of 
thinking that certain norms and values are objective. Many 
philosophers, including Nietzsche, argue this to be fanciful. Values and 
norms, they insist, are nothing other than subjective responses to an 
objective and value-free world. If value-subjectivism is indeed the only 
viable meta-ethical option, then the hypothetical option I just sketched 
would be unavailable; a definition of health would have to include a 
reference to subjective experiences, feelings, preferences, goals, and so 
on, if it aims to affirm its normative dimension. If value-subjectivism is 
false, however, and a coherent and plausible account can be given of 
objective values and norms—at least for the values and norms relevant 
to health—the possibility arises for a normative theory of health that is 
simultaneously objective. That is, it would open the possibility for 
making a claim on what is a good state for organisms to be in (health) 
without this being dependent on, or being relative to, subjective or 
cultural factors. Correct evaluations of health would then, indeed, 
amount to normative facts about living beings. The first major 
challenge, then, which I will address in the next chapter, is the meta-
ethical question—or rather, the ‘meta-normative’ question (it is the 
status of norms that is examined, not that of ethics)—whether normative 
statements can be objectively true, and if so, on what grounds. 
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Questioning whether the normativity inherent to health and 
illness is objective, and if so how, does not yield an answer to the 
question what health is and how it can best be defined. If the norms 
relevant to health are objective, this would only enable the formulation 
of an objective and normative account of health; that is, it would only 
provide the conditions of possibility for such a theory. The central 
question what health actually is, i.e. what health consists in and what its 
essential features are, must still be answered. This will make for the 
second fundamental challenge, which I will address in Chapters Three 
to Five. In the course of formulating and defending an alternative 
theory of health, I shall refer back to the accounts of health discussed 
above, steer away from the criticisms that were levelled against them by 
the various commentators as well as by myself, and in general, make an 
attempt to improve on each.  
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Life and Normative Realism 
 
1. The Sceptical Challenge 
 
The previous chapter showed how the assumption that values and 
norms are essentially subjective obstructs the formation of an adequate 
account of health. Given that health and illness clearly contain a 
normative component, linking norms with subjectivity inevitably 
renders health itself relative to subjective factors. When the subjectivist 
view of health is followed to its logical extreme, we end up with the 
sceptical view that there is no such thing as health and the conclusion 
that the concept of health cannot be defined or further specified. In 
order to avoid the sceptical view and untenable implications of 
subjective accounts of health more generally, and so to create the 
possibility for a better account of health, this chapter will call the 
assumption into question that all values are essentially subjective.  
The assumption reaches far outside the contours of philosophy of 
health, however, and has been defended by philosophers in all 
traditions and ages. Even though the reasons for thinking that values 
are not objective vary widely, it seems to me there is one particular 
thought that underlies most permutations of value subjectivism, viz. the 
idea that values are not part of the objective world, the world as it is 
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‘out there’, independent of human responses to it. This idea, proclaimed 
already by David Hume and Thomas Hobbes, has most clearly been 
formulated and defended by John Mackie and equally figures in a large 
number of Nietzsche’s aphorisms. I will turn to Mackie and Nietzsche 
first in an effort to formulate the sceptical challenge more clearly and 
rigorously. In the second part of this chapter I will turn to the work of 
several normative realists and with their help propose a way of thinking 
that overcomes value subjectivism—which, if coherent and plausible, 
would create the condition of possibility for an objective yet normative 
theory of health.  
 
1.1 Mackie’s Error Theory 
Despite the large variety of reasons why philosophers think norms and 
values are subjective it seems to me there is one underlying idea that 
unites them all. And that idea is formulated most explicitly and 
succinctly by John Mackie: values, he famously writes, are not “part of 
the fabric of the world.”1 Mackie’s claim is ultimately rather simple: 
when we seek to support normative claims, the world lets us down as 
there are no objects or properties in the world that could back up and 
validate our normative assertions. 
Denying objectivity to values in this manner relies on a realist 
conception of objectivity: the view that only things existing 
ontologically independent from us and our ways of knowing them are 
objective; or alternatively, as Mackie puts it, only objects and properties 
that exist “prior to and logically independent of” our means to 
                                                             
1 John Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (London: Penguin Books, 1990), 22. 
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acquiring knowledge about them are objective.2 Because Mackie thinks 
value judgements categorically fail to meet the realist criterion, he 
concludes that values are merely subjective responses to reality instead 
of properties woven into the fabric of reality itself. 
Mackie offers two arguments for his claim that values do not meet 
the realist criterion for objectivity. The first is that of queerness: if value-
properties were to exist in the world they would be odd or queer 
properties, unlike everything else we take to be existing.3 It would be 
strange to think that next to an object’s mass, size and shape, it has 
value properties or aesthetic qualities. The second argument is the 
argument of relativity (or variety): the fact that people in different times 
and cultures recognise different values is evidence for the claim that 
values do not exist in the world ‘out there’ and cannot be discovered as 
such.4 Realism therefore also implies universality on Mackie’s view; 
things are only real if they obtain cross-culturally and trans-historically. 
Failing the realist criterion, Mackie thinks we could understand value 
judgements better as expressions of an ‘attitude’ or ‘subjective response’ 
to what is itself a natural thing or event.5 Values, he concludes, are 
projections of human attitudes and sentiments on a mind-independent 
world—or, referring back to use Hume’s often-quoted phrase, values 
result from the propensity of the human mind “to spread itself on 
external objects.”6 
                                                             
2 Mackie, Ethics, 30. 
3 Mackie, Ethics, 38-42. 
4 Mackie, Ethics, 36-38. 
5 Mackie, Ethics, 41.  
8 Quoted in Mackie, Ethics, 42. 
77 
Mackie concludes that we commit a fundamental error each time 
we make a normative claim or judge something as valuable, viz. the 
metaphysical error of referring to properties that do not exist. The 
comparison with secondary qualities is easily made here. Every time we 
say that something is red or blue we make a mistake in some 
fundamental sense, as the thing referred to, on the traditional view of 
secondary qualities at least, is in itself, without mediation of 
subjectivity, not red or blue. The same would be true for values of all 
possible kinds on Mackie’s score: actions may seem right or wrong, 
states of affairs may seem good or bad, but in objective reality actions 
and states of affairs are neither. Independent of our perceptions and 
attitudes they are just what they are: some value-free, factual state of 
affairs onto which we project our valuative attitudes and sentiments. 
Mackie’s view has become well-known as the ‘error theory’: every time 
we make a value claim we commit an error, an error that renders value 
judgements categorically false.  
 
1.2 Nietzsche’s Error Theory 
Although Nietzsche’s meta-normative commitments are a topic of 
intense debate in recent scholarship, there are good reasons for thinking 
that Nietzsche endorses an error-theory similar to Mackie’s.7 In Human, 
All Too Human Nietzsche writes for instance:  
                                                             
7 Hussein makes a good case for attributing and error theory to Nietzsche. See: 
Nadeem J. Z. Hussein, “Nietzsche and Non-cognitivism,” in Nietzsche, Naturalism, 
and Normativity, ed. Christopher Janaway and Simon Robertson (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 111-132; and Nadeem J. Z. Hussein, “Honest Illusion: 
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Because we have for millennia made moral, aesthetic, 
religious demands on the world, looked upon it with blind 
desire, passion or fear, and abandoned ourselves to the habits 
of bad logical thinking, this world has become so marvellously 
variegated, frightful, meaningful, soulful, it has acquired 
colour—but we have been the colourist: it is the human 
intellect that has made appearance appear and transported its 
erroneous basic conceptions into things.8  
 
In this passage Nietzsche also makes a comparison between values and 
secondary qualities, claiming that ‘the human intellect’ imports values 
into things, in such a way that our value judgements are fundamentally 
and categorically erroneous. In the same text Nietzsche writes that 
when we call things good and bad we are “committing the same error 
as that by which language designates the stone itself as hard, [and] the 
tree itself as green”—again making the comparison with secondary 
qualities and stating that we are in error each time our speech suggests 
anything to be really good or bad.9 
The idea that values are human attitudes projected onto a value-
free world and categorically erroneous insofar as they purport to 
describe this world, surfaces throughout Nietzsche’s oeuvre.10 Although 
                                                                                                                                                           
Valuing for Nietzsche’s Free Spirits,” in Nietzsche and Morality, ed. Brian Leiter and 
Neil Sinhababu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 157-191. 
8 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits, trans. R. J. 
Hollingdale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), §16. 
9 Nietzsche, Human all too Human, §39. 
10 Other instances where Nietzsche clearly commits to error-theory claims are 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin 
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most of Nietzsche’s error-theoretic claims pertain specifically to moral 
judgements, i.e. claims on how human beings ought to act, rather than 
value judgements more generally, in The Gay Science we get a clear 
indication that Nietzsche considers all values to be human projections: 
 
Whatever has value in our world now does not have value in 
itself, according to its nature―nature is always value-less, but 
has been given value at some time, as a present―and it was we 
who gave and bestowed it. Only we have created the world 
that concerns man!11 
 
Given Nietzsche’s conviction that values are mental states bestowed 
onto a value-free world, it is not surprising that he thinks that health, 
qua value concept, depends on whatever individuals experience 
valuable or indeed choose to find valuable. Since health judgements are 
valuative judgements, they involve projections of subjective attitudes 
and must be considered erroneous when taken as anything other than 
projected subjective attitudes; hence Nietzsche’s claim that all attempts 
to describe health as such are wretched failures.   
  
                                                                                                                                                           
Books, 1968) §7.1; Nietzsche, Daybreak, §308; Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §108; 
and a note from 1888, published in Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, ed. 
Walter Kaufmann, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: 
Random House, 1967), §428. Clarke and Dudrick’s thesis that Nietzsche holds an 
error theory of values only in Human, All Too Human, and later replaces it with 
perspectival notion of objectivity, therefore opposes the textual evidence. See 
Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, “Nietzsche and Moral Objectivity: the 
Development of Nietzsche’s Meta-Ethics,” in Nietzsche and Morality, ed. Brian 
Leiter and Neil Sinhababu (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007), 192-226. 
11 Nietzsche, Gay Science, §301. 
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1.3 Error Theory and Value Scepticism in General 
Earlier I suggested that error theory underlies other reasons why people 
think values and norms are subjective, and therefore poses the most 
fundamental challenge to an objective yet normative account of health. 
A few words should help to at least clarify this claim.  
Error theory is often contrasted with emotivism, expressivism, and 
other strands of non-cognitivism. Emotivists like Ayer also explain 
values in terms of emotions or affective responses towards value-
neutral states of affairs, but differ from error-theorists in that they take 
normative judgements to be non-cognitive attitudes. That is, non-
cognitivists endorse the semantic theory that normative statements do 
not set a requirement on the objective world to start with and are 
therefore neither true nor false—hence also not categorically false. 
According to emotivists and other non-cognitivists, normative claims 
only express our emotive attitudes to the objective world, essentially not 
different from growling, smiling, or frowning. Although much has been 
made of the difference between error-theory and emotivism in the meta-
ethical literature, it seems to me the difference is ultimately rather faint. 
Central to emotivism remains the claim that values are not part of the 
fabric of the world and therefore cannot be objectively true. The only 
difference with error theory is that value judgements are not considered 
to be truth-apt and therefore not categorically erroneous, but we should 
wonder how significant this distinction really is.12 
                                                             
12 Moreover, emotivism has been criticised for the fact that simple modes ponens 
inferences can be constructed with normative assertions. Normative assertions 
function logically and grammatically similar to factual assertions. This undermines 
the non-cognitivist claim that normative assertions are not genuine assertions and 
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A completely different approach to values subjectivism, one that 
falls entirely outside of contemporary meta-ethical debate, but one that 
is nonetheless worthwhile considering, is an existentialist-type of 
critique towards the idea of normative truth. Phrased very loosely, and 
referring to a tradition more than any particular philosopher, a historic-
existential critique of normative truth could be that with the collapse of 
the most important meta-narratives during the 20th century the valuing 
human subject has been thrown back onto itself, so to speak, and is now 
confronted with the bare activity of its own valuing—an activity 
exposed for what it is, now that it operates without authoritative 
ideology, dominant religion, or supposed rational ground. On this 
account, subjectivism would be a time-bound and uniquely modern 
experience, resulting from historical events such as the successes of 
natural science and the dissipation of the major political ideologies. All 
that remains is the sobering existential realisation that we are, and 
always have been, the architects of values, leaving us solely with a sense 
of responsibility, but without grounds to justify any value-judgement, 
as any ground or standard would also merely be of our own making.  
Now, if historical dynamics indeed confront us with a realisation 
of this kind, that does not imply that there are no objective values or 
that value-judgements can never express any truth. We could be having 
this historic realisation also if there were mind-independent valuative 
truths. A further claim must be made to arrive at the genuinely sceptical 
                                                                                                                                                           
merely expressions of emotions. This problem is known as the Frege-Geach 
problem, which strikes me as proving error-theory to be a better version of meta-
ethical subjectivism than emotivism. See for further discussion: Alexander Miller, 
An Introduction to Contemporary Metaethics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), 40-42.  
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position, viz. the further claim that there are no objective values or 
grounds for ethical beliefs to be discovered on principle. And this further 
claim is precisely the thesis expressed in Mackie’s and Nietzsche’s error 
theory: nothing outside human thoughts, emotions, or socio-historical 
dynamics can validate a value-judgement. To put it differently: the idea 
that human beings subjectively value things is nothing controversial; 
that this activity is subject to cultural and historical influences is also not 
startlingly insightful; but from neither observation does it follow that 
there are no objective values or that truth can never be expressed in 
value judgements. What I called an ‘existentialist’ version of meta-
normative critique, if indeed construed as a substantive meta-normative 
position, also rests on the idea that values are not part of the mind-
independent world and therefore cannot transcend the historical and 
cultural influences that shape and transform our values.  
There are of course plenty more reasons why philosophers 
endorse a subjectivist position on values, just as there are innumerable 
positions within the subjectivist camp itself. But what I hope these few 
remarks show is that meta-normative subjectivism ultimately relies 
upon, or provides further argumentative support for, the fundamental 
metaphysical claim that values are not part of the objective world—the 
way the world is independent of our mental responses to it. 
Overcoming the sceptical position therefore requires the affirmation 
that there are values independent of mental projections, and that there 
is truth about what is valuable independently of our own preferences, 
sentiments, cultural standards, and ways of knowing the world.  
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2. Towards a Life-based Normative Realism 
 
2.1 Criteria for Normative Realism  
The sceptical challenge is clear: since values are not part of the objective 
world, they must be projections of human attitudes and sentiments onto 
the objective mind-independent world. Since health judgements are 
value judgements, these too must be subjective responses of some kind 
to value-neutral states of affairs. I shall now turn to the work of various 
normative realists who think this picture is fundamentally mistaken and 
will attempt to build up a realist account of values. Before doing so, 
however, it will be helpful to list some criteria for normative realism. 
Peter Railton and Richard Boyd provide clear criteria, which can be 
combined and condensed into to the following three:13 
 
1) Cognitivism: value-statements are propositions capable of being 
true and false.  
2) Independence: value-statements are true and false independent 
from our opinions, preference, sentiments, attitudes, and so on.  
3) Feedback: we can interact with values, and this interaction exerts 
an influence on our perceptions, thoughts, and actions.  
 
If we can formulate a conception of values that meets these three 
criteria, or at least isolate a sub-class of values that does so, than these 
values can be regarded as objective and real.  
                                                             
13 See Peter Railton, “Moral Realism,” The Philosophical Review 95:2 (1986): 172; and 
Richard N. Boyd, “How to be a Moral Realist,” in Essays on Moral Realism, ed. 
Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1988), 182. 
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2.2 Railton: Objectified Interests and Non-Moral Value 
One of the best known defenders of value realism is Peter Railton. His 
account opens with the observation that all human beings have ideas 
about what is in their own best interest. Railton refers to these self-
interests with the notion of ‘non-moral value’. He does not specify the 
nature of non-moral value or non-moral goodness beyond saying that it 
refers to what is desirable or good for an individual him or herself. It is 
imperative that we get a clearer conception of non-moral goodness, 
however, to prevent confusion about what is entailed if non-moral 
goods turns out to be objective.  
One way to think of non-moral goodness is the following, which is 
an adaption of Bernard Williams’s conceptualisation of self-interest.14 
Take everything an individual values, favours, or wants to promote and 
everything one would like to see happen to either oneself, to others, or 
everything else in the cosmos, in the past, present, and future. From this 
widest possible set of values, remove everything that does not directly 
benefit the person herself. So everything that primarily benefits other 
people, generations, cultures, or species is removed. Strip this narrower 
set also of any sense of obligations and duty—whether they are legal, 
moral, or otherwise. What we are left with, is a much narrower set of 
values than the first set, containing items that are good only for oneself 
and serving only one’s own interests, which would indeed amount to 
something like ‘egoistic’ goods. Although this is a very rough and 
                                                             
14 This strategy is an adaptation of Bernard Williams’s account of self-interests. See: 
Bernard Williams, “The Standard of Living: Interests and Capabilities,” in The 
Standard of Living: The Tanner Lectures, ed. Geoffrey Hawthorn (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 95. 
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schematic way of explicating the idea of non-moral goods, it is one way 
to reach a conception of goodness independent of duty and obligation. 
We can conceive of things being beneficial to ourselves without any 
further claims about reasons for action or sense of duty. Non-moral 
goods, thus conceived, are also not ethical goods: non-moral goodness 
can be identified prior to a conception of how to live a good human life 
and expresses at a more rudimentary level what is good for someone 
and what is not. Non-moral goods could even apply to non-human 
organisms, perhaps even to artefacts, and are therefore more elementary 
than ethical goods (—supposing that ethical goodness does not apply to 
non-human organisms and artefacts). Although non-moral goods for 
human beings can certainly play a role in our ethical and moral 
theorising, the goods themselves can be identified independently of 
these posterior and more practical concerns. Railton’s argument is 
primarily directed at establishing the objectivity of these non-moral 
goods and this will also be my primary objective.15  
Having narrowed the scope of concern to non-moral goods, 
Railton claims we can be mistaken about what is non-morally good. 
Being mistaken about what is in our own interest, he writes, can result 
from “ignorance, confusion, or lack of consideration, as hindsight 
attests.”16 The mistakenness is therefore not a categorical wrongness of 
the kind described by Mackie and Nietzsche, but a mistakenness 
revealed by the discovery of what was actually in one’s own interest. 
The way we can arrive at this truth, or begin to make sense of it, Railton 
                                                             
15 Railton does make an attempt to extend his account of non-moral goods into the 
moral domain. See Railton, “Moral Realism,” 184-207. 
16 Railton, “Moral Realism,” 173. 
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suggests, is by imagining a subject with full information about herself 
and her environment, a subject with “unqualified cognitive and 
imaginative power, full factual and nomological information about her 
physical and psychological constitution, capacities, circumstances, 
history, and so on.”17 Such a fully informed subject (S+) will end up 
making different choices than her normal counterpart (S) once S+ is in 
situations that S is in; choices that will represent the interests of S better. 
The example that Railton gives illustrates the point well. If S were to 
suffer from stomach aches after an instance of food-poisoning, S may 
turn to remedies she remembers to be effective from past experiences, 
like drinking warm milk, even though they would only worsen the 
ailment in her present condition. S+, on the other hand, having full 
knowledge of both S’s physical constitution and the remedial effects of 
all available substances, would be able to determine objectively what is 
good for S under these circumstances, e.g. abstaining from dairy 
products and consuming clear liquids. The idea of complete information 
and the possibility of improving our ideas about what is in our own 
interests provide the foundation for Railton’s claim to objective values. 
This procedure only amounts to an epistemic account of 
objectivity, however, and does not meet the independence criterion for 
normative realism defined above. What S+ deems valuable is still only 
subjectively valuable, i.e. dependent on one’s own preferences, 
attitudes, and desires; S+ just has better informed subjective values. The 
reason why Railton thinks full information can establish objective of 
values is not just the possibility for improving on what one takes to be 
                                                             
17 Ibid. 
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in one’s interest. This claim shelters a much stronger claim, one that 
commits him to a more robust normative realism, viz. the claim that 
bodily properties, and to some extent a person’s psychic constitution too 
(what he calls “wants/interests mechanisms”)18, are themselves factual 
matters, which, once fully understood, enable one to know what is non-
morally good for an individual. Once we have full information of our 
own body-psychic constitution and the material environment, Railton 
thinks we can know what is valuable for us. Non-moral values are 
therefore grounded in this combination of facts.  
Railton draws a distinction between ‘relative’ and ‘relational’ 
notions in this context, which is of pivotal importance. He claims values 
are relational notions, i.e. non-moral goods and bads are per definition a 
‘good-for’ and ‘bad-for’. He writes that “although there is no such thing 
as absolute goodness—that which is good in and of itself, irrespective of 
what or whom it might be good for or the good of—there may be 
relational goodness.”19 Railton compares the relational nature of values 
to the relationality of heaviness. Nothing is heavy in itself, or absolutely 
heavy, but whether one object is heavier than another is still an objective 
matter. Or, perhaps a better example, the notions ‘standing right of the 
other’ and ‘standing left of the other’ are relational in a three-place way, 
but the relationality of spatial position does not undermine its 
objectivity. Railton claims non-moral goods are objective in precisely the 
same relational way. 
                                                             
18 Railton, “Moral Realism,” 179. 
19 Peter Railton, “Facts and Values,” in Facts, Values and Norms: Essays Toward a 
Morality of Consequence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 48. 
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Unfortunately, Railton does not work out the distinction between 
relativity and relationality further. I think it is crucial that we do so if we 
are indeed to employ the distinction in an argument for the objectivity 
of non-moral goods. If non-moral values were nothing other than 
subjective preferences projected onto the objective world in the way that 
sceptics like Hume, Mackie, and Nietzsche claim they are, then values 
would also be relational in some sense, viz. relational to a valuing 
subject. I suggest that what distinguishes relationality from relativity is 
that in the case of relationality both relata are objective matters, whereas 
in the case of relativity one of the two relata is a subjective attitude or 
preference, or some kind of cultural standard. Heaviness is relational 
rather than relative because the weight of two items does not depend on 
subjective attitudes, preferences, or one’s culture. Similarly, spatial 
location is relational rather than relative because the items standing in 
the relation are themselves objective matters; they have the relevant 
properties independently of anyone’s attitudes and preferences. How 
would this work in the case of non-moral values? I suggest that when 
values depend on two objective items they are relational, whereas when 
values depend on subjective attitudes or preferences, they are relative. If 
there are objective non-moral values, those values express a particular 
type of relation between objective features of a person and objective 
features of the external world. In addition to these objective values, 
there will also remain space for subjective values, which are relative to 
someone’s sentiments, preferences, or cultural standards. What I 
propose, therefore, is a non-moral value dualism: some non-moral values 
are objective while others are essentially subjective, depending on 
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whether they are relative to subjective preference, sentiment, or cultural 
standards, or relational to (what I shall provisionally call) ‘structural 
features’ of a person. This proposed dualism creates the possibility that 
someone’s subjective values oppose and contradict what is objectively 
valuable for an individual given her structural features. 
 Even though this proposed dualism goes beyond Railton’s own 
texts, it is consistent with the way Railton employs the distinction 
between relationality and relativity. One of Railton’s passages would 
illustrate this especially well. He writes: 
 
In a naturalistic spirit, we might think of goodness as akin to 
nutritiveness. All organisms require nutrition, but not the 
same nutrients. Which nutrients a given organism or type of 
organism requires will depend upon its nature. […] There is, 
then, no such thing as an absolute nutrient, that is, something 
that would be nutritious for all possible organisms. There is 
only relational nutritiveness: substance S is a nutrient for 
organisms of type T.20 
 
What renders nutritiveness relational rather than merely relative on the 
stipulative definitions just provided, is that the digestive system of an 
organism (the relevant ‘structural feature’) is itself an objective matter. 
Had the nutritiveness of substances been dependent on whatever 
subjects or cultures prefer to consider nutritive, then nutritiveness 
would have been merely relative and subjective. A dining etiquette, for 
instance, contains norms that depend on the manner in which subjects 
                                                             
20 Railton, Facts and Values, 48.  
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or cultures prefer to consume their food, which renders the norms 
belonging to a dining etiquette relative and subjective. What is nutritive, 
on the other hand, is an objective matter, despite its normativity, as the 
two relata (our digestive system and the substances entering into it) are 
themselves objective items, having their relevant properties 
independently of our subjective attitudes and preferences.  
Railton’s account of objective non-moral values is therefore 
consistent with a reductive naturalism: objective values supervene on 
facts about the structural features of a person and the properties of the 
external world.21 This supervenience is global: it is impossible for there 
to be two worlds identical in material constitution whereby the value 
relations between people and their environment are different. To be 
clear, Railton’s naturalism is not a definitional or analytic 
reductionism—one whereby the meaning of one set of terms, value 
terms, could be fully captured in a set of descriptive terms. Railton 
thinks that normative properties are ontologically reducible to the natural 
objects or properties that constitute, or enter into, the particular relation. 
The reductionist naturalism allows him to claim that all S+ needs to 
know are facts about the reduction-base (structural features and the 
totality of the physical environment), which, together with knowledge 
of the relevant correlations, will enable S+ to infer what is non-morally 
valuable.  
Another conclusion following Railton’s reductive naturalism is 
that similar things are objectively valuable for people insofar as they are 
similarly constituted. Railton writes, more tentatively than he should, 
                                                             
21 Railton, “Moral Realism,” 183. 
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that “people with similar personal and social characteristics will tend to 
have similar values; and that there will be greater general consensus 
upon what is desirable in those areas of life where individuals are most 
alike in other regards.”22 Railton should have probably said that for 
similarly constituted people the same things are objectively valuable, 
since whether people consent or not is of no relevance. 
On Railton’s view, and the way I have tried to extend it, non-
moral values therefore come in two metaphysical variations, subjective 
and objective, depending on whether they are relative to subjective 
preference and sentiments or relational to structural features of our 
being. The latter variation, i.e. objective non-moral goods, Railton 
recognises, are those that help to promote “physical or psychological 
well-being or to escape physical or psychological ill-being.”23 In other 
words, objects and events are objectively good if they are grounded in 
our constitution and promote our health—on Railton’s view.  
This claim should not really come as a surprise. In Chapter One 
we arrived at the conclusion that an account of health is required that is 
at once normative and objective. In order to create the possibility for 
such an account, I suggested we need a theory of values according to 
which at least some values are objective and not merely projections of 
our mental states onto a value-free world. And what we find in the 
work of one of the better known meta-normative realists is an account 
of values according to which precisely the objects and states that are 
                                                             
22 Railton, “Moral Realism,” 182.  
23 Railton, “Moral Realism,” 178. Although I freely equate health with well-being in 
this paragraph, I will propose a way of thinking about the difference between 
‘well-being’ and ‘health’ in Chapter Six (§1.2). 
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conducive to health are viewed as objectively good. The values involved 
in health judgements, as well as the positive value of things promoting 
our health, on Railton’s view, do not derive from subjective sentiments, 
personal preferences, or cultural standards projected over the objective 
world, but are grounded in the structural features of our being, so that 
complete information of these features would make it possible for us to 
know what is objectively good for us. Railton’s meta-normative theory 
is therefore itself premised on the idea that health is entirely objective; 
in short, objectively valuable items are those that promote our health.   
Railton introduces the idea of values being objective in a relational 
sense—which, I suggested, requires two relata that are both objective—
and the idea that with complete knowledge of these two relata we can 
know what is of non-moral value. A further question this raises, 
however, is what is so special about human beings that make us and our 
structural features enter into specifically valuative relations. The table 
and chair in front of me are also two objective items with supervenient 
relational properties like spatial location, being heavier than, and so 
on—but they do not stand in a discernible valuative relation to each 
other. A human organism in relation to nutrition, on the other hand, 
does stand in a valuative relation: nutrition is distinctively good for us 
while poison is distinctively bad. Although Railton provides the basic 
realist framework for a subclass of non-moral values that I will adopt, 
there are two further questions I will pursue. The first question is which 
beings indeed have things that are good and bad for them, and the 
second question is why they do so. With these two questions in mind I 
will turn to the work of other realists. 
93 
2.3 Canguilhem: Life as Dynamic Polarity 
In an effort to determine which beings stand in non-moral valuative 
relations, I will briefly return to Canguilhem’s work. This may seem an 
odd choice, as in Chapter One (§5) it became apparent that Canguilhem 
grounds normativity in subjective experience. There is another 
dimension to his thought on normativity, however, which I ignored in 
that earlier discussion. Together with the claim that normativity is 
grounded in subjective experience, Canguilhem argues that life 
generates norms and differentiates between positives and negatives; 
that is, Canguilhem claims that the beings for which things can be good 
and bad are living beings. He writes: “we do not ascribe a human content 
to vital norms but we do ask ourselves how normativity essential to 
human consciousness would be explained if it did not in some way exist 
in embryo in life.”24  
Canguilhem goes as far as to argue that it is an essential property 
of living beings that ‘for-them’ the world is differentiated into things 
that are good for them and those that are not. He claims that “there is no 
life whatsoever without norms of life.”25 So “even for an amoeba, living 
means preference and exclusion.”26 Living beings establishing valuative 
differentiations is what Canguilhem calls life’s “polarity”, or “dynamic 
polarity.”27 The dividing line between beings that have non-moral 
goods and those that do not, according to Canguilhem, then, is therefore 
the same line that divides the animate from the inanimate.  
                                                             
24 Canguilhem, Normal and Pathological, 127. 
25 Canguilhem, Normal and Pathological, 228. 
26 Canguilhem, Normal and Pathological, 136. 
27 Canguilhem, Normal and Pathological, 128. 
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If Canguilhem is right about this claim it would enable us to move 
beyond Railton’s views. In an important sense, Railton’s account of 
objective non-moral goodness was developed out of, and therefore still 
tied to, the idea that a subject with full information can determine what 
is in her own best interest, thereby retaining a subjective element in 
what he calls, tellingly, “objectified subjective interest.”28 According to 
Canguilhem, all living beings generate norms and stand in valuative 
relations to their environment, so that non-moral values are entirely 
independent from human mental states. If Canguilhem is right, we 
could also claim that organisms without a nervous system, incapable of 
reflecting on their own interests, have things that are objectively 
valuable to them, which could be determined with full information of 
their constitution and environment. Rather than reducing values to 
projections of mental attitudes, as subjectivists do, Canguilhem 
advances the idea that “life is polarity and thereby even an unconscious 
position of value; in short, life is in fact a normative activity.”29  
Canguilhem’s thesis is prima facie plausible: gasses and rocks do 
not stand in any valuative relations to each other, just as tables and 
chairs do not have things that are good for them, also not in a non-moral 
sense, whereas objects and events can be good for living beings. In what 
follows I will therefore pursue Canguilhem’s thought further that living 
beings—by which I mean the complete manifold of life, including 
unicellular and the most basic forms of life—indeed polarise their 
environments and stand in distinctly valuative relations. 
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29 Canguilhem, Normal and Pathological, 126. 
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An important reason why Canguilhem’s claim that only living 
beings have things good and bad to them is plausible, is because ‘health’ 
can be predicated over all living beings and not over inanimate objects. 
If, as Railton claims, objective non-moral goods are essentially the kind 
of goods that promote the health of a being, it makes sense to presume 
that all living beings have things that are non-morally good for them, 
since all living beings seem prima facie able to expand and diminish their 
health. If things could only be non-morally good for human beings or 
‘higher’ animals, we would effectively preclude the possibility of 
‘lower’ animals, including plants, to be in a state of health or ill-health. 
The fact that health can improve or weaken also in ‘non-conscious’ 
regions of life means that also organisms without subjective experiences 
have things that are objectively good and bad for them, despite there 
being no awareness of things being good or bad. I will therefore 
consider the hypothesis that objective non-moral goods are grounded in 
the structural features of life rather than an awareness of what is good. 
Canguilhem’s suggestion that objective norms are grounded in the 
particular constitution of living beings together with their environment 
would help to demarcate the kind of beings for which things can be non-
morally good and bad, viz. living beings. A further explanatory question 
why this is so could still be raised, of course. We could question why 
things aren’t equally good for mountains and riverbanks, or artefacts 
like tables and chairs, in a way that makes those goods dependent on 
the material constitution of those natural items. What is so special about 
the structural features of living beings?  
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Canguilhem’s answer to the explanatory question why living 
beings polarise their environments is deeply dissatisfying, as he 
identifies life itself with a sphere of subjectivity. Canguilhem writes that 
“to live is to radiate; it is to organise the milieu from and around a 
centre of reference.”30 And this centre of reference is a distinctly 
subjective centre of reference for Canguilhem.31 Because every living 
being is conceived of as a subject, or a zone of pre-subjectivity, every 
living being constitutes a centre from which meanings and values 
emanate. Rather than objective features, it is life’s inherent subjectivity 
that makes living beings generate norms according to Canguilhem.  
If life itself is indeed characterised by an irreducible subjectivity, 
then normative differentiations turn out to be grounded in subjectivity 
and affective responses after all, just as subjectivists like Hume, 
Nietzsche, and Mackie think—a subjectivity that has only been 
extended outside the contours of specifically human subjectivity. 
Despite his rather compelling turn to life, Canguilhem ultimately 
remains a subjectivist about values, such that, he indeed has to claim 
that even an “amoeba recognizes the categories of health and disease 
only on the level of experience.”32 Although I will continue to explore 
Canguilhem’s thought that all living beings have objects and states 
objectively that are good and bad for them, I shall reject his claim that 
life’s inherent subjectivity explains why this is so. 
                                                             
30 Canguilhem, “Living and Milieu,” 114. 
31 In an illuminating commentary Alain Badiou writes that for Canguilhem “living 
is always in some way a pre-subjective aptitude.” See Alain Badiou, “Is there a 
theory of the subject in Georges Canguilhem?” Economy and Society 27:2 (1998): 226. 
32 Canguilhem, Normal and Pathological, 198.  
97 
2.4 Nietzsche: Life as Will to Power 
At this point I should also briefly return to Nietzsche’s work. We 
already saw that Nietzsche defends an error theory of values 
throughout his oeuvre. At the same time, however, Nietzsche argues 
that life gives rise to certain values and normative differentiations, just 
as Canguilhem says it does. Especially in his notebooks we find 
Nietzsche engaging with the idea that certain values, those that he calls 
“naturalistic values,” arise out of the makeup of living beings.33 In 
complete agreement with Canguilhem, Nietzsche notes that “‘alive’: 
that means already valuing.”34 And similarly, he notes that “valuations 
lie in all functions of the organic being.”35 Nietzsche may therefore also 
be of help in our attempt to overcome the sceptical challenge—the 
challenge that, paradoxically, he himself has provided one of the most 
forceful articulations of. My concern here is not to reconcile these 
statements with his error-theoretic claims or outspoken meta-normative 
subjectivism, or to establish internal coherence between the various 
aphorisms.36 I will, however, consider Nietzsche’s answer to the 
explanatory question why life gives rise to normative differentiations.  
Nietzsche’s answer to the question why things can be good or bad 
for living beings is, of course, “because life simply is will to power.”37 
Especially in his post-Zarathustra works Nietzsche reduces living 
                                                             
33 Nietzsche, Will to Power, §462. 
34 Nietzsche, KSA, §11.25 [433]. 
35 Nietzsche, KSA, §11.26 [72]. 
36 An admirable attempt to integrate his various meta-ethical claims into a 
systematic whole can be found in John Richardson, Nietzsche’s New Darwinism 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 67-131.  
37 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §259. 
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beings to one basic drive, viz. the drive to accumulate and release the 
greatest possible quantum of power. Other aspects of life, such as self-
preservation, nourishment, sensing, thinking, knowing, desiring, and 
valuing, are viewed by Nietzsche merely as “offshoots” of this most 
fundamental of drives.38 
 Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power is hugely complex and 
multifaceted, however, and does not permit of any short summary or 
definition. He arrives at the notion of will to power from a number of 
different angles and interests: it functions as the core explanatory 
principle of his genealogical account of Judeo-Christian morality;39 it 
plays a crucial role in his psychological interpretation of our moral 
beliefs and practices;40 he uses it to differentiate and explain different 
types of pleasures;41 he introduces it as a metaphysical notion 
purporting to show us the world as it is “viewed from inside”;42 it 
functions as a rival to Darwin’s theory of adaptation and natural 
selection;43 and, not least importantly, the will to power functions as the 
cornerstone of Nietzsche’s attempt at a revaluation of all values.44 In 
addition to these and other motives behind the will to power, there is 
                                                             
38 Nietzsche, Will to Power, §658.  
39 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, §2.13. 
40 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §23. 
41 Nietzsche, Will to Power, §703. 
42 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §36. Various commentators have pointed out 
that Nietzsche derives his theory of Will to Power from his engagement with the 
physics of Boscovich. See especially: Greg Whitlock “Roger Boscovich, Benedict de 
Spinoza and Friedrich Nietzsche: The Untold Story,” Nietzsche Studien 25 (1996): 
200–220. 
43 Nietzsche, Will to Power, §647. 
44 Nietzsche, Will to Power, §704.  
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also a question about whether Nietzsche considers the will to power a 
real fundamental force or whether he used the idea only as a heuristic 
device, or perhaps even a powerful fiction, to support his psychological 
interpretations and personally favoured values. For the present 
purposes, I will leave these interpretative issues aside and just presume 
that Nietzsche considers the will to power to be the real essence of life.  
If life indeed ultimately consists of nothing other than a drive 
towards the accumulation of power [Macht], a force geared towards 
expansion, domination, and incorporation of everything external to it, then 
everything that promotes life in doing so is bound to be non-morally 
good for it, while everything obstructing or diverting life from doing so 
is bad for it. On the basis of the identification of life with the will to 
power, Nietzsche can succinctly say: “What is good?—All that 
heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. 
What is bad?—All that proceeds from weakness.”45 The goodness of 
objects that increase power is not good in an absolute sense, i.e. good 
without being good for anything, nor is it good only on the basis of the 
projection of human sentiments and attitudes, as we saw Nietzsche 
claim in the error-theoretic passages quoted above. Whatever increases 
the power of living beings is good in an objective yet relational sense.46  
                                                             
45 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1968), §2.  
46 In a recent commentary on Nietzsche’s theory of values, Railton claims that his 
own meta-ethical position can be attributed to Nietzsche. Railton writes: “[The] 
notion of value is relational, fitting Nietzsche’s rejection of intrinsic, absolute value. 
It treats value as part of the fabric of lived existence, something we can directly 
experience and learn through doing. Not all values would be accessible, or 
intelligible, to all individuals, and in this sense value would not be universal either. 
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In Nietzsche we therefore find an answer to the question why 
living beings have things that are non-morally good and bad for them in 
an objective yet relational way and so why living beings can be more or 
less healthy: life is internally purposive and directed towards a 
particular end, viz. the acquirement of power, so that everything 
contributing to this end contributes to the realisation of the essence of 
living beings, which ‘for-it’ is necessarily good. Living beings have 
goods independently from human preference and cultural standards 
because of life’s inherent directedness towards power augmentation. To 
be clear, Nietzsche’s thesis does not imply that it is morally good that 
people strive for ever-greater power or ever-more dominion over their 
social and material environment, nor that we ought to do so—and these 
two claims should not be confused. Self-reflective beings like ourselves 
may have good reasons for thinking that an unrestrained accumulation 
of power is morally bad, and that it would be morally good to endorse 
principles constraining what is non-morally good for us as living 
beings; at least, there would be no contradiction in doing so—‘life-
denying’ though this may be. If life is will to power, it would follow 
only that power-accumulation is non-morally good for a living being; 
moral claims of one kind or another are neither implied nor precluded. 
Although Nietzsche provides a clear answer to the question why 
living beings have things that are good and bad for them, I think it 
                                                                                                                                                           
But the various realms of value would be real enough—not just whatever we take 
them to be.” See Peter Railton, “Nietzsche’s Normative Theory? The Art and Skill 
of Living Well,’ in Nietzsche Naturalism and Normativity, ed. Christopher 
Janaway and Simon Robertson (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2012), 47. 
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should be pointed out that it is not a particularly good or compelling 
answer. A problem internal to Nietzsche’s own thinking is that the will 
to power not only forms the essence of living beings but that it also 
constitutes the innermost nature of everything else that exists. Not just 
living beings and organic functions but every entity in world when 
“viewed from inside” and “determined according to its ‘intelligible 
character’” is claimed to be “will to power and nothing else.”47 
Nietzsche’s notebooks make it even clearer that will to power is not 
restricted to organic being alone. He writes that “there must be an inner 
nature ascribed to the world, which I refer to with ‘will to power’, that 
is, an insatiable longing for display of power; usage of power, exercise 
of power, the creating drive.”48 He describes the world itself as “a 
monster of power, without beginning, without end, a solid, iron 
magnitude of power […].”49 If not only living beings but practically all 
substances consists of quanta of power seeking their own magnification, 
then not just living beings but all beings have objects and states good 
and bad for them. The will to power then loses its ability to explain why 
only living beings have non-moral goods.  
Also if the will to power were restricted to living beings alone, 
however, the idea remains unconvincing, primarily because the 
animism or vitalism that it commits to has been superseded in 
contemporary evolution theory and is generally considered to be an 
outdated mode of understanding life. Moreover, it is hard to supress the 
impression that Nietzsche discovered the idea of the will to power 
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48 Nietzsche, KSA, §11.36 [31]. My translation. 
49 Nietzsche, KSA, §11.38 [12]. My translation. 
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primarily as a psychological principle—one with which he managed to 
explain much of our behaviour, desires, and thinking, in often quite 
profound and penetrating ways—but which he subsequently projects 
into the heart of organic being itself and even into the makeup of the 
entire universe, effectively ‘psychologising’ all of nature. Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, we do not need a psychological principle or 
claim about the essence of life in order to explain why living beings can 
be more or less healthy, or in order to identify what these non-moral 
goods are. It is possible to claim that living beings have states and 
objects that are good for them independently of how they emotionally 
respond to them, even if those states indeed consist of heightened 
power of some kind, without having to accept that life itself is 
intrinsically, or essentially, a strife for greater power. Although I shall 
continue to explore the thesis that only living beings have a good-for, I 
shall not rely on Nietzsche’s metaphysical animism which, if restricted 
to life, would indeed make for an explanation why this is so.  
 
2.5 Foot: Life-forms and Natural Goodness 
The next author I will turn to in the quest to understand why it is living 
beings, and living beings alone, that have non-moral goods in an 
objective yet relational sense, is Philippa Foot. Late in her career she 
wrote Natural Goodness, in which she documents a radical change in her 
meta-normative thinking and advocates an altogether “fresh start.”50 In 
this text Foot equally seeks to break with the Humean tradition of 
reducing values to human projections of their responses, desires, and 
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sentiments. She too argues that there is an objective basis for valuative 
judgements and that this objective basis is to be found in the nature of 
living beings. In agreement with Railton and the line of thought I have 
been pursuing so far, Foot thinks that “norms belonging to life” have to 
be “explained in terms of facts about things belonging to the natural 
world.”51 Foot therefore belongs to the group of normative realists who 
think that life grounds certain values and that these values can be 
reduced to objective features of living beings.  
Foot nevertheless departs significantly from the meta-normative 
view built up so far by insisting that we should compare “the basis of 
moral evaluation to that of the evaluation of behaviour in animals.”52 She 
argues that “moral defect is a form of natural defect,” and that what is 
naturally good automatically tells you “what you ought to do.”53 She 
thinks there is therefore “no change in the meaning of ‘good’ between 
the word as it appears in ‘good roots’ [of trees] and as it appears in 
‘good dispositions of the human will’.”54 By contrast, we have only been 
considering the objectivity of non-moral goods, and with the help of 
Railton, Canguilhem, and Nietzsche been exploring the possibility that 
non-moral goods are grounded in the makeup of living beings. Foot 
thinks moral goods like ‘not harming others’ and even, astonishingly, 
“keeping faith”, are comparable to the way things are good for plants 
and animals.55 Foot’s claim that moral goodness, together with its 
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52 Foot, Natural Goodness, 16. Emphasis added.  
53 Foot, Natural Goodness, 27; 37. Emphases added. 
54 Foot, Natural Goodness, 39. 
55 Foot, Natural Goodness, 53. 
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archetypical language of ‘oughts’, ‘duties’, and ‘obligations’ relies on a 
similar sense of ‘good’ as statements about what is non-morally good 
for any other living being, is one I shall not endorse and think we 
should, in fact, strongly resist. There is an important difference between 
claiming that certain objects and states are good for living beings due to 
their own internal constitution, and proclaiming that human beings 
have a duty or obligation to act in accordance with these or any other 
kind of goods. The latter is an altogether different claim and not 
entailed by the former.56 Why non-moral goods for non-human 
organisms, like taking in the right nutrients, could become, or indeed 
should become, a moral obligation in human life, and why, therefore, 
morality can be likened to natural goodness, is not at all clear.  
Nevertheless, Foot does provide an answer to the question why 
living beings have things that are naturally and objectively good for 
them, and to this answer I shall restrict the present discussion. The 
reason Foot thinks life stands apart is not by reference to an element of 
subjectivity or on the basis of a metaphysical animism of some kind, but 
on the basis of the Aristotelian idea that the goodness for living beings 
depends on, what she calls, the ‘life-form’ of an organism. The central 
idea is that “it is the particular life form of a species of plant or animal 
that determines how an individual plant or animal should be.”57 She 
                                                             
56 Christine Korsgaard agrees with this diagnosis and thinks the distinction follows 
from an extension of the open question argument. If it is an independent fact that 
certain acts are good, then it remains an open question whether one should comply 
with it. Korsgaard states therefore also that “evaluative standards, taken by 
themselves, do not obligate.” See her “Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-
Century Moral Philosophy”, in The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason 
and Moral Psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 317. 
57 Foot, Natural Goodness, 32. 
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argues that an individual organism can be evaluated vis-à-vis an 
Aristotelian ‘form’, compared to which it can have certain defects and 
shortcomings. And extremely importantly, given the concerns of the 
present thesis, Foot believes such evaluations can be conducted 
independently from our subjective attitudes, desires, and so on: 
 
Evaluation of an individual living thing in its own right, with 
no reference to our interests or desires, is possible where there 
is intersection of two types of propositions: on the one hand, 
Aristotelian categoricals (life-form descriptions relating to the 
species), and on the other, propositions about particular 
individuals that are the subject of evaluation.58 
 
Recall the way Boorse’s bio-statistical theory of health was criticised for 
involving reference classes, which, on Kingma’s view, rendered the 
theory both circular and normative. I argued that Kingma’s true concern 
was not the normativity of Boorse’s theory as such, but her suspicion 
that the relevant norms were fixed on the basis of subjective values and 
preferences about what is to count as healthy and pathological. In Foot’s 
account of natural goodness we get an account of an objective norm (a 
life-form) and an objective reference class (a species). Precisely because 
the norm and reference class obtain independently of subjective 
preference or sentiment, we end up with an objective yet normative 
mode of evaluation. This form of evaluation is therefore one that will 
have to be preserved in the attempt to formulate an objective yet 
normative account of health in the next chapter. 
                                                             
58 Foot, Natural Goodness, 33. 
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Foot’s argument continues further along Aristotelian lines when 
she argues that life-forms of plants and animals have self-maintenance 
and reproduction as their natural end, while the life-form of human 
beings has happiness as its end.59 When an organism functions in a way 
similar to how members of the species characteristically maintain and 
reproduce their form the organism is in a good state, Foot claims, and 
everything that promotes the organism in doing so, is naturally good for 
it. At least in the botanical and zoological world, natural goodness is 
therefore equated with being in a state of physical health. Also Foot 
writes that “goodness in respect of bodily health […] is precisely that 
which fits a living thing for the instantiation of the life form of its 
species, and […] this counts as the good of a living thing.”60 Like 
Railton, the values that Foot considers objective and grounded in the 
nature of living beings are precisely those corresponding to what 
promotes the health of living beings. Foot therefore also thinks, or at 
least presumes, that the being and value of health are objective matters, 
i.e. existent independently from factors like mental attitudes, 
preferences, opinions, cultural standards, and so on.  
When it comes to human life, however, Foot’s account gets more 
complex, as she claims that the form of human life consists primarily in 
the pursuit of happiness via the exercise of morally good actions, 
thereby blending elements of Aristotelian eudaimonsim with features of 
modern moralism. According to Foot, natural goods for human beings 
                                                             
59 She writes that “in plants and non-human animals these things all have to do, 
directly or indirectly, with self-maintenance […] and the obtaining of nourishment, 
or with the reproduction of the individual.” Foot, Natural Goodness, 31.  
60 Foot, Natural Goodness, 92. Emphases added. 
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far exceed the concerns of health. As said before, the extension to moral 
goodness is most problematic; but more importantly, we do not have to 
rely on it, since we are considering the objectivity of non-moral goods. 
And Foot also claims that, at least for plant and animal life, it is 
precisely health-related values that are objective. If moral goods are 
equally objective, as Foot claims they are, then this would be a bonus 
and strengthen the position of normative realists more broadly. But it is 
not a claim we require for our present purposes. 
Although Foot’s account of natural goodness provides a model for 
objective normativity, it does not explain why it is only living beings 
that have states and objects that are good for them and why only living 
beings can be more or less healthy. Aristotle makes no distinction 
between life and inanimate being in a way that would restrict goodness 
only to living beings. Aristotle thinks that all substances have a final 
cause, a telos, such that all substances have states and objects naturally 
good for them. If we are to maintain that only living beings have states 
and objects that are good in an objective yet relational way, as Foot 
insists as well, then we would have to explain why life-forms are 
different from the forms of inanimate beings. Foot does not provide the 
conceptual tools to substantiate the distinction between forms of living 
and non-living beings, and can therefore not explain why only living 
beings have states and objects that are objectively good for them. Still 
pursuing the explanatory question why living beings have a good-for 
and bad-for, I will now turn to Korsgaard’s work. 
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2.6 Korsgaard: Functional Goods and Having a Sake 
Presenting Korsgaard as a meta-normative realist immediately demands 
adding an important qualification, however, as she repeatedly distances 
herself from realists like G. E. Moore and generally describes herself as a 
constructivist.61 The value realism that she rejects, however, is a realism 
according to which things are good and bad independently of anyone or 
anything for which they would be good or bad. In other words, 
Korsgaard rejects an absolutist view of values; the same absolutism that 
Mackie and Nietzsche criticised in their respective error theories. 
Korsgaard even thinks that the idea of absolute values—things being 
good or bad without being good or bad for anything or anyone—
“should be rejected as unintelligible.”62 She does, however, endorse a 
relational theory of values similar to Railton’s, and equally defends the 
view that values, qua relations, can be objective. 
Korsgaard’s ideas about which beings are constituted in such a 
way that they have states and objects that are good or bad for them are 
nevertheless much more complex, in part because she distinguishes 
between two ways in which something can be non-morally good, but 
also because she combines elements of Aristotelian naturalism with 
Kantian transcendentalism. Instead of striving for a comprehensive 
overview her position, in the following explication of her views I shall 
primarily focus on drawing an answer out of her work to my question: 
why do living beings have objects and states that are objectively good 
and bad for them while all other entities do not?  
                                                             
61 Korsgaard, “Realism and Constructivism,” 304-310. 
62 Korsgaard, “The Relational Nature of the Good,” in Oxford Studies in Metaethics 
Volume 8, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013) 5. 
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The two different ways in which Korsgaard thinks something can 
be non-morally good are labelled ‘evaluative’ or ‘functional goods’ on 
the one hand, and ‘final goods’ on the other.63 Functional goods can be 
attributed to practically any kind of being on her view. She follows 
Aristotle in thinking that any substance, in virtue of being a substance, 
has a function—including, most obviously, artefacts like knives, cars, 
and vacuum cleaners.64 So whenever we consider something as good, in 
the sense of being in a good state, we mean that something performs its 
function well: a vacuum-cleaner is in a good state if it vacuums well, a 
knife is in a good state if it cuts well, etc. And on the same basis, 
whatever helps a thing to perform its function is good for it: sharpening 
is good for a knife, a new bag is good for a vacuum cleaner, gasoline is 
good for a car, etc.65 Functional goods are therefore objective and 
relational on Korsgaard’s view; goods are grounded in the nature of 
every individual substance insofar as they are a functional system. 
When writing in Aristotelian mode, and, importantly, when she isn’t 
referring to the unique way in which human beings are functional, 
Korsgaard’s position is that functional goods obtain independently of 
human attitudes and preferences, and are therefore wholly objective.66  
                                                             
63 See Korsgaard “On Having a Hood,” 11-21; “Relational Nature of the Good,” 5-7; 
and “The Origin of the Good and Our Animal Nature,” in Problems of Goodness: 
New Essays on Metaethics, ed. Bastian Reichardt (Forthcoming): 16-22. 
64 Christine Korsgaard, Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), 35-41.  
65 Or in Korsgaard’s words: “If something is a functional system, the properties 
that enable it to perform its function well are the properties that make it a good 
one, and the conditions that tend to promote and protect those properties are good 
for it.” Korsgaard, “On having a Good,” 20 
66 I return to Korsgaard’s ideas about human functionality in Chapter Five (§4.1). 
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The other way in which something can be non-morally good, 
Korsgaard calls ‘final goodness’. Final goods are also good-for certain 
beings on her view, but good-for in a more specific sense, viz. good “for 
their own sakes.”67 Korsgaard argues that functional goods of artefacts 
are not good for the ‘sake’ of the artefacts themselves. Cars, knives, and 
vacuum cleaners can be in a good state and have things contributing to 
their well-functioning, but only insofar as these items fulfil a function for 
the sake of human beings. Functional goods for animals and human 
beings, by contrast, are good for the sake of animals and human beings 
themselves. The reason why Korsgaard thinks that only animals and 
human beings have things beneficial for their own sake is because 
animals and humans have conscious experiences of what is good and bad 
for them; animals and human beings are creatures “who can welcome or 
reject the things that they experience.”68 When a being consciously 
relates to its own functional goods these goods become final goods on 
Korsgaard’s view; only then are they good for the sake the being itself. 
‘Having a sake’ therefore requires being a conscious being. 
Now, at this stage of her argument it looks like all substances have 
functional goods and only conscious beings have final goods, which 
would be of little help in explaining our claim that only living beings 
stand in valuative relations to an external environment and their own 
states. In analysing what it means to have ‘a sake’, however, Korsgaard 
moves away from this dualistic set-up and does end up isolating living 
beings in a special way—at least, this is what I will now try to show.  
                                                             
67 See for instance Korsgaard, “On Having a Good,” 12.  
68 Korsgaard, “Relational Nature of the Good,” 4.  
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When Korsgaard writes that an “artefact exists and has a function 
only with reference to us and our needs” her claim is not just that 
artefacts are made and designed by human beings and therefore happen 
to have a function that is useful to us.69 She makes the more 
fundamental and ultimately Kantian claim that the functionality of 
artefacts as such exists only in relation to human beings, so that the 
things good-for an artefact are good-for-it only with reference to us.  
Instead of the Aristotelian idea that something has to have a function in 
order to be a substance, Korsgaard endorses the Kantian view that we 
impose functional unity onto things when we isolate and interpret them 
as functional systems. In Self-Constitution she indeed claims that “what I 
want to claim […] is that we pick out an object as a region of the 
manifold that appears to be doing something, and we understand it as a 
single and unified object by understanding it as internally organised for 
doing whatever it does.”70 As a result of this transcendental move, the 
good-for of artefacts is only a derivative good-for, originating with 
human judgement and interpretation instead of the nature of the thing 
itself, so to speak. So although the function of a knife is to cut, the idea is 
now that the knife’s functionality, and therefore also anything that 
benefits it, exists only in relation to human beings for whom knives are 
things with a cutting function. Things that are good for knives are good 
only within the context of human judgement and our activities of 
cutting and slicing up of things; that is, the functionality of artefacts, 
and thus also their functional goods, depends on our functionality.  
                                                             
69 Korsgaard, “On Having a Good,” 26. 
70 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 38.  
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The functional goods of living beings, by contrast, are not 
derivative and do not necessarily refer to human judgement in this way. 
We could of course call a chicken a ‘good’ chicken when it serves our 
nutritional needs, just as we can call a dog a ‘good’ dog when it obeys 
our commands, but animals and plants also have states and objects that 
are good for their own sake. I think the reason behind this distinction 
between the functionality of animate and inanimate beings is that living 
beings are functional ‘with regard to themselves’—so to speak; that is, 
their functions are directed at the entity of which they are a part, i.e. the 
organism itself, rather than anything external to it. Goods for living 
beings are good for their own sake rather than the sake of something 
else. And since all living beings are functional in a non-derivative way, 
all living beings have ‘a sake’. 
 The sake of plants and animals, according to Korsgaard, consists 
in self-preservation and reproduction, which, she argues, amounts to 
nothing other than their health.71 So when something is good for a plant 
or animals it is good for the sake of the plant or animal itself, which 
means exactly the same thing as serving the health of the plant or 
animal. ‘Having a sake’, at least in the context of plants and animals, 
means nothing other than being able to be healthy and unhealthy.72 I 
think Korsgaard therefore ultimately defends a claim quite similar to 
Railton, Canguilhem, and Foot: non-moral goodness exists only in 
relation to living beings and coincides with what promotes the health of 
living beings—at least in the case of plants and animals.   
                                                             
71 Korsgaard, “Animal Nature,” 18. 
72 The sake of a human being is an altogether different matter for Korsgaard, and 
something I will return to in Chapter Five (§4.1). 
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The distinction just drawn between goods for living beings and 
goods for non-living beings marks a move away from Aristotelian 
metaphysics in the direction of a more Kantian perspective, it seems to 
me. In the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgement Kant equally 
argues that the functionality and purposiveness of inanimate objects 
exists only relative to something else, viz. to humans and other living 
beings. Kant calls the functionality of inanimate things “usefulness” if 
they are functional to human beings and “advantageousness” if they are 
functional to another type of creature.73 Kant considers a thing internally 
functional or purposive, by contrast, when it is functional in relation to 
itself. Kant calls this internal functionality or purposiveness “objective 
purposiveness.”74 This latter type of functionality, Kant claims, and 
Korsgaard seems to agree, can be only found in living organisms. Since 
it is only living organisms that are internally functional, i.e. not 
functional relative to something else, it is only living organisms that 
have a sake and only living beings that are capable, ultimately, of 
grounding functional goods. Although Korsgaard opens her recent 
papers with the Aristotelian position that goods originate in functional 
systems and that each individual thing has a function, I think her 
reflections on ‘having a sake’ gradually make her switch back to a 
Kantian perspective according to which only living beings are internally 
functional, so that only living beings have states and objects non-
derivatively and indeed objectively (at least in the case of plants and 
animals) good to them.  
                                                             
73 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 5:367. 
74 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgement, 5:368. 
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Now, at this stage of my reconstruction of Korsgaard’s views it is 
no longer clear whether it is only conscious beings that have ‘a sake for 
which’ things are good or bad or whether all living beings have this 
property. We saw that Korsgaard’s original claim is that only conscious 
beings have goods for their own sake, because conscious beings can 
welcome and reject things in experience. When Korsgaard specifies 
what it means to have a sake, however, she turns to the internal 
functionality of living beings, directed at maintenance of the health of 
the organism as a whole. The latter claim would imply that all living 
beings have a sake, including ‘non-conscious’ organisms like plants, 
because all living beings are ‘internally’ functional. So the question is 
now whether on Korsgaard’s view all living beings have a sake and 
therefore non-derivative relational goods, or whether only conscious 
organisms do so. If the latter is true, we would be back at Canguilhem’s 
position that living beings give rise to normative differentiations due to 
life’s inherent subjectivity. If all living beings have a sake, however, and 
if this sake is underpinned by something other than conscious 
experience, she will have explained why living beings have things that 
are of value to them other than subjective experience of some kind. 
Korsgaard appears divided on this crucial issue. A draft version of 
her paper “On Having a Good” includes an appendix with the title ‘On 
Having a Sake’ and focusses precisely on this issue. Sadly this appendix 
and the views expressed therein have largely disappeared in the 
published version of the paper.75   
                                                             
75 Christine Korsgaard, “On Having a Good,” Presented as The Royal Institute of 
Philosophy Lecture, London, March 2012, Accessed April 15, 2013, www.people. 
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In this appendix, Korsgaard considers the question whether non-
conscious living beings like plants have a sake for which things are 
good or bad. Her answer is affirmative: when things are good for a 
plant they are good for its own sake, whereas when things are good for 
artefacts they are not. Now, given her earlier claims, this would imply 
that plants have a final good, which means that plants must be able to 
welcome and reject things in experience, which is absurd. Korsgaard 
recognises the dilemma and answers that “it is because the things that 
are bad for it frustrate its ‘efforts’ at self-constitution that they are bad 
for its own sake.”76 What this remark reveals, I think, is that instead of 
conscious experience of what is functionally good, it is life’s inherent 
functionality that makes living beings such that things can be good and 
bad for their own sake; that is, because living beings can be healthy and 
unhealthy things can be good and bad for them.  
Even if this final statement has distanced us somewhat from 
Korsgaard’s own views, it would provide us with an answer to the 
question we were looking for, viz. the question why living beings have 
states and objects that are non-morally good and bad for them while 
non-living beings do not. The answer is that non-moral goods are 
grounded in the inherent functional organisation of living beings 
directed at the sake of the organism itself. And since the sake of a living 
being, at least for non-human living beings, consists in the promotion of 
health, Korsgaard’s answer to the question why living beings have 
                                                                                                                                                           
fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaar/CMK.HG.pdf. When reference is made to this earlier 
version of the paper, [Draft] will be added to the reference. Where content has 
remained unchanged, reference is made to the final version.   
76 Korsgaard, “On Having a Good [Draft],” 45. 
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relational goods, is, ultimately, because living beings can be healthy and 
unhealthy whereas non-living beings cannot. Inanimate beings are 
functional only with reference to a living being, therefore do not have a 
sake for which things are good and bad, and therefore, to point out the 
obvious, cannot be healthy or unhealthy.  
This Korsgaardian view, stripped of all subjective or experiential 
elements, therefore works as an explanation for Canguilhem’s, Foot’s 
and Nietzsche’s thesis that living beings, in virtue of being alive, have 
things that are objectively good and bad for them: objective goods are 
grounded in functions, and only living beings have functions that serve 
their own sake, i.e. their own health, rather than something outside of 
themselves, so that only living beings have an objective good-for. What 
I earlier and only provisionally called the ‘structural features’ of living 
beings, are therefore the biological functions or functional parts that make 
up living beings. The objective properties of living beings in relation to 
which external objects or events are objectively good or bad are the 
functional systems of living beings, qua functional part, are directed at 
maintaining the health of the organism as a whole. 
  
 
3. Summary of the Proposed Meta-Normative View 
 
With these final explanatory remarks, we can now integrate the relevant 
ideas and concepts into a summary overview of a theory of values and 
try to show that on this account there are indeed non-moral values that 
meet the three criteria for normative realism as specified above. 
117 
On the meta-normative view I propose, objects and events in the 
world have no value independently of beings constituted in such a way 
that things can be of value to them. The meta-normative theory 
therefore concedes to Mackie and Nietzsche and other anti-realists that 
values have no absolute existence or complete ontological independence. 
Nevertheless, the normative realists’ views discussed above suggest this 
recognition does not entail that all value judgements are categorically 
erroneous or that moral values cannot be part of the mind-independent 
world in another way. Denying value absolutism does not imply that 
values cannot have an objective relational nature. Specifying this meta-
normative position therefore primarily means unpacking the idea of 
objective relational values and to explain this very possibility. 
 
3.1 Two Kinds of Non-Moral Value 
In the discussion of Railton’s argument for normative realism I argued 
that there are two kinds of non-moral values, differing metaphysically 
as well as epistemologically. One kind of non-moral goodness exists as a 
relation between subjective attitudes and things considered or 
experienced as valuable. These objects are valuable only for people with 
these particular attitudes and experiences. People may be alone in 
having these values, share them with a community or culture, or even 
with humanity at large; but as long as values are relative to subjective 
attitudes and preferences they remain metaphysically subjective. True 
statements can be made about subjective values, but the truth-
conditions for these statements include the presence of the relevant 
subjective attitudes of the person who considers or experiences 
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something valuable. If someone’s subjective attitudes change, so do the 
things that are subjectively valuable. Subjective values therefore 
supervene on individual attitudes and certain objects and events. In 
order to know what is valuable for someone in this way we have to 
inquire into someone’s valuative attitudes or infer these attitudes from 
choices, behaviour, and emotional responses. Subjects are ultimately the 
sole authorities over these values and under normal circumstances 
people cannot be claimed to be wrong or mistaken about what they 
value in this way. Subjective values are therefore legitimately diverse, 
but they do not have to be. Although described in terms of relations 
rather than projections of mental attitudes, I expect this to be a relatively 
uncontroversial characterisation of subjective non-moral values. 
If all values were metaphysically and epistemologically subjective 
in this way, then subjectivists like Mackie and Nietzsche would be 
correct to claim that there are no mind-independent values, and Fulford, 
Canguilhem, and Nietzsche would be right to say that truth-conditions 
for health-judgements involve subjective attitudes or experiences of 
some kind. On the account of values I propose, however, there are also 
values that obtain between two items neither one of which is a 
subjective attitude or personal preference. The claim is that certain 
objects or states are good for living beings without the mediation of 
subjective attitudes, desires, or any other kind of affective 
responsiveness. Knowledge about these values involves being informed 
about, what I provisionally called the ‘structural features’ of living 
beings, but later specified as the ‘functional parts’ of living beings, as 
well as knowledge of the relevant properties of the external world. If 
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this is right, then in addition to subjective values there are also values 
supervening on the objective properties of living beings (their functional 
systems in combination with objective properties of the external 
world)—values that, due to the objectivity of both relata, have an 
objective yet relational nature. Contra Mackie, I conclude that these 
values are not metaphysically queer, given the fact that there are 
numerous other objective relational properties that we do not think of as 
metaphysically queer. Subjects have no authority over these values and 
statements about them are true independent of our ways of gaining 
knowledge about them. We could be wrong and mistaken about what is 
objectively valuable for us and for other living beings. Although there is 
mind-independent truth about these values, these objective values do of 
course depend on the existence of living beings and their specific 
makeup; in the life-independent world or a universe without living 
beings whatsoever, the proposed account implies that nothing is 
valuable, good or bad, better or worse.  
 
3.2 Objective Non-moral Goodness as Identical to Health 
The normative realists considered above all think that objectively 
valuable states and objects correspond to what promotes a living being’s 
health. In other words, the ‘sake’ for which things are good and bad in a 
relational yet objective way corresponds to the health of an organism. 
External objects and events are objectively good for an organism if they 
are conducive to the health of the organism as a whole; grass, for 
instance, is not good for a cow’s stomachs but good for the sake of the 
cow as whole. The end towards which biological functions themselves 
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are directed is also the health of the organism as a whole. Objective 
values, I therefore conclude, are either relations between an organism as 
a whole and any of its functional parts, whereby parts are well-
functioning if they sustain the health of the organism as a whole (and 
vice versa)—or relations between the organism as a whole and objects 
and events external to it that sustain and promote an organism’s health, 
whereby objectively good objects and events are those that promote the 
health of the organism as a whole (and vice versa). In short, therefore, 
objective values are relations between the organism as a whole and any 
of its functional parts or relations between the organism as a whole and 
external objects and events, whereby objective goods sustain and 
promote the health of an organism and objective bads do the opposite.  
 
3.3 Further Explanatory Question 
The best explanation I could find for the fact that living beings have 
non-moral relational goods was a functional explanation. Objective 
relational goods, then, are grounded in functional systems: if something 
is a functional system it is purposive, directed towards a certain end, 
which automatically gives rise to normative differentiations in its own 
states as well as its external environment. An explanation why only 
living beings have things of value to them is because only living beings 
are internally functional, i.e. not functional relative to something else. 
Other entities that we can conceive of as functional items derive their 
functionality and directedness, and therefore also their functional 
goods, from human beings or other living entities who, as part of their 
own functionings and purposes, interpret these entities as functional 
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entities: a river is a functional entity only insofar as we bestow a function 
on it—e.g. taking it to be a source for providing drinking water (which it 
can do better or worse)—and is therefore functional only relatively to us 
and our own functional nature. Likewise, a collection of branches is a 
nest, i.e. a thing with a purpose or function (e.g. protecting offspring, 
thermoregulation, etc.), only relatively to animals that nest, so that 
whatever is good or bad for the nest is so only relatively to nesting 
animals rather than to the nest itself. The functional constitution of 
living beings, on the other hand, exists for the sake of a living being 
itself, i.e. for its own health. Because only living beings have functional 
parts directed at their own health things can be good and bad, 
ultimately, only for living beings.   
 
3.4 Satisfying the Criteria for Normative Realism 
This sub-class of values, grounded in the functional organisation of 
living beings and directed towards the health of the organism as a 
whole, satisfies the three criteria of normative realism outlined above: 
life-based values are cognitive since statements about them permit of 
truth and falsity; they are independent from our opinions, preferences, 
sentiments, attitudes, and so on, since they arise out of the functional 
nature of living beings rather than our own subjective attitudes; and 
they give feedback in the rather straightforward way that objectively 
good things promote health and objectively bad things undermine it. A 
sub-class of non-moral values, grounded in the functional organisation 
of living beings and corresponding to what is healthy and unhealthy for 
living beings, are therefore values that are objective and real. 
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At this point I should also repeat that the proposed normative 
realism only pertains to a sub-class of non-moral values. Whether 
typically moral statements like ‘killing is wrong’ can be objectively true 
is a question on which I have made no claim and shall not take a stance. 
I have insisted, however, that statements about what is non-morally 
good for a living being do not entail anything about what a living being 
ought to do or about what is morally right and wrong—an inference 
from non-moral goods to moral goods that we found in Foot’s work. If a 
sub-class of non-moral values is indeed objective then it does not follow 
that moral claims are also objectively true, also not by analogy to the 
objectivity of health. Paul Bloomfield has recently written a book-length 
version of latter the claim, boiling down to the idea that “moral 
goodness has the same ontological status as physical healthiness, so that 
if we are realists about the latter, then we ought to be also about the 
former.”77 This is blatantly false: it is perfectly possible to be a realist 
about values involved in judgements of health while accepting an error-
theory or other form of anti-realism of typically moral values and 
ought-statements. Using the objectivity of health-judgements as an 
analogy or spring-board to claim objectivity of moral principles 
amounts to committing a category mistake: it muddles and obfuscates 
the distinction between things that are good for living beings on the 
basis of their own functionally integrated make-up, and principles 
guiding and constraining human conduct in societies composed of 
people with conflicting needs, interests, and desires.  
                                                             
77 Paul Bloomfield, Moral Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 28. 
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Categorically distinct though moral and non-moral values may be, 
they are nevertheless also not entirely disconnected; it is not hard to 
imagine that in a society of beings for whom it is non-morally and 
objectively bad to be killed (it annuls their health), moral principles like 
‘one ought not to kill’ arise and are treated with utmost seriousness. 
Moral statements may therefore in some indirect way be anchored in 
what is non-morally and objectively good for living beings, i.e. what is 
healthy and not. This would not even be a possibility, however, if non-
moral goodness was not itself already grounded and objective. Having 
said this, it is important to emphasise that moral claims and ought-
statements are not identical to, or entailed by, or true by analogy with 
the fact that there are non-moral values with an objective status.  
 
3.5 Three Desiderata for a Theory of Health 
The conclusion yielded by the analysis Chapter One was that we needed 
an objective yet normative theory of health, which, given the ubiquitous 
assumption that everything normative is essentially subjective, required 
a second-order view enabling the possibility of objective normativity. In 
the works of prominent meta-normative realists we find the claim that 
precisely health-promoting goods are objective goods. If the concept of 
health were now to be defined in a way that would render health itself 
relative to subjective values and cultural standards, it would undermine 
the second-order account itself. The respective meta-normative views 
we considered all postulated an objective account of health: Railton and 
Korsgaard specify health as conditions for survival and reproduction; 
Foot specifies health as conditions for preserving and reproducing in a 
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manner typical to the life-form of a species; and Nietzsche in his later 
works, freely interpreted at least, could say that health consists in an 
accumulation and exercise of power. These accounts of health are 
normative but at the same independent of subjective attitudes and 
preferences. The proposed meta-normative realism view according to 
which certain non-moral values are objective, if indeed plausible, 
therefore not only enables an objective yet normative account, but even 
demands such an account; that is, health must be defined without 
reference to subjective attitudes or preferences for the meta-normative 
realist view itself to hold. 
Another consequence of the proposed theory of values is that the 
meaning of health is drawn outside the contours of strictly medical and 
psychiatric contexts. The claim we encountered several times in this 
chapter and one that I endorsed in the final sections, is that a sub-set of 
non-moral goods can be reduced to whatever promotes the health of a 
living organism; so on that basis, health corresponds to objective non-
moral goodness itself. In other words, something is objectively non-
morally good for an organism if it sustains or improves its health. And 
by the same token, when a living being is in an objectively good state, it 
is in a state of health. If we now return to the question what health itself 
is, what we are asking is what objective non-moral goodness consists in 
for a living being. Instead of a reflection on medical and psychiatric 
practice per se, this meta-normative exercise shows that raising the 
question of health means asking a much broader question; viz. the first-
order normative question what objective non-moral goodness consists 
in for living beings. 
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 The third and final point to take from this chapter is that health 
itself cannot be defined as the well-functioning of parts, as this would 
amount to a circular definition. We said that an organism’s functional 
parts are in a good state and functioning well if they promote the health 
of the organism as a whole. If we now were to define health itself as the 
well-functioning of parts, we would effectively define health in terms of 
health: health would be the state of an organism where its parts fulfil 
their role in sustaining the health of the organism. To avoid such 
circularity, health must be defined on the level of the organism as a 
whole and capture what it means for parts to be in a good state and for 
them to be functioning well. The most obvious candidate for such an 
account of health, defended, as we already saw, by Boorse, Wakefield, 
Railton, Foot, Korsgaard, and many others, is that parts function well if 
they facilitate self-preservation and reproductive success of the 
organism of which they form a part. If health is defined as a state in 
which an organism is successful at self-preservation and reproduction, 
then the effectiveness of functional parts can indeed be measured 
against a conceptually distinct level, namely that of successful self-
preservation of the organism. Parts would be functioning well or poorly 
depending on how well or poorly they promote the preservation and 
reproductive success of the organism. Although in the opening sections 
of the next chapter I will criticise this idea and attempt to salvage health 
from its identification with conditions for self-preservation and 
reproduction, it is important to point out that even though an 
organism’s health depends on the well-functioning of its parts, health 
itself cannot be defined in terms of well-functioning of parts.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
A Universal Theory of Health 
 
1. Towards a Capacity Account of Health 
 
1.1 Requirements for a Theory of Health 
In the previous chapter a meta-normative position was outlined 
according to which objects and events are objectively good for a living 
being if they promote its health and objectively bad if they do the 
opposite. Although normative judgements can be considered objective 
on this view, the position itself demands, and is conditional upon, 
health being something objective. That is, we must be able to define and 
specify the nature of health independently of subjective experience, 
attitudes, and preferences in order for the meta-normative position itself 
to hold. The task of this chapter is precisely to formulate such an 
account of health and to provide an answer to the central question of 
this thesis: what is health? 
From the foregoing discussions we can derive a number of criteria 
that a viable theory of health must meet. The first criterion is that the 
theory of health should be applicable to all forms of life. Whatever the 
properties and characteristics are that the concept health picks out, these 
properties and characteristics must be present across the complete 
manifold of life. Every living being has functional systems directed at 
their own sake that can function in better or worse ways, so all living 
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organisms must be able to expand and diminish their health. This first 
criterion immediately narrows down the options for an account of 
health and excludes the subjective elements we are supposed to avoid 
anyway. Notions like happiness, pleasure, and desire-satisfaction fail to 
generalise to most other forms of life and therefore cannot be the 
defining features of health—presuming, pace Canguilhem, that plants 
cannot feel happy and amoebas do not experience pleasure. A healthy 
fungus is something quite different from a healthy human being of 
course, but my claim will be that they are healthy in the same way: 
health retains the same meaning when predicated over different forms 
of life. Rather than being limited to some class of species, the account of 
health we require must capture the nature of health for all forms of life: 
it must be a universal account of health.  
The second criterion is that a theory of health must enable the 
evaluation of biological functions and functional parts. At the end of the 
last chapter I pointed out that health cannot be reduced to effective 
functioning of parts since the functioning of parts is itself evaluated in 
terms of how well it succeeds in sustaining the health of the organism as 
a whole. To avoid circularity, health must be defined on the level of the 
organism as a whole and have the form of a standard or principle 
against which the functioning of parts and subsystems can be evaluated.  
And third, the reference class with respect to which an organism’s 
health is evaluated must be fixed independently of subjective values 
and prejudices. Similar to Foot’s notion of a life-form, but unlike 
Boorse’s arguably more arbitrarily chosen reference classes, the 
reference class must be an objective category. 
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1.2 Health as Self-Preservation 
The most obvious and widely shared candidate for a theory of health 
based on these constraints—ubiquitous in the literature and deeply 
ingrained in our use of language and health care practices—is one 
whereby health is defined in terms of conditions for self-preservation.  
Health defined as conditions for self-preservation, perhaps even as 
conditions for ‘optimal’ self-preservation, would seamlessly meet the 
criteria we just defined for a universal theory of health. First, self-
preservation is applicable to every form of life; in fact, living beings are 
usually defined and distinguished from the non-living precisely on the 
basis of their ability to preserve and sustain themselves. Second, self-
preservation enables the evaluation of functional sub-systems. As we 
already saw in Boorse and Wakefield, functional subsystems can be 
evaluated on the basis of their contribution to the preservation of the 
organism of which they are a part. Biological functions too are usually 
defined precisely in this way, i.e. as directed at the preservation of the 
organism as a whole. Effective functioning of a cow’s digestive system 
and effective functioning of a plant’s photosynthetic cells involve 
radically different processes, but what they have in common, and what 
would unite them if they function well, is their success in preserving the 
life of the organism as a whole. And third, the reference class for this 
account of health is probably the species: health would be measured in 
terms of how well an organism preserves itself compared to how well or 
long it could preserve itself given the species to which it belongs. And 
species are objective reference classes, fixed independently of personal 
preferences and prejudices about health. 
129 
 
Reducing health to conditions for self-preservation would also fit 
well within the meta-normative position outlined in the previous 
chapter, where a sub-set of non-moral goods was said to reduce to what 
promotes the health of an organism. Especially in the context of animal 
and plant life it seems prima facie plausible that objective goods are 
indeed nothing other than things that helps to preserve and sustain an 
organism in its existence. The judgement that some plant or animal is 
healthy seems to express little beyond the impression that it will stay 
alive for an extended period of time and, perhaps, that it can endure 
some challenging conditions. In the previous chapter the example par 
excellence of an objectively bad object was a poison, i.e. a substance 
imposing death upon an organism. The ideal-type of an objective good 
is nutrition, i.e. something that nourishes an organism and helps to 
preserve it. It seems therefore quite reasonable to think that what is 
objectively good for an organism is indeed what helps to preserve it. 
Also in the context of human life we tend to identify health with 
successful self-preservation, at least if we look at typical health policies. 
Objects and behaviours standardly considered unhealthy and publicly 
disencouraged are the kind of objects and behaviours that result in a 
reduced life-expectancy, e.g. cigarettes, UV radiation, fatty diets, stress, 
general passivity, etc. Likewise, things we ordinarily think of as healthy 
are considered healthy in virtue of the fact that they reduce the risk for 
the most common causes of death and thus on average increase the 
longevity of our lives. I think it is fair to say that most health policy and 
discourse on human health is premised pretty straightforwardly on the 
idea that health consists in successful, if not optimal, self-preservation. 
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The idea that that health consists in successful self-preservation is 
also shared by a number of thinkers we already looked at: Boorse thinks 
health consists in internal parts giving their statistically typical 
contribution to self-preservation and reproduction; Wakefield argues 
health consists in parts performing the function they were selected for 
in evolution, which results in the preservation of the organism; Railton 
thinks well-being consists in states associated with survival and 
reproductive fitness;1 Foot thinks health consists in “development, self-
maintenance, and reproduction”—at least for plants and animals;2 and 
when Korsgaard reflects on health she also writes that “we should not 
call a condition healthy if it did not tend to maintain or extend life” and 
that it is “very nearly a tautology to say that good health will extend 
your life.”3  
The equation of health with self-preservation can be found 
everywhere, remains largely unquestioned, and pervades the very 
definitions of life and organic functions. And yet, it is this idea of health 
that I think we must call into question and seek to improve upon. It is 
obvious that preservation is in some way important to an organism’s 
health, as an organism cannot be healthy without at least preserving 
itself for some period of time. But the question I shall raise is whether 
self-preservation and reproductive success are indeed the defining 
features of health and whether these notions indeed fully capture what 
health is. After presenting several arguments against the health as self-
preservation identification, I will propose a different theory of health. 
                                                             
1 See Railton, “Moral Realism,” 179, footnote 21. 
2 Foot, Natural Goodness, 33. 
3 Korsgaard, “On Having a Good,” 17.  
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1.3 Salvaging Health from Self-Preservation 
One way to criticise the identification between health and conditions for 
optimal self-preservation is to show that it is possible for an organism to 
improve and diminish its health without affecting its life-expectancy. If 
this is indeed possible we would have good reasons for thinking that 
health does not correspond to conditions for self-preservation.  
Now, at the very least, it seems possible for an organism to 
diminish its health without shortening its life-expectancy. There are 
plenty of diseases that uncontroversially weaken and undermine 
human and non-human health without affecting life-expectation or 
reproductive success. We must either conclude that such diseases aren’t 
reductions in health or accept that health is something else, something 
that can diminish irrespective of the expected duration of life.4 If 
someone were to have his leg amputated after a bacterial infection, for 
instance, I think it would be safe to say this marks an uncontroversial 
reduction of his health. Yet, an amputated leg does not necessarily affect 
life-expectancy or reproductive success. Moreover, even if it turns out 
that amputees do on average live shorter lives and reproduce less 
prolifically, it seems strange to think that their health is reduced on the 
basis of these statistics alone. The reduced abilities they suffer from 
seem to be the more relevant features health loss, more so than life-
expectancy or reproductive success. One could of course object that in 
medically less advanced or socially less supportive societies the chances 
of survival would be significantly reduced after losing a leg. But this 
                                                             
4 The former option is defended in Robert E. Kendell, “The Concept of Disease and 
its Implications for Psychiatry,” The British Journal of Psychiatry 127 (1975): 305-315.  
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line of thinking easily leads to absurdities: someone unable to walk long 
distances on bare feet may not have survived long in prehistoric times, 
but this fact would not render someone unable to walk long distances 
without footwear unhealthy in the present. It seems beyond dispute, 
then, that not every disease and uncontroversial health reduction 
implies an earlier death or lowered reproductive success. And even 
when diseases do diminish life-expectancy it is not obvious that the 
reduced life-expectancy is indeed the defining feature of the health loss. 
The conceptual discrepancy between health and optimal self-
preservation can be shown to be even greater if we can establish the 
possibility of an organism increasing its life-expectancy after an 
uncontroversial reducing its health. If health consists in conditions for 
self-preservation, then the very idea of health impairments resulting in 
an increased life-expectancy would amount to a contradiction and an 
empirical impossibility. Various examples demonstrate that increased 
health and lower life-expectancy can coincide, however, and by no 
means constitute an impossibility of this kind. We could for instance 
think of an insect that normally dies after mating, like the male praying 
mantis. An inability to mate would result in a significantly longer life 
for the praying mantis, but the reproductive inability should probably 
count as a diminution of its health—at least not an improvement. Or, 
alternatively, we could think of a rodent with a chronic paw-injury, 
unable to sprint over exposed terrain and no longer capable of 
performing its treacherous leaps from one branch to another. The 
rodent’s health is uncontroversially compromised, it seems fair to claim, 
but it may end up growing exceptionally old whilst hiding out in its 
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burrow, hidden away from its natural predators. Or we could think of 
an infected tree no longer capable of growing fruits, yet living an 
extraordinarily long life as a result of being avoided by herbivores and 
fruit-eating insects. Increased life-expectancy may be unlikely in these 
cases, but the point is that the health of these organisms is at least not 
increased proportional to their augmented life-expectancy. Health 
impairments resulting in increased life-expectancy, although requiring 
some imagination, do not form a contradiction or an empirical 
impossibility. If someone were to insist that under ‘normal’ 
circumstances the aforementioned cases and all others like it would 
result in reduced life-expectancy and therefore qualify for states of ill-
health, it would have to be specified what ‘normal’ circumstances are 
and which likelihood of reduced life-expectancy is required for 
inabilities to qualify for a reduction in health. But regardless of how this 
is detailed, if health is indeed identical to the condition for self-
preservation it must be acknowledged that dysfunctions and inabilities 
resulting in greater life-expectancy are instances of improved health. 
And this is precisely where things would have been turned on their 
head: inabilities and incapacities are de facto signs of lessened health. 
For human life the difference between health and conditions for 
self-preservation seems even more self-evident. A life lived in complete 
conformity with the conditions for the longest possible life, thought in 
extremis—i.e. with fixed exercise routines and strict dietary constraints, 
absence of stress and ambition, limited exposure to sunlight, long spells 
of boredom, complete risk avoidance, etc.—would make for a poor 
caricature of a healthy human life and one we should criticise for reasons 
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of health. Especially for human beings the conditions required for self-
preservation do not seem to cover what it means to be healthy—a 
feature of human life that I will discuss later on. But the claim that 
conditions for self-preservation do not capture what it means for an 
organism to be healthy is not limited to human life.  
Health could be dislodged from its presumed identity with 
successful self-preservation further if we could establish the possibility 
that an organism’s health can improve without affecting life-expectancy, 
or the stronger case whereby an organism’s health improves at the 
expense of life-expectancy. These options would require an alternative 
account of health, however, one that has not yet been defined. So far I 
have relied on relatively uncontroversial cases of health reductions and 
argued that they do not necessarily shorten life and sometimes even 
extend it. But if we were to accept that health is best understood as an 
organism’s range of capacities, as I will argue below, then we could 
think of cases in which an organism’s capaciousness increases at the 
expense of life-expectancy, effectively creating the possibility for a 
tension between health-improvements and successful self-preservation. 
Other than raising counter-examples, we could also criticise the 
health as successful self-preservation thesis by asking what is good about 
an extended life and what is bad about death. On the second-order 
theory formulated in the previous chapter a subset of non-moral goods 
reduces to objects and events that promote an organism’s health. If this 
is true, and if health itself were indeed reducible to conditions for self-
preservation, then it follows that self-preservation corresponds to non-
moral goodness for an organism and death to non-moral badness; self-
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preservation would capture completely what it means for an organism 
to be in a good state. Nevertheless, it seems to me that mere self-
preservation, i.e. merely living on, or life-extension qua life-extension—
insofar it is possible to thematise this notion independently of what is 
effectively made possible by life-extension—is not of positive value for an 
organism. Think for instance of an organism living in a medically 
supported comatose state, incapable of any type of activity whatsoever 
and without prospects of waking up: the bare fact of living on does not 
seem to carry any positive value for an organism. Instead, it seems that 
the increased possibilities for activity that a longer life opens up bear the 
positive value and make self-preservation generally something good. 
And the same seems true about the badness of death: the mere 
transition to a state of non-living, or death qua death, is not bad for an 
organism. Death is something bad for an organism because it deprives it 
of its potential for any kind of further activity.5  
These considerations suggest that life-extension is something good 
for an organism and associated with health primarily because it 
increases an organism’s potential and scope for acting, not because life-
extension as such is healthy and of positive value. And likewise, death is 
something bad and absolutely unhealthy for an organism primarily 
because it limits and annuls an organism’s potential for acting. The 
concept of health, then, primarily seems to denote something along the 
lines of the scope of potential activity of an organism. If this is correct, 
                                                             
5 This latter claim is adopted from Thomas Nagel, “Death,” in Mortal Questions 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 1-10. While Nagel concludes that 
death deprives us of ‘possibilities’ in a general and undefined sense, I will argue 
that it is our ‘potential for activity’ that death reduces to a zero-point.   
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self-preservation would be important to health but only in an indirect 
way, viz. only insofar as successful self-preservation conditions an 
increase in potential for activity for the organism. The hypothesis with 
which I shall continue, derived from the criticisms towards the health as 
self-preservation hypothesis, is that health consists in a range of abilities 
and possible activities—a range that can be compromised by diseases, 
reduced to zero by death, and in part increased by life-extension. 
I should add that disconnecting health from conditions for self-
preservation in this qualified manner does not conflict with evolution 
theory. In short, evolution theory is an explanatory theory, also of the 
things that people subjectively value, but as an explanatory theory it 
does not warrant or justify any claims about what is in fact good for an 
organism.6 From the fact that that certain traits are adaptions, evolved 
through natural selection due to their positive effect on the replication 
of off-spring with the genetic material responsible for the trait, nothing 
follows about what is good for the being with the respective traits. 
Evolution theory therefore does not conflict with the claim that an 
expansion of abilities outside the economy of survival and reproduction 
is good for organisms and a token of health. And the same applies to the 
idea that reductions of abilities irrelevant to an organism’s chances for 
survival are something bad and a token of lessened health. What the 
above considerations suggest, I shall therefore maintain, is that health 
consists in an organism’s abilities and capacities—to some extent 
irrespective of their chances for survival. 
                                                             
6 See for further discussion: Sharon Street, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist 
Theories of Value,” Philosophical Studies 127:1 (2006): 109-166. 
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1.4 Capacities and the Theoretical Constraints 
In presenting arguments against the idea that healthiness reduces to 
conditions for self-preservation and reproductive success, the idea 
surfaced that health refers to an organism’s abilities and possibilities for 
activity. A shorthand and preliminary way of describing abilities and 
possibilities for activity would be to speak of an organism’s capacities—
or rather, an organism’s ‘set’ or ‘range’ of capacities. The hypothesis I 
shall explore further is that an organism is healthier if it possess a 
greater range of capacities, and that it is less healthy or indeed in a 
pathological state if it has a smaller or significantly reduced set of 
capacities. Before detailing this account further, I will first attempt to 
show that a ‘capacity account’ of health, roughly defined along these 
lines, meets the three requirements for a universal theory of health. 
 With respect to the first criterion, we can point out that every 
living being has capacities, so a capacity account of health could indeed 
apply to all forms of life. Every living being acts in some way, if only by 
growing and maintaining its form, and can be attributed a prior 
capacity for these activities. Capacities are not restricted to living 
beings, as inanimate objects like computers, batteries and engines also 
have capacities. Overextension to the non-living domain is no weakness 
of the account; in fact, I will argue that this is an important strength of a 
capacity approach to health. But for now it is only required to establish 
that capacities can indeed be attributed to all forms of life.  
 More contentious is the second requirement: the way in which an 
account of health must enable the evaluation of functional parts. This 
requires a distinction between an organism’s set of capacities on the one 
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hand, and the functioning of its parts on the other. Not only must this 
be a meaningful distinction, it must also apply to all forms of life if a 
capacity account of health is indeed a candidate for a universal theory of 
health. And most importantly, it must make sense to evaluate functional 
parts in terms of capacities of the organism as a whole. These three 
concerns demand more careful consideration.  
Although a distinction between biological functions and capacities 
of the organism as a whole is fairly easily drawn for complex organisms, 
the distinction is more tenuous in the sphere of the smallest forms of 
life. What would be the capacities of unicellular organisms like bacteria, 
for instance?—capacities made possible by underlying functions like 
protein synthesis and other metabolic processes? In unicellular life a 
distinction between functions of parts and capacities of the whole 
almost seems to collapse. Despite this near collapse, I think we can 
maintain the claim that all living beings have capacities on the level of 
the whole made possible by underlying biological functions, also for 
unicellular organisms. Capacities of bacteria could include the capacity 
for fission and multiplication—capacities made possible by some set of 
underlying biological functions. But also capacities like the synthesis 
and breakdown of external substances, the capacity to cause necrosis in 
tissues of a host organism, or something like the capacity to colour 
surrounding solutions could be counted amongst the capacities of 
bacteria considered as wholes. Functional parts enable the bacterium to 
manifest these capacities, of course, but the bacterium as a whole, rather 
than any of its parts is the reference-point for these activities. 
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 The fact that bacteria do not possess many capacities on the level 
of the organism as a whole implies that variations in health are minimal 
in these regions of life; it would explain why it is indeed almost 
meaningless to speak of ‘healthy’ bacteria and fungi. What matters for 
our purposes, though, is that capacities can be identified across all 
forms of life and differentiated from underlying biological functions, 
enabling the evaluation of parts against a distinct level of capacities.  
The distinction between functions of parts and capacities of 
organisms as wholes is even more complex in the case of bacteria, 
because bacteria can also be functional parts of larger organisms. The 
bacteria in our stomachs, for instance, are functional parts of our bodies 
and therefore also influence our health. On the account of health now 
under consideration, evaluating bacteria qua functional parts of larger 
organisms means evaluating how the bacteria influence the range of 
capacities of the organism of which they are a part, just like any other 
functional part can be evaluated in terms of its capacity-supporting or 
capacity-inhibiting effects. Bacteria can thus be evaluated in two 
different ways: as organisms themselves, comprised of functional parts 
and with a degree of health of their own, and as functional parts of 
larger organisms whose capacities they can facilitate or constrain. And 
these two levels of evaluation can indeed conflict: a bacterium can itself 
be in a functionally good state and have a wide range of capacities, 
while at the same time being detrimental to the health of the organism 
in which it resides. To make these distinctions somewhat clearer and to 
try and systematise the choice of terminology, the following schematic 
overview might be of help:      
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  Functional part  Organism as a whole    
 
 Doing well to function well being healthy 
  or effectively   
   
 The meaning of to condition a wide  to have a wide range  
 doing well range of capacities for of capacities 
   the organism as a whole   
   
 Doing poorly to function poorly or being less healthy, or 
  or ineffectively diseased, or ill 
 
 The meaning of to constrain the range of to be constrained  
 doing poorly capacities for the and to have a small 
  organism as a whole  range of capacities 
    
    
   
Capacities of unicellular organisms include capacities for fissure, 
the synthesis and breaking down of substances, and so on. For plants 
we may think of capacities for growth, blossoming, growing fruits, 
emanating scents, directing leaves towards the sun, etc. In the animal 
kingdom, with the structural properties for locomotion, perception, 
communication, the range of abilities and capacities of organisms 
increases exponentially. And human beings of course have a variety of 
capacities spanning an even wider range, mainly due to our cognitive 
powers. This does not imply that a squirrel is healthier than a cactus 
plant, of course, or that human beings are de facto the healthiest beings 
on earth; comparisons of health are possible only between different 
states of one organism or between two specimens of the same species—
something I will return to in §2.4 when specifying the reference classes. 
Table 1 
141 
 
The basic idea, then, is that functional parts function well and 
effectively if they maintain or increase the range of capacities of the 
organism of which they are a part. Consider for instance the capacity of 
a shark to swim. Functional parts like the shark’s cardiovascular system, 
its musculoskeletal apparatus, and its metabolic system together 
condition the shark’s swimming abilities. If a shark were to develop the 
capacity to swim faster, accelerate more swiftly, or turn more sharply, 
the shark would be a healthier shark on a capacity account of health, 
and thus have better functioning parts, ceteris paribus, than a shark that 
doesn’t have these additional capacities. And importantly, the more 
capacious shark is healthier and has better functioning parts not because 
of its enhanced chances of survival; the idea is that the greater 
capaciousness as such renders it a healthier shark. For even if the 
increased abilities would undermine its chances for survival, e.g. if an 
enhanced leaping capacity would make it more susceptible to being 
harpooned by fishermen, the expansion of abilities still marks an 
increase in the shark’s overall health.  
Evaluation of functional parts in terms of their contribution to the 
organism’s set of capacities is not only possible for all forms of life, there 
are also good reasons for thinking that it is better to evaluate parts in this 
way, especially compared to evaluation of parts in terms of their 
contribution to self-preservation. Consider for instance the functioning 
of a cardiovascular system. It is obvious that a severely dysfunctional 
cardio-vascular system immediately results in death, while effective 
functioning will help keep the organism alive. But this is not the be all 
and end all of its well-functioning. Someone’s heart condition may be 
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life-sustaining but still inhibit the individual in various ways—by 
precluding intense physical activity, for instance. A defender of the 
health as self-preservation thesis could of course argue that this 
individual would not survive under demanding conditions and therefore 
has a poor-functioning cardio-vascular system. But not all activities 
precluded by a poor functioning cardio-vascular system will result in 
death when attempted; some activities are simply not achievable and 
realisable anymore. The capacity restrictions following poor functioning 
of parts signify lessened health without necessarily impacting on self-
preservation. A better way to evaluate functional parts may therefore 
indeed be to evaluate them in terms of the range of capacities of the 
organism they enable or exclude—a range reduced to zero if a part’s 
poor functioning indeed causes death, but a range that is also 
compromised if poor functioning merely inhibits certain activities. 
Also in the case of exceptionally well-functioning of parts does a 
capacity account of health seem to capture better what it means for 
them to be functioning exceptionally well. We no doubt want to 
maintain that a cardio-vascular system is in a functionally better state if 
it enables a person to run over longer distances, walk up hills more 
rapidly, and engage in all kinds of other intensive physical activities. If 
the functioning of parts were evaluated strictly in terms of their 
contribution to the preservation of the whole, it would be unclear when 
an exceptionally well-functioning cardio-vascular system would indeed 
be exceptionally well-functioning, as it would be so only if it positively 
impacts on the organism’s success at self-preservation; only if the ability 
to engage in intensive physical activities would result in higher chances 
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of survival would the cardio-vascular system actually be better function. 
If the functioning of parts were evaluated in terms of the range of 
capacities they condition, however, as I suggest, a cardio-vascular 
system functions exceptionally well when it enables a large amount of 
capacities for the organism as a whole, to some extent independently of 
whether these activities positively affect chances for survival. 
At this point of the analysis of what it means for a part to be well-
functioning someone like Boorse might still agree. Although Boorse 
defines health as absence of disease, he claims that ‘positive health’ 
describes situations where functional parts perform their function in a 
statistically supra-normal way.7 Boorse’s account of positive health 
remains tied to the idea of self-preservation, however, in a way that my 
account is not. On Boorse’s view a part functions abnormally well only 
if it performs its self-preserving function better than what is statistically 
normal. A well-functioning cardio-vascular system enabling more 
intense physical activities would thus fall under Boorse’s idea of 
positive health; the self-preserving function of the cardio-vascular 
system is simply carried out better than what is statistically normal. 
A capacity account of health, by contrast, has more radical 
implications and takes the evaluation of functional parts outside the 
economy of self-preservation. To show this, we must briefly return to 
the discussion of ‘spandrels’, touched on before in Chapter One (§3). 
Recall Wakefield’s thesis that an organ or functional part is 
dysfunctional if it fails to fulfil the function evolution selected it for, 
which was criticised for falsely excluding disorders and health-
                                                             
7 See especially Boorse, “Rebuttal on Health,” 8.  
144 
 
reductions resulting from spandrel failure. Not only failures in 
functions directed at self-preservation can constitute a disorder but also 
failures in non-adaptive functions of organs can constitute an instance 
of lessened health, I agreed with Murphy and Woolfolk. Now, the 
capacity account of health under consideration, in its crudest form, 
states that the greater the set of capacities an organism possesses the 
healthier it is. Hence, on this account, the more capacities a functional 
part enables the better or more effectively the part functions. In addition 
to a part’s contribution to self-preservation, spandrels therefore play an 
important role: if a part has functions that support a wide range of 
capacities for the organism, also if these capacities have no bearing on 
the preservation of the whole, these extra functions are constitutive of 
an organism’s health. Likewise, spandrel failure resulting in reduced 
capacities for the organism signifies a decline in its health, which, in 
turn, means that the part functions less well, even if the part continues to 
successfully carry out its role in self-preservation. The capacity account 
of health therefore does not restrict the evaluation of functional parts to 
their contribution to self-preservation alone, but incorporates the full 
range of spandrels within its evaluative scope. The more capacities a 
part’s spandrels condition, the more capacities the organism has and the 
healthier the organism is—and so in a roundabout way, the better the 
part functions. Instead of Boorse’s claim that a part functions 
exceptionally well only if it is more efficient in fulfilling its role in self-
preservation, a capacity account of health implies that a part is in a 
functionally better state if it enables a wider range of capacities for the 
organism—including those unnecessary for self-preservation. 
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To illustrate this latter point we could return to the example 
previously employed—human hands. Evaluating the well-functioning 
of hands in terms of their contribution to self-preservation proved 
wholly insufficient; it would only measure how well hands execute their 
gripping functions, which barely captures the variety of ways in which 
our hands can be dysfunctional and constrictive of our health. A 
capacity account of health, by contrast, makes it possible to claim that 
hands are in a functionally better state if they support a wider range of 
capacities for the individual, also if these capacities have no bearing on 
self-preservation. Put simply, the more we can do with our hand the 
better they function—and this includes spandrel-based capacities like 
hand writing, playing the piano, throwing baseballs, and mastering 
origami. The capacity account of health implies that a hand is in a 
functionally good state if it supports a wide range of capacities for the 
person as a whole, and in a functionally bad state if they pose structural 
limitations to the range of capacities.  
Labouring the distinction between functions and capacities in this 
manner aims to demonstrate three points, all of which were part of the 
second requirement for a viable theory of health: an organism’s 
capacities can be distinguished from underlying functional parts; the 
distinction between capacities of the organisms and the functioning of 
its parts can be maintained across all forms of life; and most importantly, 
a part’s functioning is evaluated more adequately when evaluated in 
terms of how many capacities it supports for the organism as a whole—
more adequately, in any case, than when parts are evaluated strictly in 
terms of their contribution to self-preservation.  
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Before moving on there is one more theoretical constraint we need 
to consider, viz. the objectivity of reference classes. So far I have only 
explored the hypothesis that health consists in a range of capacities of 
some kind without mentioning any reference classes. When detailing 
the capacity account of health further in the second part of this chapter I 
will introduce three different reference classes relative to which the 
health of an organism can be measured: the species, the individual 
organism, and the individual organism at some point in its existence. 
The final verdict on whether these three reference classes are derived 
from prior valuations about what is healthy and unhealthy or whether 
they are indeed objective, will have to be postponed until after they 
have been described in greater detail. But by way of anticipation, the 
main idea is that an organism’s health consists in a range of capacities 
vis-à-vis a maximum of capacities that the organism could have given 
the species that it belongs to, given the individual organism that it is, 
and given the individual organism that it has become at some point in 
its life. And I will claim this to be an entirely factual matter—
unmediated, in any case, by subjective preferences and attitudes. 
On the basis of these considerations, I believe we may tentatively 
conclude that a capacity approach to health meets the theoretic 
requirements formulated at the beginning of the chapter: capacities 
apply to all living beings; capacities are conceptually distinct from 
biological functions and enable the evaluation of functional parts; and 
capacities can be measured against an objective reference class—
although the latter claim still has to be examined more closely.  
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1.5 Further Advantages of a Capacity Approach  
Before spelling out the capacity approach in greater detail, there are 
several further advantages to the approach worth highlighting. Going 
back to the problem cases levelled against the health as self-preservation 
thesis, a capacity approach to health could explain why an organism’s 
health can improve and worsen without changing life-expectancy; on a 
capacity approach it is possible for organisms to gain or lose capacities 
without necessarily influencing chances for survival or reproductive 
success. Likewise, diseases that do not affect life-expectancy could be 
understood as systematic reductions in capacities of the organism, 
either in the present or the future, but as conditions that simply do not 
bring about an earlier death. 
Although my primary concern is the nature of health, a capacity 
account of health also has ramification for the way we understand 
pathology. On a capacity account of health it is a necessary (but not 
sufficient) requirement for pathology that it reduces the range of 
capacities of an organism. This implication seems correspond to all the 
paradigm cases: whether we consider orthopaedic, cardiovascular, 
neurological, endocrine, congenital, or psychiatric diseases, the common 
denominator is that diseases involve a reduction in capacities for the 
organism as a whole. Pathology incapacitates: a shoulder lesion inhibits 
one to lift something; intermittent claudication reduces the capacity to 
walk; aphasia limits the capacity for speech; anxiety disorders limit 
one’s capacities for specific actions; and so on. A capacity approach 
therefore seems to get it right that reduced capaciousness is a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for diseases.  
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This also opens the possibility for disconnecting pathology from a 
reliance on ‘natural’ functions, or even worse, ‘design’. We saw before 
that Wakefield considers conditions like albinism, reversal of heart 
position, and fused toes to be dysfunctions, falling short of being 
disorders because societies do not consider them harmful. A capacity 
account of health does not require social standards to establish that 
these conditions are not pathological; neither condition constrains the 
range of capacities of the person in any way and so neither qualifies for 
an impairment of health. And the same would be true for something 
like homosexuality, which on the accounts of Boorse and Wakefield do 
not necessarily escape the verdict of being a disorder. Since 
homosexuality has no impact whatsoever on one’s range of capacities it 
is not a pathological condition, regardless of what one might consider 
the ‘natural’ function of our reproductive parts or the ‘design’ of our 
bodies.    
Although diseases necessarily imply a reduction in capacities, they 
are not straightforward opposites of health. If a spell of disease results 
in an increase in capaciousness, then on the suggested account of 
disease it is to be judged as health-promoting and thus something that is 
objectively good for an organism. There are at least two ways in which 
illness and disease can be part of health. First, a disease may have an 
effect comparable to a vaccination and create a state of resistance or 
immunity. The health improvement would consist in immunity towards 
specific threats and organic disturbances and so an ability to retain one’s 
capacities under a wider set of circumstances. Canguilhem recognised 
this point as well and wrote: “the possible abuse of health is part of 
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health.”8 This is all little more than common sense and the reason why it 
is generally considered healthy for children to go through periods of 
illness. A second way in which disease can be part of health is because it 
can improve an organism’s capacities for recovery and convalescence. 
After a disease an organism may achieve greater resilience, so that it can 
absorb and overcome a greater intensity of pathology. We may quote 
Canguilhem here again, when he writes: “to be in good health means 
being able to fall sick and recover, it is a biological luxury.”9 And 
similarly: “The measure of health is a certain capacity to overcome 
organic crises and to establish a new physiological order, different from 
the old. Health is the luxury of being able to fall ill and recover.”10 But 
clearly not every disease ends up enhancing the degree of biological 
luxury. Diseases could also cause lasting reductions in an organism’s set 
of capacities and thus be straightforwardly opposed to health. If a 
disease imposes death on an organism it is even the absolute antagonist 
of health, a reduction of capacities to an absolute zero point. Disease 
and illness are therefore ambiguous phenomena: under certain 
circumstances or for certain individuals a disease can be conducive to 
health, while in other circumstance or for other individuals a disease 
can be straightforwardly health-negating and life-destroying. 
Something like a stomach bug may in the long run result in an increased 
resistance and increased capaciousness—by increasing the capacity to 
                                                             
8 Canguilhem, Normal and Pathological, 200 
9 Canguilhem, Normal and Pathological, 199 
10 Georges Canguilhem, “The Normal and the Pathological,” in Knowledge of Life, 
ed. Paola Marrati and Todd Meyers, trans. Stefanos Geroulanos and Daniela 
Ginsburg (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 132. 
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digest certain foods for instance. In the sphere of mental health a 
depressive episode may result in deepened self-knowledge and the 
overcoming of life-events that exerted inhibiting effects, which would 
equally widen one’s range of capacities. On the other hand, a stomach 
infection may also have lasting negative effects, just as periods of 
depression can be utterly detrimental to one’s health. One of the virtues 
of a capacity approach to health is that it draws out this ambiguity and 
provides a relatively clear model on how to differentiate beneficial from 
disadvantageous periods of illness.  
A final advantage of the capacity approach to health worth 
pointing out is that for human beings it makes for a unified theory of 
health—one that includes physical, mental, and social components. 
Rather than distinguishing physical health, mental health, and social 
health and somehow forging them together into a mysterious 
cumulative notion ‘Health’, as the 1946 WHO definition of health 
famously has it, the total set of capacities captures and describes health 
as a unitary phenomenon.11 The range of capacities of organisms 
endowed with psychic life is determined partly by their psychic states. 
A depressed athlete, for instance, may become incapable of carrying out 
even the most basic of daily activities and therefore be judged as being 
in very poor health. The psychic dimension of health is not only 
relevant but also equally objective: psychic conditions influence one’s 
overall capaciousness just as bodily conditions do. Psychological factors 
                                                             
11 World Health Organization, “WHO definition of Health,” in Frank P. Grad, “The 
Preamble of the Constitution of the World Health Organization,” Bulletin of the 
World Health Organization 80:12 (2002): 984. 
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are not less objective or somehow less real than physical ailments. In 
fact, once human health is taken to refer to the full range of capacities it 
becomes problematic to claim that someone is physically healthy but 
mentally not, or that one is mentally healthy despite being physical ill. 
On the proposed view health consists in the range of capacities of 
human beings as a whole—a range conditioned by both physical and 
psychic factors. A capacity account of health not only grasps health in a 
unified sense, then, it simultaneously restricts it to this sense as well.  
To sum up, additional advantages of a capacity approach to health 
are that it renders intelligible how health can improve and worsen 
independently of changes in life-expectancy; that it explains the nature 
of positive health; that it provides a necessary condition for disease and 
illness; that it is capable of accounting for the ambiguous value of 
disease and illness; and finally, that it allows for a unified account of 
health, rendering psychic and social determinants equally important in 
evaluations of human health. This first characterisation of a capacity 
approach to health, I think, therefore warrants a more rigorous and 
detailed analysis, to which I shall turn now. 
  
1.6 Capacities Further Analysed   
An organism’s health improves when its range of capacities expands 
and it deteriorates when its range of capacities shrinks. This kind of talk 
about capacities was merely a short-hand way of saying that health 
consists in a potential for activities that an organism is able to carry out. 
Although this rough characterisation made it possible to argue for the 
attractiveness of the approach, it must now be defined more precisely.  
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The first important characteristic of a capacity approach to health 
is that it refers to what an organism is capable of doing. That is, 
capacities primarily refer to the activities that an organism is able to 
carry out or. The word ‘activity’ is preferable over ‘action’ here, as 
‘action’ is traditionally reserved for what is intentionally done by 
human agents, involving at least some processes of rational 
deliberation. ‘Activity’ is used less restrictively in the tradition and will 
therefore be more suitable to denote the behaviours and manifestations 
exhibited by all organisms. I shall simultaneously reserve ‘activities’ for 
the domain of life, excluding manifestations of inanimate things. The 
eruption of volcanos or the erosive effects of rivers on their banks are 
therefore not genuine activities on my use of the term; they are activities 
only insofar as we speak metaphorically of the movements of inanimate 
entities, i.e. only when we speak as if rivers and volcanos were living 
beings. The first point to note about the capacity approach to health, in 
any case, is that it refers to the range of activities that an organism is able 
to carry out or manifest.  
Capacities are of course not activities currently being carried out, 
just as evaluations of an organism’s health do not describe what an 
organism is doing at a specific point in time. Capacities are properties 
required for the execution of activities, activities that may or may not be 
carried out in the future. Capacities are nevertheless genuine properties 
of things, possessed in the present tense. Statements about an 
organism’s health are evaluations of the present state of an organism, 
even though on the proposed account of health the most relevant factors 
are the activities it can exhibit in the future. A capacity approach to 
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health therefore identifies health with a potential for activities. ‘Potential’ 
is preferable over ‘possibility’ here, as ‘possibility’ generally denotes the 
external circumstances under which potentials may or may not be 
realised. An organism can have the potential to fly thousands of miles, 
for instance, but lack the possibility if it is locked inside a cage. Even 
though natural language is not all too strict here, I will henceforth stick 
to the distinction that an organism’s capacities condition its potential 
activities, while the possibility of their manifestation depends on external 
circumstances.  
The proposed capacity approach to health centres on the idea that 
the ‘range’, or ‘set’, or ‘scope’ of capacities determines the level of an 
organism’s health. On this approach, health therefore refers to a 
multiplicity of potential activities that an organism has or is able to carry 
out. Just as an organism’s capacities are amongst their actual properties, 
so is their number, range, set, or scope. A capacity approach to health is 
an approach whereby variations in multiplicity of potential activities 
correspond to variations in health. The multiplicity of potential 
activities determines whether one state of an organism S1 is healthier 
than another state of the same organism S2, or whether organism X of 
species α is healthier than organism Y of species α.  
One crucial element is still lacking in this more precise 
formulation of the capacity approach to health, viz. a reference to the 
species necessary to mark off the relevant capacities; that is, we still 
need a reference class. A reference class is ineliminable from an account 
of health for two reasons. First, health judgements do not merely state 
how many capacities an organism has and how great its potential for 
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activities is. A mere numbering or listing of capacities does not 
determine whether an organism is healthy or not; we know whether it is 
health only in contrast with a maximum of capacities that it could have, 
i.e. in contrast to a norm. And second, without a maximum set by a 
reference class there would be infinitely many activities that organisms 
lack a potential for, which would render every organism de facto 
infinitely unhealthy, which is absurd. The variation in multiplicity of 
potential activity of an organism has, what I shall call, factual limitations: 
limitations fixed by the species to which the organism belongs. Trees are 
factually incapable of flying, orcas will never be able to climb up a 
mountain, and human beings shall never grow mangoes out of their 
armpits, and these incapacities do not compromise their respective 
degrees of health. Every species has intrinsic, factual limitations to what 
a specimen belonging to the species can have a potential for. On the 
proposed view, then, assessing an organism’s health means comparing 
its multiplicity of potential activity vis-à-vis the factual limitations of the 
species. An organism is completely healthy—that is, healthy in a way 
that does not permit of any further improvement—when its multiplicity 
of potential activity coincides with the species-bound factual limitations, 
i.e. when the organism can perform all possible species-specific 
activities.12  
 
                                                             
12 The species-relativity of maximum capacity is not identical to species-normality. If 
a statistically normal orca cannot jiggle itself on and off a beach, for instance, then 
an orca capable of doing this, other things being equal, is a more capacious and 
thus a healthier orca than the statistically normal one. 
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On a more precise definition of the capacity approach to health, 
then, we find that health consists in a multiplicity of potential activity vis-
à-vis factual limitations. This is the definition of health that will be 
developed further and analysed in piece-meal fashion in the rest of this 
chapter, and defended against various objections in the next chapter.  
 
 
2. Health as the Multiplicity of Potential Activity  
vis-à-vis Factual Limitations 
  
The purpose of the second part of this chapter is to analyse the idea that 
health consists in a multiplicity of potential activity vis-à-vis factual 
limitations in greater detail. Each element of this account of health 
comes with specific problems and important implications. In the 
following sections the aim is to clarify health as a unitary phenomenon 
while elucidating each element of the definition. The concern is still a 
universal account of health, i.e. one that applies to all forms of life. More 
specific considerations regarding human health will be addressed in the 
following two chapters.  
 
2.1 Multiplicity  
Variations in health correspond to variations in multiplicity of potential 
activity, which I will henceforth abbreviate as MPA. The greater an 
organism’s MPA the greater it’s health, and vice versa―this is the basic 
principle of the account of health under consideration.  
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The idea that an organism’s health refers to a multiplicity of some 
kind points to the idea that health denotes something essentially 
quantitative. The most natural way to understand a multiplicity is to 
identify, separate and add up individual units, in this case the activities 
that an organism has a potential for. So we could take any organism at 
any point in its life, say a squirrel at some time t1, and count the 
potential activities it could perform at that point: digging a hole, 
cracking acorns, jumping over branches, climbing trees, etc. The larger 
the set or range of potential activities the healthier the squirrel. 
Although the account of health was roughly introduced along these 
lines, it suffers from one major deficit, viz. its failure to account for the 
fact that potential activity also extends into the future. In addition to 
what an organism is currently capable of doing health refers to what an 
organism is capable of doing in the future, and for how long, given its 
current state of being. This was the indirect way in which self-
preservation was said to be relevant to health. In addition to working 
out this temporal aspect of multiplicity I shall question whether health 
corresponds to a quantitative multiplicity or whether it refers to, what 
Henri Bergson calls, a ‘qualitative multiplicity’. Both these issues shall 
be addressed in an effort to elucidate what is meant by ‘multiplicity’. 
  
2.1a Multiplicity and Time 
First I shall turn to the temporal dimension of the multiplicity expressed 
in health judgements. Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the idea is 
by means of graphs, beginning with one representing the deceptive idea 
that multiplicity refers to what an organism currently has a capacity for. 
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The horizontal axis in Graph 1 stands for a period of time and the 
vertical axis signifies a numerical index of potential activities, with t0 
being some random point in the squirrel’s life. At each point in time the 
squirrel is capable of performing some given set of activities, indicated 
by the lowest line and the lightly shaded surface below it. The MPA 
increases between t0 and t2, indicating an increase in health, e.g. if the 
squirrel has been well-nourished for some time and gained abilities it 
previously didn’t have. After t2 the MPA drops significantly, possibly 
due to disease, hunger, or an accident, while at t3 recovery begins—a 
recovery that never fully restores the level of health the squirrel had 
before. At t4 the MPA is reduced to zero, meaning our squirrel has died. 
The upper line and darker shade represents the factual limitations of the 
species, indicating the factual limits to what the squirrel could have 
been able to do, and for how long, given the fact that it is a squirrel.  
This representation of the account of health may look consistent 
with what I said so far, but it misrepresents the temporal aspect of 
health. An organism’s level of health does not just denote what it is 
capable of doing in the present, but also, and probably for the most part, 
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what it is capable of doing in the future. A healthy sprout, cub, or child 
is not healthy on the basis of the few things it is capable of doing early 
in life, but healthy in virtue of harbouring a potential for activities in the 
future. An unhealthy sprout, cub, or child is not necessarily 
compromised in its typical sprout, cub, and child activities; its health-
deficit often lies in the constraints to its future potential activities. Or 
consider an animal with a malign form of cancer, still able to execute all 
activities available to the species. The animal is not unhealthy due to 
any current constraints in its action-potential, but unhealthy due to the 
loss of potential for activities it is bound to suffer in the near future. In 
short, the relevant multiplicity is not limited to current activities but 
also includes the potentialities the organism is expected to have in the 
future given its current state of being. The multiplicity therefore requires 
a different graphic representation than Graph 1. A better way to 
represent the nature of health, I suggest, would be the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2 
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This requires some explanation. While the first graph represented 
health over a period of time, Graph 2 aims to characterise the health of 
an organism only at one single point in time. The variety of activities the 
organism is currently capable of carrying out determines the width of 
the base of the lightly shaded triangle and falls within a wider shade 
representing factual limitations to how much the organism could 
possibly be capable of given the species that it belongs to. Each living 
being has a projected point of death, here indicated with ‘p.d.’, which 
again falls within the darker shade of factually given or ‘intrinsic’ age-
limitations.13 The height or depth of the pyramid marks life-expectancy 
along an axis of projected time and thus does not represent any actual 
passage of time or the actual moment of death. Actual death, on this 
type of graph, would be represented by an empty plane containing 
neither MPA nor factual limitations: MPA and factual limitations would 
coincide in being zero. The organism’s health is represented by the total 
size of the area of the lightly shaded triangle. This kind of graph 
represents more adequately how health is a function of current 
capacities as well as capacities projected to be had in the future—despite 
remaining overly simplistic and suggesting that capacities decrease 
linearly. The size of the area spread out over this two-dimensional plane 
constitutes the multiplicity of potential activity, i.e. the health of the 
organism.  
                                                             
13 Not every life-form has intrinsic age-limitations, however; there are for instance 
types of trees that can in principle live on forever. Such rare cases do not 
fundamentally alter the picture of health, however, as there still is a projected point 
of death—all organisms die eventually. The projected point of death, as well as the 
limitations within which it must fall, are just wholly indeterminate.  
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With this type of representation we may return to some of 
examples that I used in the preceding sections and provide some further 
graphic illustration. Graph 3 would be a way to represent a human life 
lived in complete conformity with the longest possible life, or indeed 
the injured rodent growing old in its burrow.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
This graph illustrates why both human and rodent are in poor 
health, despite expected to realise the maximum possible longevity; the 
total surface area of potential activity remains relatively small. We may 
now also appreciate why such a life can be criticised for reasons of 
health; a healthier life would have been possible given what is factually 
possible for it. An organism that increases its potentiality at the expense 
of it its projected life-span may turn out to be in a far healthier state on 
this model, as the total MPA will be significantly greater, illustrated by 
the increased surface space of the light shaded triangle in graph 4.  
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These illustrations should help clarify how a one-dimensional 
numerical model of multiplicity falls short and how the multiplicity that 
health consists in is one that spreads out into a dimension of projected 
time. In short, the multiplicity referred to in judgements of health is one 
that obtains at a single point in time, which could be any moment in an 
organism’s life, but the multiplicity that obtains at that point, i.e. the 
level of health then possessed, is partly constituted by the scope of the 
projected future and the number of capacities projected to be had 
therein—all based on an organism’s current state of being. 
 
2.1b Quantitative and Qualitative Multiplicity 
A further question about the multicity constitutive of health is whether 
it is indeed a quantitative multiplicity or whether it is what Henri 
Bergson calls a ‘qualitative multiplicity’. A few words on Bergson’s 
notion of a qualitative multiplicity are required to answer this question.  
Bergson develops the notion of a qualitative multiplicity in his 
work on consciousness, where he argues that conscious states cannot be 
separated and treated as individual unities in the way that deterministic 
theories of mind tend to presuppose.14 Bergson claims that in immediate 
experience we find that conscious states continually fuse together, 
permeate one another, and form a continuous, indivisible flow.15 As a 
result, consciousness does not lend itself for division, partitioning, 
numbering, and counting—i.e. the type of procedures he considers 
                                                             
14 Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness, 
trans. F. L. Pogson (London: George Allen & Company, 1913).  
15 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 75-87. The technical name for this indivisible flow is 
Bergson’s famous notion of ‘duration’. 
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necessary for deterministic theories of mind. On the basis of this insight 
Bergson differentiates between two different kinds of multiplicity: a 
‘numerical’ or ‘quantitative’ multiplicity on the on hand, and what he 
called a ‘continuous’ or ‘qualitative’ multiplicity on the other.16 A 
numerical or quantitative multiplicity is made up from individual and 
separable units, like a collection of extended objects positioned in space, 
which can unproblematically be added up. A continuous multiplicity, 
by contrast, pertains to the non-extended sphere where a certain flow or 
continuous becoming unfolds—constituting a multiplicity that, whilst 
being multiple, essentially remains indivisible. While changes in a 
numerical multiplicity are quantitative changes, i.e. changes in number, 
changes in a continuous multiplicity are qualitative changes; conscious 
experience changes in quality rather than number when experiences 
appear or disappear, intensify or weaken.17  
Of these two options presented by Bergson, I think it is evident 
that the multiplicity denoted by health is a quantitative multiplicity, just 
as the norms against which an organism’s MPA is measured in health-
judgements are quantitatively defined. On the proposed view it is the 
number of activities that an organism can manifest that determines its 
degree of health. When health improves the quantity of potential 
activities increases and when health worsens the quantity drops. The 
multiplicity referred to in judgements about an organisms health, is 
therefore first and foremost a quantitative multiplicity. 
                                                             
16 Bergson, Time and Free Will, 87.  
17 Deleuze’s commentary on Bergson’s work is particularly clear on the qualitative 
aspect of a continuous multiplicity. See Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. Hugh 
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1991), 42.  
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This is not to deny that changes in health cannot be experienced as 
qualitative changes—changes that are continuous, that fuse with one 
another, and that constitute a certain indivisible colouring of one’s 
experiences. When my health deteriorates I will indeed experience this 
as a qualitative change rather than a quantitative alteration of some 
kind. My experience of falling ill does not consist in a number dropping 
on an internal potentiality index. Health loss is revealed to me in 
qualitative way: I feel weaker, incapacitated, and experience that my 
horizon of possibilities has narrowed down. Health may therefore be 
subjectively experienced as a qualitative multiplicity of a certain a kind. 
Such changes to a qualitative multiplicity, I suggest, could best be 
understood as the experiential counter-part of what objectively occurs 
when health improves or worsens. There is no reason to favour or 
prioritise the qualitative dimension, however, for if we were to do so the 
problems inherent to subjective accounts of health would immediately 
reappear: organisms without a nervous system do not experience a 
qualitative multiplicity and so could not improve or impair their health; 
it is possible to experience an intensification of a qualitative multiplicity 
while in reality the scope of one’s potential for activities actually drops, 
(e.g. in a state of drunken euphoria); and the situations in which a 
multiplicity is qualitatively experienced as intense may be widely 
divergent among different people, throwing us back onto the sceptical 
view that there are only a plurality of conditions experienced as healthy 
that have objectively very little in common. The multiplicity referred to 
in health judgements is therefore a quantitative multiplicity, with, 
perhaps, a qualitative multiplicity as its experiential counter-part.  
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2.2 Potential  
Unlike the notion of multiplicity, the idea of potentiality has played a 
much more prominent role in the philosophical tradition, going back at 
least to Aristotle’s concept of dunamis. The task here is not to recount the 
history of the concept and its myriad theoretical roles, but to provide an 
account of potentiality in the context of a theory of health that answers 
to several important questions. The first question is one of explication: 
what does it mean for an organism to have a potential for an activity 
and what is the metaphysical status of capacities and potentials? The 
second question is whether potentialities pertain only to the domain of 
life or whether potentials also exist in the rest of nature. If the latter is 
true, the account of health would remain within the contours of 
naturalism; the properties referred to would be homogenous and 
continuous with rest of nature. A third question about potentiality is 
whether there is a fundamental difference within the domain of life 
itself, viz. between a potentiality of human beings and higher animals 
and the potentiality pertaining to the rest of organic life. In human life 
having a potential for certain activities means, on the face of it, having 
alternatives lines of action available, which seems different from a 
plant’s potential to absorb water and to grow flowers. Human potential 
seems to include alternative lines of action while in plant life 
potentiality seems to refer to the unfolding of a more linear process. 
And the fourth question is what it means for an organism’s potentiality 
to increase or decrease: how can its multiplicity vary? In answering 
these four questions we should get to the heart of the thesis that health 
designates a multiplicity of potential activities relative to a certain norm. 
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2.2a Explication of Potentiality 
In contemporary metaphysics most authors tend to treat potentials and 
capacities in terms of ‘dispositions’ and ‘powers’—two terms generally 
used interchangeably.18 This growing bulk of literature will prove 
instructive in my attempt to explicate the idea that organisms have a 
certain potential corresponding to their degree of health. The typical 
examples used in debates on dispositions and powers, however, seem to 
have little to do with the potentiality of organisms that on my account 
constitutes their health: the standard cases for dispositions are ‘fragility 
of glass’ and ‘salt’s solubility’. A bridge must therefore be made 
between dispositional properties like the brittleness of glass and 
solubility of salt and the potentiality of organisms, including that of 
human beings.  
The reason why so much attention has been given to dispositions 
in recent metaphysics is that properties of any object whatsoever are 
detectable, identifiable, and known due to the causal effects they have 
                                                             
18 I have relied on the following sources for this discussion: David M. Armstrong, A 
World of States of Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David M. 
Armstrong, Charles B. Martin, and Ullin T. Place, Dispositions: A Debate, ed. Tim 
Crane (London: Routledge, 1996); Alexander Bird, Nature's Metaphysics: Laws and 
Properties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); John Heil, From an Ontological 
Point of View (Oxford: Clarendon Press 2003); Charles B. Martin, The Mind in Nature 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); George Molnar, Powers: A Study in 
Metaphysics, ed. Stephen Mumford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); 
Stephen Mumford and Rani L. Anjum, Getting Causes from Powers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011); Elizabeth Prior, Robert Pargetter and Frank Jackson, 
“Three Theses about Dispositions,” American Philosophical Quarterly 19:3 (1982): 
251–257; Sydney Shoemaker, “Causality and Properties,” in Time and Cause: Essays 
Presented to Richard Taylor, ed. Peter van Inwagen (Dordrecht: Reidel Publishing 
Company, 1980), 109-135.  
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on other objects and their properties—including, as Locke already 
taught us in the context of secondary qualities, the causal power to 
affect our senses. If properties were causally inert we would have no 
way of detecting their presence and determining their nature. The 
central thought is that something is yellow because it is disposed, or has 
the causal power, to give us a sensation of yellowness; glass is brittle 
because it is disposed to break when struck with force; and salt is 
soluble because it is disposed to dissolve in water. If properties were not 
dispositional or powerful in this manner we would have no means of 
detecting their presence and determining their character.  
A disposition or power may in its simplest form be defined as 
follows: X has a certain disposition D (or power P) if under a set of 
circumstances C it will manifest M. This is probably the most basic 
formulation of dispositions and powers and one that will suffice for our 
purposes. The central metaphysical question is whether properties are 
only known through their manifestation or whether properties are 
themselves nothing other than the dispositions or powers to bring about 
certain manifestations. In Armstrong’s words, the central metaphysical 
question is “whether a property’s nature is exhausted by the powers that 
it bestows, or whether instead the property, in itself, is to be 
distinguished from those powers.”19 To this question several answers 
are possible, which I will survey shortly. First a case must be made that 
the potential of organisms, the potentiality for activities corresponding 
comprising their health, are metaphysically identical to dispositional 
properties like brittleness of glass and solubility of salt.  
                                                             
19 Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, 69 
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To that end, consider the potentiality of a plant, or two capacities 
in particular: a plant’s potential to flower and its potential to absorb 
water from the ground―two genuine capacities of plants and prima facie 
important to its health. If plant A of species α lacks the potential to 
flower and plant B of species α has lost its capacity to absorb water, 
other things being equal, plant A and plant B are less healthy than plant 
C of species α that doesn’t lack either capacity. Can the potential to 
flower and the potential to absorb water be treated as ‘dispositions’ or 
‘powers’ of the plant? I think the answer is positive: a plant has the 
disposition ‘flowering’ or ‘absorbing water’, if, and only if, under 
particular circumstances it will manifest the growth of flowers or an 
influx of water. A capacity, or a potential for an activity, then, is the 
same thing as being disposed towards something or having a power for 
it. What else could it mean for a plant to have a capacity or potential 
other than that the relevant manifestations will occur under a set of 
specific circumstances? If a plant does not manifest the growth of 
flowers or the absorption of water under any circumstances whatsoever, 
then the plant would simply lack the potential; this is what it means not 
to have a potential or capacity for something. So a potential for some 
activity is nothing other than a disposition or power for that activity, 
which must become manifest under some set of circumstances.  
Is there really no difference then between a plant’s potential to 
flower and for glass to break when struck with sufficient force? Two 
differences do appear to obtain. First, for glass to break is for it to have a 
passive disposition or power, i.e. a disposition to be affected by 
something in the world, whereas for plants to flower and to absorb 
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water is for it to have an active disposition or power, i.e. a disposition to 
change something in the world or bearer of the disposition itself.20 Some 
have suggested that ‘power’ would be a more adequate a term for active 
dispositions and ‘disposition’ for its passive counterpart, but generally 
authors do not make the distinction. But even if one would insist that a 
plant’s capacities are active powers rather than passive dispositions, this 
would not entail a break between life and the rest of the material world, 
for active powers also exist everywhere in the rest of nature. The plant’s 
potential to flower could for instance be compared to the active power 
of fire to heat up things, or to the active power of painkillers to supress 
sensations of pain: both cause changes external to themselves rather 
than being affected by something. The potential activities of living 
beings are therefore not ‘active’ in a sense that dispositions of non-living 
beings are not; they really are the very same kind of property. 
The second apparent difference between glass’s brittleness and a 
plant’s potential to flower is the complexity of what goes into the 
relevant circumstance necessary for a plant’s potential to become 
manifested. For glass to have the dispositional property brittleness is for 
it to shatter when struck by a solid object with sufficient velocity. For a 
plant to have the potential or disposition to flower means that flowers 
will grow, but they typically do so only under a complex set of 
circumstances, including conditions like sufficient nutrition, sufficient 
sunlight, the right seasonal temperatures, absence of hungry herbivores, 
limited surrounding vegetation and so on. The relevant circumstances 
are much more complex due to the fact that a large range of factors 
                                                             
20 Armstrong, States of Affairs, 70. 
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could prevent the plant from flowering, even though the plant itself has 
the potential to flower. Frost in spring, for instance, could prevent the 
plant from growing flowers even though it would have flowered in 
warmer circumstances. A plant with flowering potential may also get 
crushed in a stampede of large animals and never materialise its flower-
growing potential. But no matter how long the list of circumstances 
necessary for the flower-power to manifest itself, the crucial point is that 
flowers must grow when the relevant circumstances obtain, if, that is, 
the plant indeed has a genuine potential to flower. So an organism’s 
potential for an activity, I conclude, is a disposition or power to 
manifest an activity under particular circumstances, which is really no 
different from dispositions of non-living beings.  
While a dispositional analysis of potentiality may indeed be 
defensible in the context of plant life, for more complex forms of life, 
especially human life, it is not immediately obvious this is the case. In 
human life much more complex processes are involved in the formation 
of behaviour. Adopting a dispositional analysis of human potentiality 
may strike one as a bridge too far, as it seems to reduce complex 
motivational processes to crude behaviouristic operations of stimuli and 
responses. Such a behaviouristic account could be deemed inadequate, 
as we are inclined to think human activities are not merely triggered by 
the right stimuli in a way that salt dissolves when placed in water and 
plants soak up water from soil due to osmotic forces. But this 
behaviouristic view of dispositions rests on a mistake: no behaviourism 
is implied in treating human potentiality as a cluster of dispositions. For 
the set of circumstances necessary for the manifestation of a power may 
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very well involve rational processes, individual choices, or perhaps 
even the free will of autonomous agents.21 For me to have the potential 
to run, for instance, is for me to have the disposition or power that if I 
indeed decide to run, and some further conditions are satisfied, I will 
indeed exhibit a run. If there is no determinable set of conditions under 
which I will run, I simply lack the potential for it. The claim can 
therefore be defended that human potentiality is also fundamentally no 
different from the potentiality of glass and salt. Human capacities are 
dispositional properties that under some set of conditions will manifest 
the relevant manifestation. And choices, emotions, and free will are 
included in the required circumstances or conditions, if they are indeed 
necessary for the relevant manifestations. While for the manifestation of 
brittleness a strike with a solid object may suffice, the manifestation of 
human potentials may require acts of will, emotions, rational 
deliberation and so on. In analysing human potentiality as dispositions 
or powers, however we can afford to stay neutral on questions on free 
will and determinism. Whatever turns out to be required for the 
manifestation of out dispositions will be the circumstances under which 
a disposition or power must be manifested, if the potentiality is indeed 
possessed by an individual.   
Note that this account of human dispositions and powers is 
markedly different from the way that van Inwagen conceives it in his 
influential taxonomy of freedom-related terminology.22 For van 
Inwagen the power of human agents is radically different from the 
                                                             
21 I am indebted to here to conversations with Martin Lipman. 
22 Peter van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). 
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powers and capacities of other things, despite being united in 
terminology. The power of a human being, he writes, is the power to 
“originate” changes rather than merely “react” to environmental 
changes.23 According to the view I am advancing here, however, van 
Inwagen may be right that human beings don’t merely react to stimuli 
and that acts of choosing and willing are indeed necessary for certain 
behaviours to occur. But once it is admitted that choosing and willing is 
a condition or circumstance required for certain actions, there is no reason 
to presume that the basic dispositional model has to be abandoned in 
the context of human activities: powers and dispositions do not demote 
human behaviour to mere reacting to circumstances. Our choosing and 
willing may indeed be a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for 
the manifestation of various powers; that is, humans can be self-
conditioning. This does not imply, however, as van Inwagen thinks, that 
“talk about the action of hydrochloric acid on zinc and the action of an 
automatic pistol … is really very different from talk of the power of an 
agent to act, despite their common origin in the technical terminology of 
medieval Aristotelianism.”24 According to the view outlined here, it is 
precisely the same talk, as it concerns the same kind of happenings, viz. 
manifestations of dispositions—only with more complex conditions 
involved in some of our behavioural manifestations.  
                                                             
23 van Inwagen writes: “The concept of a causal power or capacity would seem to 
be the concept of an invariable disposition to react to certain determinate changes 
in the environment in certain determinate ways, whereas the concept of an agent's 
power to act would seem not to be the concept of a power that is dispositional or 
reactive, but rather the concept of a power to originate changes in the 
environment.” van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, 11.  
24 van Inwagen, An Essay on Free Will, 10. 
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The uniformity of human potential and dispositional properties of 
brute objects also helps answering the question raised above regarding 
a difference in potentiality between human life, involving alternative 
lines of action, and the potentiality of simpler life forms, restricted to a 
more linear unfolding of potentials. I argued that if choice between 
alternatives is indeed a feature of human action, then choices are part of 
the required conditions for a manifestation of human activity. There is 
no reason to suppose that potentiality itself is radically different for 
human beings, however, or that health takes on a different meaning in 
the context of human life: also in human life does health refer to and 
individual’s dispositional properties and powers.  
For things to have a disposition or power does not require the 
relevant manifestation ever to occur; in fact, the standard scenario is 
that it doesn’t. The solubility of a salt flake may never manifest itself if 
contact with water never occurs. The number of dispositions and 
powers always outstrip and exceed their manifestations. The actual 
circumstances and corresponding manifestations will never be more 
than a fraction of the dispositions possessed by a thing. The same 
applies to life and human life in particular. If the right circumstances do 
not occur, potential activities will never become manifested. If volition 
is part of the necessary circumstances under which humans manifest 
their dispositions, and if alternative lines of action are abandoned when 
we choose one action over another, alternatives will remain unrealised. 
Again, I think we may conclude that a dispositional model does not set 
human potentiality apart from that of animals or plants, or even from 
that of glass and salt.  
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2.2b Dispositions and Metaphysical Naturalism  
This brings me to the metaphysical status of dispositional properties. 
Here the views diverge widely and a number of positions are available. 
According to one view, ‘categoricalism’, dispositional properties 
depend on underlying non-dispositional properties. On this view 
dispositions are higher-level properties that require lower-level 
properties as their metaphysical realisers, or as their “causal basis”, as 
Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson write in their classic paper on the subject.25 
So on this view the brittleness of glass would not be the cause of it 
breaking when struck, in the same way that the power to flower is not 
causally responsible for plants growing flowers. According to 
categoricalism, the lower-level realisers are categorical properties, i.e. 
properties that are non-dispositional and self-contained, i.e. properties 
that do not point outside of themselves to any possible effects. On the 
two level view defended by Prior, Pargetter, and Jackson, dispositions 
are therefore “impotent” and “epiphenomenal” properties, while lower-
level categorical properties are causally responsible for all 
manifestations: “the disposition does nothing.”26 Subtly different from 
this two level view would be the categoricalist thesis defended by 
Armstrong, in which dispositions are not higher-order properties but 
simply properties that follow from the combination of categorical 
properties and the laws of nature. According to Armstrong, being 
fragile or having a potential to grow flowers result from the 
microphysical categorical properties of glass and plants, which, together 
                                                             
25 Prior, Pargetter & Jackson, “Three Theses,” 251. 
26 Prior, Pargetter & Jackson, “Three Theses,” 255. 
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with the actual laws of nature, form the relevant dispositions—
dispositions that do not reside at some higher or additional level.27 
According to categoricalism, then, any entity’s dispositions are 
grounded in non-dispositional or categorical properties. So an 
organism’s capacities and potentials are understood as underpinned by 
functional unities like organs, cells, DNA, but ultimately, at the most 
fundamental level, by the microphysical particles that causally 
determine the cascade of dispositions and discernible potentials—
microphysical particles that are themselves not dispositional.   
Diametrically opposed to categoricalism is the view known as 
‘dispositionalism’, the view that “all there is to a property is its 
contribution to the dispositionalities of its possessor.”28 Shoemaker, an 
early proponent of the view, accepts the claim of two-level 
categoricalism that a thing has powers like fragility, solubility, a 
potential to grow flowers, and so on due to underlying properties. 
Shoemaker argues that these underlying properties are themselves to be 
regarded as powers—powers that give the thing the dispositions that it 
has. The underlying properties acquire their identity from their 
contributions to the causal powers or dispositions of the thing of which 
they are the underlying properties. For these underlying properties are 
also known, and can only be known, via the causal effects that they 
have. Shoemaker argues in favour of this ‘dispositions all the way 
                                                             
27 For the categoricalist, if the same categorical properties were placed in a universe 
with different laws of nature then the dispositions of things would change 
accordingly. Categoricalists therefore follow Hume in considering the laws of 
nature to be contingent. 
28 Heil, Ontological Point of View, 97. 
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down’ view because, if it were false, then it must be possible for those 
underlying properties to never have any causal effects, so that 
properties could exist that are in principle undetectable and 
unknowable. Furthermore, a thing could radically change its non-
dispositional properties without changing its causal powers, and thus 
undetectably undergo fundamental changes. Deeming such 
consequences epistemically untenable, Shoemaker proposes a two-level 
dispositional theory of properties in which both the higher and lower-
order properties are essentially dispositional. More recently this kind of 
‘pan-dispositionalism’ has been defended by Mumford and Bird, who 
argue that all properties are potencies, i.e. that all properties have 
dispositional essences. Mumford’s and Bird’s arguments go much 
further than Shoemaker’s epistemic concerns, however, and state that 
an ontology truthful to current theories in physics demand a pan-
dispositionalist ontology. They claim that only this kind of ontology 
could consistently ground the laws of nature that contemporary physics 
has put forward. These arguments are highly detailed and would take 
us way too far afield.29 But on the dispositionalist view an organism’s 
potentials are underpinned by unities like organs, cells, DNA, but at the 
most fundamental level remain equally dispositional.30 
                                                             
29 One important implication of dispositionalism is that, contra Hume and 
Humeans like Armstrong, laws of nature are not contingent. According to 
dispositionalism the laws of nature could not be different than what they are with 
the same fundamental properties in place; laws of nature are metaphysically 
necessary and fixed by instantiated dispositional properties. 
30 Categoricalism and dispositionalism form two extremes on a spectrum of views. 
Mixed views and intermediary positions have also been formulated. Molnar, for 
instance, defends the view that some properties are fundamentally powers, while 
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For our purposes, merely sketching these two positions on the 
metaphysical status of dispositions should suffice, as we can afford to 
remain neutral on the question whether dispositions are ultimately 
grounded in non-dispositional properties or not. My claim is that health 
consists in the multiplicity of potential activities vis-à-vis a certain 
maximum, whereby potentiality can be explicated as the totality of 
dispositional properties and powers at the level of the organism a 
whole. The literature on dispositions gives us reasons to accept 
capacities and potentials as real properties of organisms, just as fragility 
and solubility are real properties of glass and salt. The properties 
invoked in the proposed theory of health would thus be real features of 
organisms. Even if categoricalism turns out the superior metaphysical 
theory, nothing would be lost. The same properties of organisms would 
be picked out by the concept of health and these properties would not 
be any less real; dispositions would just be underpinned by non-
dispositional microphysical realisers. The dispositionalist’s thesis is 
quickly gaining terrain, however, and would imply that the account of 
health involves the kind of properties—dispositions and powers—that 
are congruous with the fundamental properties of everything that exists, 
also at the most fundamental level.  
                                                                                                                                                           
others, like a thing’s shape, are categorical. Molnar’s ontology has therefore a 
property dualism built into it: at the most fundamental level there are both 
dispositional and non-dispositional properties. Another mixed view is defended 
by Martin and Heil, who argue that properties are not exclusively categorical or 
dispositional. They argue instead that properties always contain both aspects: 
every property is both dispositional as well as categorical like two sides of the 
same coin. 
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This brief excursion into metaphysics has two important 
implications. The first is that a dispositional account of health does not 
require any form of metaphysical vitalism—a metaphysical picture 
according to which the fundamental constituents of life diverge from 
the rest of nature. The potentiality of an organism consists in 
dispositions identical to the dispositions and powers found everywhere 
else in nature, and, if dispositionalism is true, it is identical in structure 
to the most fundamental constituents of everything else that exists. As a 
result, the account of health falls within the boundaries of naturalism. By 
‘naturalism’ here I only mean that the properties referred to in the 
account of health also figure in, or are required by, our best scientific 
theories. That is, we only have to accept the existence of things and 
properties we have to accept anyway if we are to take the natural 
sciences seriously. The capacity account of health does not commit us to 
entities other than the kind properties that the natural sciences take to 
be there; at least in its reliance on capacities, potentials, and 
dispositions—terms that, ultimately, all amounting to the same thing.  
A second, related implication is that the theory of health lives up 
to the promise of objectivity. We sought to formulate an account of 
health that is objective; that is, an account of health in which subjective 
preferences and attitudes play no constitutive role. Health defined as 
MPA succeeds in picking out real, objective features of organisms. Even 
if the metaphysical debate settles on categoricalism, capacities and 
potentials remain real properties of organisms and would continue to be 
objectively grounded, but only by fundamental constituents that 
themselves are not dispositional in nature.  
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2.2c Quantitative Variation in Potentiality 
Having a firmer grasp on what is meant by potentiality, we can now 
consider the ways in which the potentiality of an organism can increase 
or decrease, i.e. the various ways in which a multiplicity can change. 
The basic schema of dispositions will again provide guidance: X has a 
disposition D or power P if under circumstances C it will manifest M. 
On the basis of this formula, we can identify three ways in which the 
potentiality of an organism can increase of decrease.  
The most obvious way for an organism’s potentiality to expand is 
for more dispositions to be included in the cluster of dispositions. This 
is the way in which I have been speaking about the multiplicity of an 
organism’s potentiality so far. If an organism can exhibit a greater 
number of activities, i.e. if a greater number of dispositions are 
possessed by an organism on the level of the whole, the greater is its 
overall potentiality. The plant disposed to flower, the animal capable of 
discerning scents, the human with the ability to write—all have a 
greater potential than identical plants, animals and human beings (of 
the same species) lacking the power to manifest these activities. 
A second way in which potentiality can increase follows from a 
difference between dispositions that are exhausted and those that are 
sustained after their manifestations. The disposition of glass to shatter is 
exhausted after one proper shattering, while the power of fire to heat up 
things is usually sustained for a period of time. The potentiality of the 
object possessing the disposition is of course greater if dispositions are 
not exhausted in their manifestation. If a plant is capable of flowering 
only once while another plant of the same species can flower time and 
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time again, for instance, the latter plant has a greater potential for 
flowering. In short, potentiality of an organism is greater when it 
sustains its dispositions after their manifestations. 
Finally, potentiality increases when the circumstances under 
which the manifestations can occur become more flexible and variable. 
The more specific the set of circumstances under which a disposition is 
manifested the smaller the potentiality, and vice versa. Imagine a plant 
flowering only at precise temperatures and with a highly specific level 
of humidity. This plant certainly has the potential to flower, as it will 
flower under particular circumstances. But its potentiality would be 
greater if the plant would flower under a wider variety of temperatures, 
soil conditions, humidity levels, and so on. Or think of a leopard’s 
capacity to run with a speed of 50 miles per hour. If the leopard can 
reach this speed only under cool temperatures and on dry surfaces, then 
a second leopard capable of running 50 mph also over slippery terrain 
and under warmer conditions has a greater capacity for running at that 
speed. If an organism is capable of manifesting a disposition under a 
wider set of circumstances the multiplicity of its potential for activities 
increases proportionally.31  
                                                             
31 There is a possibility of reducing the second and third form of potential 
multiplication to the first. To have the potential to sustain a disposition after 
manifestation may be formulated disjunctively, e.g. D1 to grow flowers once, D2 to 
grow flowers twice, or perhaps D3 to grow flowers multiple times. The disposition 
itself would not be sustained after a manifestation but more dispositions would be 
included in the total set from the start. Similarly for the range of circumstances 
under which manifestations are possible for a given disposition: rather than one 
disposition being manifested under a wider range of circumstances, one could 
identify a large amount of disjunctive dispositions; D1 to run 50mph over dry 
surfaces, D2 run 50mph over wet surfaces, D3 run over 50mph on a hot day, etc. The 
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This is also the point to introduce the idea that potentials can be a 
condition for further potential activities. A plant’s potential for 
flowering is necessary for it to have a potential to reproduce. Similarly, 
a bird’s capacity to fly is required for further potential activities like the 
potential to migrate, to hunt, to build nests, and so on. The human 
capacity to see and hear similarly conditions a great number of further 
potential activities. The idea that capacities can be a pre-condition for 
further capacities, or that certain dispositions are necessary for the 
having of other dispositions, makes it possible to appreciate the fact that 
some capacities impact the overall potentiality more significantly than 
others; some capacities are more basic and thus more broadly 
capacitating than others. Potentiality increases not only by possessing 
more dispositions, but also by possessing the dispositions that are 
required for a broad range of further dispositions. And precisely the 
latter dispositions are the dispositions most important to an organism’s 
health.32  
In sum, then, potentiality increases when an organism has more 
diverse dispositions; when the organism can sustain its dispositions also 
after their manifestations; when an organism can manifest its 
dispositions under a wide range of circumstances; and when it develops 
dispositions that condition a broad range of further dispositions.  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
disjunctive option would result in an explosion of dispositions and thus be far less 
economical in set up, but it would be possible to reduce the second and third form 
of increase of potentiality to the first. The point remains, however, that by having 
sustainable powers and by being able to manifest a disposition under more flexible 
and varying conditions, overall potentiality increases. 
32 In §1.1 of Chapter Four I shall return to this crucially important idea. 
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2.3 Activity  
The idea argued for so far is that the greater the range of dispositions, 
and the more variable the set of circumstances under which they can be 
manifested, the greater the overall potentiality of an organism and, ipso 
facto, the greater its health. The task now is to determine the relevant 
‘activities’, the dispositions for which constitutes an organism’s health. 
A number of questions will drive the discussion. First, how do we 
prevent the overextension of the predicate ‘health’ to the inanimate 
world? How can we prevent the account of health from implying that 
salt with the disposition to dissolve is ‘healthy salt’ and a battery being 
charged from improving its ‘health’? A dispositional account of health 
has the advantage of being naturalistic, but the trouble now reappears 
on the other end, viz. that health appears to apply to the rest of the 
world as well. Second, clearly not all dispositions of organisms are 
relevant to an organism’s health: the disposition of a tree to cast a 
shadow over a field is entirely irrelevant to its health, but it is a 
disposition of the tree, and thus has to be included in the set of 
dispositions that makes up its health. Equally, a human being’s powers 
to leave footprints in the sand, block the wind, or to fall down when 
pushed of a rooftop, seem completely trivial to its health, and yet these 
powers are included in the total set of its potentials. How are we to 
think of dispositions for such trivial activities? And finally, I will 
question whether not doing something is also a kind of activity. Do 
negative dispositions belong to health in some sense, and if so, how are 
they included in the dispositional model provided above? 
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2.3a Overextension of Health 
First the question regarding overextension of health: while reducing 
health to a quantity of dispositions, how do we preclude health from 
applying to everything that exists? A dispositional account may be 
naturalistic but risks overextension of the predicate ‘health’ to things 
that it should not apply to. One way to solve this issue is with a 
conjunctive definition of health: X can be healthy, or health can be 
predicated over X, if and only if, 1) X is a cluster of dispositions and 
powers, and 2) X is a living being. This solution would retain the 
continuity between manifestations of living beings and those of the rest 
of the material world, while precluding inanimate things from being 
healthy or unhealthy. This is a superficial answer, of course, but 
ultimately the same answer that we already endorsed in Chapter two 
(§2.6) when pursuing the question why only living beings have a good-
for and bad-for. In that discussion I agreed with Korsgaard that only 
living beings have a sake for which things are good and bad, which, as 
we saw, amounts to saying that only living beings can be healthy and 
unhealthy. Ultimately this is just a primitive that I think we must accept. 
The idea that living beings can be healthy and unhealthy while 
inanimate beings cannot is something that cannot be argued for further, 
or broken down into more fundamental propositions, or proven right in 
some way. The reason why the range of dispositions makes up an 
organism’s health and why the dispositions of inanimate things do not, 
is ultimately just because only living beings can be healthy and non-
living beings cannot. And this claim cannot be further broken down or 
explained: it is a primitive.  
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2.3b Trivial Dispositions: Active and Passive? 
The question about trivial dispositions does not permit of such a simple 
solution. What distinguishes a tree casting a shadow from a tree 
growing fruits or turning its leaves towards the sun? The former activity 
seems trivial to the tree’s health while the latter activities are not. 
Identifying health with the total potentiality of living beings, then, may 
not be specific enough to pick out the potentiality that constitutes 
health. One fairly intuitive way of distinguishing dispositions relevant 
to health from those trivial to it, briefly touched upon before, would be 
to distinguish between passive and active manifestations. Growing 
fruits and directing leaves have a certain active character and therefore 
seem prima facie more relevant to a tree’s health, while casting a shadow 
and falling down seem utterly passive, rendering the potential for these 
activities irrelevant to a tree’s health. I will consider two ways to flesh 
out the intuition that health refers only to active dispositions, but will 
end up rejecting both. Although I shall maintain that there are 
dispositions trivial to an organism’s health, I will argue that their 
triviality does not consist in a metaphysical type of passivity.   
One way to substantiate ‘active’ activities would be to return to 
the difference between active and passive dispositions that we already 
encountered above. To repeat, what differentiates active from passive 
dispositions and powers is that active dispositions bring about changes 
in a second thing, while possessors of passive dispositions have a 
disposition to be changed by a second thing.33 The distinction between 
active and passive here, then, revolves around the locus of change rather 
                                                             
33 Armstrong, States of Affairs, 70. 
184 
 
than causal priority. It is an active power of a hammer to shatter glass 
and a passive disposition of glass to break when struck by a hammer; 
the active or passive component do not determine which has causal 
priority. With this distinction between active and passive dispositions 
one could try to argue that health is restricted to active powers of 
organisms. Health, on this view, would refer only to an organism’s 
cluster of powers for changing things external to the organism and 
exclude the dispositions to be affected by something. This may sound 
promising, but on closer inspection proves to be a non-starter. First, the 
distinction between active powers and passive dispositions becomes 
blurry outside the stereotypical cases: is the growing of fruits a change 
brought to the tree by external things like sunlight and nutrition, or is it 
an active power of the tree? It seems arbitrary to call it one thing instead 
of another. Second, most trivial dispositions would still not be excluded: 
the casting of a shadow would count as an active power of the tree as it 
is the tree that effectuates a change external to itself, viz. casting the 
shadow over the meadow. And finally, most importantly, many clear-
cut passive dispositions of organisms are of central importance to their 
health. The disposition to experience pain when tissue gets damaged by 
an external thing; the narrowing of pupils in darkness; vasoconstriction 
in cold environments; the release of adrenaline when confronted by 
threats; flowers opening during daytime—all are passive dispositions 
but certainly to be included in the cluster of dispositions constituting 
their health. A distinction between active and passive dispositions 
therefore does not help to isolate the relevant dispositions that make up 
an organism’s health. 
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An alternative and more traditional way to try and bring out the 
active component of certain activities would be to look at the order of 
causation. If an event is caused by the organism it would be active, 
whereas if an event is caused by something outside of the organism it 
would be passive. The suggestion, then, would be that health refers to a 
potential for activities, whereby the organism itself must be the cause of 
those activities. This would be a definition of activity close to what 
Spinoza calls ‘actions’, which he defines as the happening of something 
solely understandable through the being that acts—as opposed to being 
acted upon, which he defines as an occurrence partially explainable in 
terms of the being that acts and partly by something else.34 This 
suggestion also does not help us much, however, as the bar for ‘active’ 
activities would be raised far too high: not a single organism could 
display an activity on this criterion. The growth of fruits and turning of 
leafs are not explainable on the basis the nature of the tree alone, as the 
causal nexus also involves nutritional substances, sunshine, and so on. 
When is an organism the sole cause of an occurrence? The ascription of 
such radical agency is already highly contestable in the context of 
human life, but certainly a non-starter for the rest of life. If ‘active’ 
activities require full causal responsibility, all manifestations of living 
beings would be equally passive.   
                                                             
34 This is freely paraphrased from Benedict de Spinoza, Ethics, ed. Edwin Curley 
(London: Penguin Books, 1996), III D3: “I say that we act when something 
happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, that is (by D1), 
when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly 
and distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are 
acted on when something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, of 
which we are only a partial cause.” 
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So where does the difference lie between trivial and relevant 
activities? I suggest the best answer is that the triviality and seeming 
‘passivity’ of certain dispositions lies in the fact that it is impossible for 
living beings not to have them, and that this impossibility not to have 
them renders them trivial and redundant in evaluations of health. It is 
impossible for a tree to fail casting a shadow over a field when sunlight 
falls on it, in the same way that it is impossible not to fall downwards 
when thrown of a rooftop. It is, however, an empirical possibility for a 
tree not to blossom or not to grow any fruits, in the same way that it is 
empirically possible for human beings not to be able to walk. The best 
way to understand trivial dispositions, I would suggest, is not in terms 
of them being passive in some metaphysically significant sense, but on 
the basis of it being empirically impossible not to possess such 
dispositions. Anything with a shape and mass will have the disposition 
to cast a shadow and fall downward. The multiplicity of potential 
activities cannot fluctuate in terms of these trivial dispositions, which is 
precisely what renders them trivial in evaluations of health. When 
health improves or diminishes it cannot do so in terms of trivial 
dispositions, as it is impossible to gain or lose them. There is therefore 
also no need to exclude trivial activities in the definition of health, as it 
would exclude only a class of dispositions that is trivial and redundant 
in evaluations of health to begin with: an organism cannot fluctuate in 
terms of trivial dispositions. Instead of being passive in a 
metaphysically significant sense, then, I suggest that trivial dispositions 
can best be understood as dispositions that an organism cannot gain or 
lose.   
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2.3c Negative Dispositions 
This brings me to the question of negative powers and dispositions, i.e. 
the capacity not to do something. Generally, a disposition or power not 
to manifest an activity simply means not having the power or 
disposition. To say about a tree that it has the power not to grow any 
fruits simply means the tree lacks the disposition to grow fruits—a lack 
that does not have any positive existence. But the question of negative 
dispositions could also be taken to mean that an organism has a 
capacity not to do something under particular circumstances, such as a 
tree not growing any fruits when it is freezing. Also this form of a 
negative disposition does not have any positive existence; the only 
property that obtains is the property to grow fruits, manifested when 
temperatures are above a certain threshold. A third form of negative 
dispositions, the most interesting and relevant one, is a power to refrain 
from activities that otherwise would have been manifested. Such a 
power is probably limited to human beings and certain higher animals, 
for trees cannot be attributed the power to refrain from growing fruits 
under conditions it otherwise would grow them. But the question is 
whether a negative disposition of this form is still a negative disposition 
and not a descriptive variant of a positive disposition. Consider a fox 
with the power to hunt, which, for simplicity’s sake, gets manifested 
under conditions of being hungry and seeing a rabbit failing to pay 
attention. If the fox has the ability not to hunt whilst being hungry and 
seeing a rabbit goofing around, this amounts to an additional power. If, 
for instance, the fox does not hunt because it spots an eagle hovering 
over its head, the fox has the power or disposition to hide: it has the 
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power or disposition ‘to hide’ if under the circumstance ‘spotting 
predators’ it manifests the activity ‘moving to a position invisible to the 
predator’. Refraining to surge towards the rabbit would therefore be the 
positive manifestation of another disposition, not a negative disposition.  
Thus far, then, we have not encountered any genuine negative 
dispositions or powers. But how about the situation in which the fox 
refrains from launching itself onto the rabbit strictly on the basis of its 
own will? Or, more realistically, a human being who decides not to eat 
even though all conditions are present under which it would otherwise 
engage in the consumption of food. Again this can be best accounted for 
in terms of an additional disposition or power. The quasi-autonomous 
fox and dieting human would have an additional power, which may 
look as follows: X has the power ‘not to eat’, if under circumstances 
‘being hungry’ and ‘having food nearby’ and ‘a will not to eat’, it 
manifests ‘abstinence from eating’. And this property is only possessed 
if, simultaneously, the same X has the power ‘to eat’, if under 
circumstances ‘being hungry’ and ‘having foods nearby’, it manifests 
‘eating’. Again it appears that non-actions are entirely understandable 
as positive actions conditioned by positive dispositions. With these final 
examples, however, we have begun thinking about forms of autonomy 
and ways in which increased autonomy constitutes a greater 
potentiality for activities and thus greater health. The nature of 
autonomy and its relation to health will be addressed more extensively 
in Chapter Five (§3). For now, it only matters that all dispositions and 
powers are positive dispositions and powers: nature does not contain 
negative dispositions. 
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2.4 Factual Limitations 
Fluctuations in MPA of a living organism have trivial dispositions as 
their lower limit—they are impossible not to be possessed—and what I 
called ‘factual limitations’ as their upper limit: the upper boundary that  
marks off the range of activities an organism could have a potential for. 
These upper limitations are determined by reference classes and 
constitute the norm relative to which an organism is more or less 
healthy. One of the requirements for a viable theory of health, I said at 
the beginning of this chapter, was that the reference class has to be 
objective, as otherwise it would fall prey to Kingma’s objection. If 
reference classes are fixed on the basis of subjective values and prior 
intuitions about health, the norms relative to which an organism health 
is evaluated are subjective norms and the ensuing health judgements 
would remain subjective judgements. We therefore need objective 
reference classes, setting an objective norm relative to which an 
organism’s health can be assessed. This mode of evaluation was already 
found in Foot’s work, whose key passage I’ll quote again:  
 
Evaluation of an individual living thing in its own right, with 
no reference to our interests or desires, is possible where there 
is intersection of two types of propositions: on the one hand, 
Aristotelian categorical (life-form descriptions relating to the 
species), and on the other, propositions about particular 
individuals that are the subject of evaluation.35 
                                                             
35 Foot, Natural Goodness, 33. 
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Whereas Foot provides one reference class, viz. a life-form belonging to 
a species, I suggest there are three different reference classes to be 
identified when evaluating an organism’s health, which result in three 
different measures of health. The three reference classes imply a 
different set of factual limitations relative to which an organism is in a 
state of greater or lesser health, i.e. each reference class implies a 
different norm.36 The frames of reference I propose are the species, an 
individual organism, and an individual organism at some point in its 
life. I shall discuss each separately, argue that they are objective frames 
of reference, and describe the kind of health judgements they yield. 
  
2.4a Species Limitations and Absolute Health 
The first reference class is the species to which an organism belongs. A 
species sets an upper limit to what is possible for any of its members. 
Being a cherry tree means that the MPA of an individual cherry tree is 
limited to what is possible for the species cherry tree; being an Icelandic 
horse determines which dispositions could be possessed by an 
individual Icelandic horse in virtue of being an Icelandic horse. Species-
dependent factual limitations, by stipulation, cannot be transcended. It 
                                                             
36 The use of the adjective ‘factual’ may seem unnecessary and inelegant, but will 
be utilised consistently to stipulate that there is a certain ‘givennes’ or ‘fact of the 
matter’ about these limitations—as opposed to what subjects may feel or think as 
being their limitations. Someone may think that running a marathon is beyond 
their limitations, while, factually, it may very well lie within their capacities. 
Likewise, a plant may not appear to have the capacity to grow flowers but still 
flower under some particular set of unknown circumstances, de facto including the 
capacity to flower within its factual limitations. Factual limits to MPA of organisms 
may never be completely or fully known but there is a fact of the matter, which 
renders them ‘factual’ in precisely this crucial sense. 
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is an a priori impossibility for a cherry tree or Icelandic horse to possess 
more dispositions than those included in the maximum set of to the 
species while being a cherry tree or an Icelandic horse. This does not 
mean, however, that species are themselves defined on the basis of a 
cluster of dispositions. The standard scientific definition of a species—a 
group of organisms capable of interbreeding and producing fertile 
offspring—is sufficient to demarcate a collection of living beings with 
an upper limit to what any of the members could possibly be capable of. 
If species stand in continuity with one another, as evolutionary biology 
teaches us, this would only imply that the factual limitation to an 
organism’s maximum range of potential activities is to some extent 
vague and indeterminate. If species boundaries are vague then the 
maximum range of potential activities of the species will be equally 
fuzzy around the edges; this does not mean, however, that factual 
limitations do not obtain. 
Determining this maximum range of powers and dispositions is 
an a posteriori enterprise and depends entirely on what, for instance, 
cherry trees and Icelandic horses empirically turn out to be capable of. 
There is no a priori metaphysics of species involved that sets in stone, or 
inscribes in a Platonic heaven, what ‘Icelandic horse-ness’ or ‘cherry 
tree-ness’ means in terms of maximum potentiality. The precise 
determination of this upper limit is nevertheless a complex affair: only 
one specimen has to display a new activity and this activity will have to 
be included in the maxim set of activities possible for the species. In 
order to fully know the maximum set of dispositions possible for the 
species, all members would have to be assessed under all possible 
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circumstances and with full imagination. Only with such an extensive 
procedure would it possible to determine the complete set of potential 
activities and fix the species-bound factual limitations. As this is 
practically impossible, knowledge of absolute limitations will always 
remain an approximation. Factual limitations belonging to a species can 
therefore best be viewed as what Kant called a regulative idea: an idea 
that can be utilised for grounding and guiding judgements while itself 
not being completely knowable to an investigator. Judging whether a 
cherry tree or Icelandic horse is healthy requires having an approximate 
idea about which activities an Icelandic horse or cherry tree could 
possibly carry out, which subsequently regulates judgements about an 
organism’s degree of health. Approximate knowledge of species-bound 
factual limitations would normally suffice for this regulatory function. It 
does not seem epistemologically unacceptable that species-bound 
factual limitations to potentiality are known only by approximation; it 
seems enough to know approximately what cherry trees and Icelandic 
horses, qua species, are capable of doing and judge the potential of an 
individual specimen vis-à-vis this rough background knowledge. An 
Icelandic horse unable to gallop, for instance, is impaired in its absolute 
health if galloping is an activity included within the factual limitations 
of the species. Species-bound factual limitations to the dispositions that 
an organism could have, then, are a posteriori determined and function 
as a norm in relation to which an organism’s health can be measured. 
Measuring the capacities of an individual organism against the 
factual limitations to its capacities determined by the species, yields a 
measure of health that I will call ‘absolute health’. Absolute health is 
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perfect, i.e. impossible to improve on, if an organism’s MPA overlaps 
precisely with the maximum set of potential activities possible for the 
species. That is, an organism is in a state of complete absolute health if it 
can execute all species-specific activities under the maximum range of 
circumstances, and for as long as it possibly could, given the species 
that it belongs to. For complex organisms a state of perfect health will be 
virtually impossible as there will always be activities that one specimen 
has a disposition that another does not; hence, complex organisms will 
always be able to be healthier than they in fact are. For smaller 
organisms, on the other hand, perfect absolute health may not be 
impossible. Unicellular organisms do not have too many dispositions on 
the level of the organism as a whole, so possessing all the dispositions 
factually possible for the species is more likely to be the rule than the 
exception. When we speak of the health of plants and trees, I think we 
usually refer to their absolute health, i.e. their MPA measured vis-à-vis 
the maximum range of potential activities it could have given the 
species it belongs to. If a cherry tree lacks the capacity to blossom while 
it is possible for cherry trees to blossom, the non-blossoming cherry tree 
is limited in its absolute health.  
Because species are objective reference classes, existent and fixed 
independently of intuitions and subjective values about when an 
organism is healthy or not, and because the norms set by the reference 
class are also a factual matter—factual limitations to the potential 
activities belonging to the species obtain independently of what we may 
think or want an organism’s factual limitations to be; the absolute health 
of an organism is an objective matter.  
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2.4b Individual Limitations and Individual Health 
While species-bound factual limitations yield judgements about the 
absolute health of organisms, this is not the only type of health 
measurement there is and certainly not always the most informative 
one. The health of an individual organism can also be measured against 
what would be possible for it, given the individual organism that it is. 
From the beginning of each single life some rough upper limit of what 
an individual organism could be capable of is already marked off, and 
these individual limitations do not always coincide with the limitations 
of the species. Organisms with a congenital deformity, for instance, may 
be impaired in absolute health, but within the scope of their individual 
limitations still achieve a certain optimum state; their MPA could still 
correspond to the maximum scope set by their individual limitations.  
Measuring the health of an organism against the limitations of the 
individual organism yields a measure of health that I will call 
‘individual health’. The reference class—or better, the frame of 
reference—of this second measure of health is the individual organism 
itself, and the norm is the maximum range of dispositions that the 
individual organism could develop given the individual organism that 
it is. With ‘individual health’ I obviously do not mean a notion of health 
dependent on whatever this or that person thinks health is, or an 
understanding of health relative to individual desires, values and goals. 
By stipulation, individual health is a measure of an organism’s MPA 
contrasted with the factual limitations inherent to the individual 
organism. Just as species-bound limitations, the factual limitations 
belonging to an individual organism can only be known by 
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approximation, as it involves knowledge about the range of capacities 
an individual organism could develop in a variety of different 
environments, and as a result, again, only plays a regulative role in 
judgements of individual health. Determining individual factual 
limitations presents greater epistemic difficulties than species-
limitations as the only point of reference is the individual organism. 
This nevertheless need not be epistemically catastrophic; it still seems 
possible to know by approximation what an individual organism could 
have been capable of given the individual that it is, and measure its 
actual MPA in relation to this incomplete and approximate background 
knowledge. And like species-bound limitations, factual limitations of 
the individual also cannot be exceeded and transcended. If in fortuitous 
or therapeutically heroic cases people or other organisms end up 
becoming far more capacious than anyone ever expected, this does not 
mean that their individual limitations were transcended; people just had 
the facts wrong about what the individual limitations were.  
Individual health is a meaningful concept in all regions of life. If a 
bacterium lives in an environment unfavourable to its functioning, it 
may end up having an MPA smaller than the MPA it could have had 
given the individual bacterium that it is. The temperature, acidity levels 
or nutrients of its immediate environment can positively or negatively 
affect its metabolic processes, for instance, which in turn may widen or 
narrow down its MPA. The same is true for plants, which may be born 
with a capacity to grow to a certain height, but due to draught or an 
overexposure to pesticides lose that capacity irreversibly. Both absolute 
health and individual health would be impaired in this scenario, as the 
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plant’s MPA has been reduced relative to the species-maximum as well 
as the individual-maximum MPA. In the context of human life, 
individual health is also a meaningful measurement of health, probably 
more so than absolute health. Rather than comparing what a person is 
capable of doing to the maximum range of capacities possible for Homo 
sapiens at large, it is more meaningful to consider someone’s health on 
the basis of a comparison between the MPA of the person and the MPA 
that person could have had given his or her individual limitations. 
Someone could have the capacity for handwriting but lose this capacity 
after a car accident, for instance, reducing individual health. But, to be 
clear, if handwriting was never possible for the individual to begin 
with, individual health would not have been affected by such an event. 
Individual health is therefore necessarily perfect and impossible to 
improve on at the beginning of an individual life—which could be the 
moment of conception, some stage during foetal existence or indeed at 
birth, depending on where the line is drawn. 
One of the most interesting aspects of this notion of individual 
health is that it can be improved, strived towards, and perhaps even 
perfected also if an individual organism lacks certain potentials from 
birth and thus in an absolute sense will always be restricted in its health. 
Someone born with irremediable blindness, for instance, may reach 
great levels of individual health by developing all the capacities falling 
within her individual limitations, despite necessarily falling short in 
measures of absolute health. Individual health, then, provides an 
objective measures for how much one has been able to make out of 
oneself within the scope of one’s own factual limitations. 
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2.4c Contingent Limitations and Attainable Health 
The third frame of reference is an organism at a specific point in its life. 
The basic idea here is that in addition to species-bound and individual 
limitations there are factual limitations that an organism acquires 
through life. A plant having been affected by draught or pesticides; an 
animal having lost the power to run, to crack acorns, or to procreate; a 
human being incapable of walking after an amputation, unable to speak 
after a cerebral accident, or having lost the capacity for intense exercise 
after a cardiac arrest—all have their absolute and individual health 
reduced, but simultaneously acquire new upper limits to their MPA, 
which determine the possible fluctuations of their health after the 
structural loss of capacities.  
Contingently acquired factual limitation function as a third norm 
in relation to which an organism’s health can be evaluated. The health 
judgements yielded by this measurement are what I will call ‘attained 
health’. Attained health is a measure of an organism’s MPA relative to 
the maximum MPA they could have had given their species-limitations, 
individual limitations and contingently acquired limitations. Again 
these limitations can only be determined via a posteriori means, known 
only by approximation, and function as a regulatory idea in evaluations 
of health. But most importantly, there is a fact of the matter about the 
limitations. The limitations to how capacious an organism could get are 
not dependent on our preferences or attitudes: they are factual 
limitations. Comparisons between an organism’s MPA and the 
maximum MPA it could have had given its acquired limitations, 
therefore also yields an objective evaluation of health. 
198 
 
 Although attained health is a meaningful concept for all forms of 
life, I consider it to be most relevant in the domain of higher animals 
and human life especially. After a stroke, an amputation, a traumatic 
experience, a psychosis, a heart attack, or any other event with sufficient 
impact to have lasting effects, new factual limitations obtain for the 
individual. Within the scope of these acquired limitations, expansion or 
diminution of health is possible. The notion of attained health may 
therefore be of great therapeutic significance. Rather than measuring 
one’s state of being vis-à-vis the way a human being could be, or vis-à-
vis the way one could be given the potential one had at the beginning of 
life, the therapeutically and possibly ethically most relevant conception 
of health is one that expresses how capacious one is compared to how 
capacious one could be given the individual one has become. While 
absolute health is a kind of ideal state, one that can perhaps be aspired 
to but never fully realised, attainable health is a more workable notion 
of health that could be strived for and indeed realised.  
The different frames of reference and the measures of health they 
produce, then, may be schematically presented as follows: 
 
Frame of Reference Species  Specimen Specimen   
    at birth at point in life  
 
Factual Limitations  Absolute Individual Acquired 
 Limitations Limitations Limitations 
 
Measure of Health Absolute  Individual Attained 
 Health  Health Health 
 
 Table 2 
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3.5 Synopsis 
The central idea put forward in this chapter is that an organism’s health 
corresponds to its range of capacities. An organism’s functional parts 
function well if they support a wide range of capacities for the organism 
as a whole and function poorly if the reduce this range. On a closer 
analysis of this account, health was claimed to correspond to a 
multiplicity of potential activities relative to a certain norm. The 
multiplicity referred to in health judgements is a quantitative 
multiplicity and a function of present capacities and those expected to 
be possessed in the future. The potentiality of organisms corresponds to 
the totality of their dispositions and powers, and the activities referred 
in the proposed definition of health are nothing other than the 
manifestations of these disposition and powers. The greater an 
organism’s health, the more dispositions and powers an organism has, 
and the greater its overall potentiality.  
 The margins within which the health of living organisms can 
fluctuate have trivial disposition as their lower limit, as it is impossible 
not to have them, and factual limitations as their upper limit, as it is 
impossible to exceed them. The norms in relation to which the 
multiplicity of potential activity is measured in judgements about health 
are the upper limitations to an organism’s potential activity. These 
upper limits come in three forms and are determined by facts about the 
species, facts about the individual organism and facts about what the 
individual has become. Depending on the norms in relation which an 
organism’s potential for activities is evaluated we measure the 
organism’s absolute health, individual health, or attained health. 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Objections and Further Elaborations 
 
1. General Objections  
 
This chapter contains a number of objections to the theory of health 
developed in the previous chapter and a defence of the central claims in 
light of these objections. The ambition of this chapter is not just to 
neutralise the objections, but also to develop and unpack the theory of 
health further in the domain from which the objections derive their 
force. There are undoubtedly more objections and counter-examples 
than there is opportunity to address here, but the hope is that answering 
this particular selection of objections will add to the overall plausibility 
of the account of health and open up avenues for answering further 
objections and concerns.  
 
1.1 Which Capacities? Quality versus Quantity 
The account of health specified in the previous chapter ultimately 
operates on the basis of one basic principle: the more capacities an 
organism has, i.e. the greater the multiplicity of its potential activity 
relative to an upper limit, the healthier it is.1 Supposing the concept 
                                                             
1 Henceforth I will use the terms ‘capacities’ and ‘potentials’ and ‘dispositions’ 
interchangeably.  
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health indeed latches on the range of capacities, an immediate objection 
is that the value or quality of capacities determines whether an organism 
is healthy—more so, in any case, than the quantity of capacities 
possessed by an organism. Plenty of non-trivial capacities are prima facie 
more important to health than others. The capacity to fly is more 
valuable to a bird and more important for its health than the capacity to 
scratch its own neck, for instance, just as a dolphin’s capacity to 
navigate via sonar is more valuable and important to its health than its 
capacity to perform summersaults through a hoop. A plant’s capacity to 
absorb water and nutrients is similarly more important to its health than 
its capacity to emanate scents. And in the human case, capacities for 
perception, communication and mobility are unquestionably more 
central to health than a capacity to wiggle one’s little toe independently 
of other toes. My account stating that more capacities equals greater 
health seems to disregard these qualitative or valuative differences and 
may therefore be accused of falsely treating all capacities as equally 
valuable and equally relevant in evaluations of health. 
A more schematic way of formulating the objection would be to 
point out that two organisms of the same species with precisely the 
same quantity of dispositions are on my account by definition equal in 
absolute health. Yet, if one organism has prima facie valuable 
dispositions included in its set of dispositions and the other has only 
prima facie irrelevant dispositions, it is counter-intuitive to think they are 
indeed equal in health. If one pigeon has a capacity to scratch its own 
neck but lacks the capacity to fly, while another can fly for hundreds of 
miles but not scratch its own neck, ceteris paribus, the latter pigeon is no 
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doubt healthier than the former. The value or quality of what the 
organism is capable doing therefore appears be more important than the 
quantity of capacities it possesses, as I have claimed.  
If this objection holds, the value of capacities is to be determined 
independently from the quantity of dispositions, and precisely the value 
of dispositions would turn out decisive in evaluations of health. Valuing 
an organisms capacities independently of the quantity of their 
capacities, however, would require some principle or source on the 
basis of which these valuations are to be made. If the value of capacities 
is ultimately a matter of subjective preference or social convention, the 
proclaimed objectivity of health would also be undermined—if not lost 
beyond repair. If the objection holds the account of health I provided 
would be at best incomplete but at worst plainly mistaken. 
In response to this objection I shall return to the point touched on 
in Chapter Three (§2.2c) and further develop the idea that the value of a 
capacity can be derived from the quantitative increase of potentiality 
that it conditions. The objective value of a capacity, that is, can be 
determined by the quantity of further capacities that it conditions. The 
central idea is that capacities prima facie important to health are 
generally important to health precisely because they condition a greater 
range of additional capacities; or more specifically, valuable capacities 
are valuable precisely because they increase the multiplicity of potential 
activity of the organism more substantially. The capacity for a bird to fly 
is valuable and important to its health because it conditions the 
potential to locate and hunt down prey, migrate to warmer climates, 
escape from natural enemies, assemble nests, and so on. The capacity to 
203 
 
scratch its own neck is typically unimportant and insignificant for its 
health precisely because it hardly conditions any further capacities. 
Similarly, a plant’s capacity to absorb water and nutrients from its 
environment is more important to its health than its capacity to emanate 
scents because the capacity to absorb water conditions virtually 
everything else a plant is capable of, including the emanation of scents. 
If a plant were to lose its water-absorbing capacity its multiplicity of 
potential activity would drop dramatically, much more so than if it 
would somehow fail to release scents. When the plant no longer absorbs 
water it will soon cease to live and so its overall potentially has 
diminished immensely. Likewise, the human capacities to walk, see, 
hear, communicate, and so on, are more important to our health than 
wiggling our little toe, because possessing the former capacities are a 
pre-condition for a wide range of further capacities while the latter is 
not. The reduction in potential activity following from an inability to 
walk, or from blindness, or deafness, or aphasia is indeed monumental, 
whereas the reduction in potentiality following the inability to wiggle 
one’s little toe is negligible. What this amounts to, therefore, is the 
fundamental and critically important claim that the value of capacities 
and dispositions can be determined on the basis of the same principle 
that I proposed in the definition of health: the more a capacity or 
disposition increases the overall potentiality of an organism, the more 
significant it is for its health, and thus so the more objectively valuable it 
is for the organism as a whole.  
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The idea that the objective value of a capacity for an organism can 
be derived from the quantity of further capacities it conditions remains 
intrinsic to the theory of value and the account of health formulated in 
the previous two chapters. That is, no additional valuative moment, 
standard of evaluation, or source of normativity is required to assess the 
objective value of the capacities possessed by an organism. Individual 
values and cultural preferences therefore do not enter into the valuation 
of capacities. Individuals or cultures may of course subjectively value one 
capacity over another; people may subjectively value throwing darts 
over running marathons. But the capacities that are objectively valuable 
are those that are a pre-condition for the having of other capacities and 
thus most significantly impact the multiplicity of potential activity of the 
organism as a whole.  
The upshot of answering the quality versus quantity question in 
this way is the formation of a hierarchy of potentials for each species, 
whereby the most basic and objectively valuable potentials are those that 
are the least conditioned and the most conditioning. For birds the ability to 
fly will be more basic and objectively valuable than the ability to scratch 
their own neck, as the capacity to fly is a pre-condition for a larger 
number of further capacities than neck-scratching. For human beings the 
ability to walk, see, hear, and communicate are more basic and 
objectively valuable capacities than potentials to wiggle toes or to run 
marathons, irrespective of what someone might find subjectively valuable 
and preferable. For every living being a hierarchy of capacities can be 
identified and formed, with the most basic and broadly conditioning 
capacities at the basis and the least conditioning capacities on top of the 
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hierarchy. And the capacities found at the top of such orderings, it 
should be clear, are the least significant in evaluations of health and 
objectively the least valuable.  
The kind of comparison sketched in the formulation of the 
objection must therefore be relegated to the realm of impossibilities: it is 
impossible for two organisms to have a set of capacities equal in size 
with one having more valuable capacities than the other. Once the 
objective value of a capacity is accepted to be dependent on the range of 
capacities it conditions, the individual organism possessing the valuable 
capacities must harbour a greater multiplicity of potential activity, for 
otherwise it would not have had more valuable capacities. 
The capacities that are most important to health, therefore, are 
those that condition the widest range of further capacities and open up a 
larger range of potential activity. The quality or objective value that a 
capacity has for an organism can be derived from the range of potential 
activities that it enables. In short, the objective value of a capacity can be 
derived from the quantitative variation it conditions.  
 
1.2 Specialisations 
A second objection is that the dispositional account of health implies 
that it would be unhealthy for organisms to specialise towards the 
execution of one activity, or only a limited few activities. Especially 
organisms living in groups tend to specialise towards certain activities 
and inevitably adapt towards performing it. A straightforward answer 
to this concern would be to point out that there is nothing unhealthy 
about processes of specialisation as long as capacities for other activities 
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are not lost: becoming specialised in, or well-adapted towards, the 
execution of one activity does not necessarily imply a loss of potential to 
perform other activities.  
However, a stronger version of the objection would immediately 
present itself: various organisms, human beings in particular, do in fact 
specialise towards certain activities at the expense of abilities to perform 
alternative activities. Some capacities are mutually exclusive, meaning 
that the development of one capacity automatically negates the possible 
development of other capacities. A classic example would be the ability 
to sprint and the way that a specialisation in sprinting requires a body-
type incompatible with the ability to run long distances. Since 
specialisations of this kind are not health-reductions in any obvious 
way, the account of health may seem inadequate.   
There are three ways in which the account of health can be 
defended against this stronger version of the objection. First, it should 
be pointed out that becoming specialised in one kind of activity 
constitutes, in and of itself, a growth of capaciousness and therefore 
amounts to an improvement of health. A bird developing specialised 
skills to dive deeper into the ocean to catch fish swimming further 
below the water surface has simply expanded its capacities. Similarly, 
someone well-trained and specialised in running long distances has 
thereby first and foremost increased her action-potential. Although this 
point is question-begging in the context of specialisations that go at the 
expense of other capacities, this recognition still constitutes the first step 
towards answering it. For the same can be said about adaptations and 
specialisations for the mutually excluded activities—e.g. sprinting really 
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fast. This specialisation too would first and foremost be an increase in 
capacities, albeit an increase in a different and opposite direction. Both 
specialisations mark an increase of action-potential and thus constitute 
an improvement of health compared to a state in which these 
specialisations didn’t occur. The fact that at some level of training one 
cannot simultaneously improve the potential for both activities does not 
render it a health-reduction. It only shows that there are factual 
limitations to the development of certain capacities; the maximum set of 
potential activities cannot contain both capacities in a specialised or 
highly developed mode. The objection can be neutralised, therefore, by 
pointing out that factual limitations within which growth or diminution 
of potentiality is possible are to be taken into consideration. 
If, however, one of the mutually excluded capacities would be 
very broadly conditioning—imagine, for instance, that it were true that 
the ability to run long distances would open a much larger set of further 
activities compared to the ability to sprint—then the capacity theory of 
health indicates that the more broadly conditioning capacity would be a 
healthier and more valuable capacity to develop and sustain. However, 
this would still not imply that the development of the excluded 
capacity—sprinting fast in this case—would be health-reducing. The 
development of both capacities amount to improvements of health, even 
if one is more broadly conditioning than the other. One potential would 
just constitute a more substantial health-improvement than the other. 
 A second way to answer the objections is by taking features of 
group behaviour into account. For herd animals capacity-reducing 
specialisations are necessary for survival. Imagine an animal that hunts 
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in a pack, say the grey wolf, whereby each member belonging to a pack 
has a highly specialised role: one wolf locates prey, another isolates a 
vulnerable young, the next wolf side-tracks it, a few others bar off 
escape routes, and the final one goes for the kill. Let’s further suppose 
that each has a specialised role that requires specialised capacities 
towards executing it. We already established that specialisation will 
only begin to challenge the account of health insofar specialisations go 
at the expense of possessing and sustaining other capacities. So we 
should also presume that the ability to perform one single role in the 
hunt excludes the ability to perform the other roles: the division of 
labour in hunting requires mutually exclusive capacities. A 
specialisation of this kind, one might argue, annuls a whole series of 
potential activities otherwise available to the wolf, but still, 
specialisations of this kind do not seem necessarily unhealthy for it.  
Once again, however, the factual limitations of the species must be 
taken into account. If wolfs prove to hopelessly inept at hunting 
individually and hardly ever succeed in catching a prey, then in order to 
survive they simply have to operate in groups and take on specialised 
roles. The action-potential of the non-specialised lone wolf would be 
extremely limited, as it would be in an unsustainable state. Whether 
specialisations are capacity-reducing therefore depends entirely on 
what organisms prove capable of without the specialisation. If the grey 
wolf could hunt perfectly well on its own then a reduction of action-
potential following from joining a pack and undergoing in a capacity-
compromising specialisation would indeed be an unhealthy move. In 
nature this scenario is extremely unlikely, however, and almost sounds 
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like an absurdity. Human life is probably the only exception where 
unnecessary action-potential reducing specialisations occur. Only 
human beings manage to specialise in the execution of small sub-tasks 
while simultaneously reducing and eradicating other capacities, even 
though we would be perfectly capable of carrying out the complete 
activity ourselves. A factory worker specialised in putting two 
miniscule components together with lightning speed will typically be 
deprived of the capacity for other stages of the production process, let 
alone develop or sustain the capacity to utilise the end-product. Not 
only would the worker be alienated from the final product, the results 
of specialisation would also result in a genuine loss of health. To be 
clear, the reason why it would be unhealthy for the factory worker to 
specialise in this capacity-negating manner and not for the hypothetical 
grey wolf, is because the factory worker has factual limitations that do 
not demand capacity-negating specialisations for survival.  
The third and final reply to concerns about specialisation is that 
under certain circumstances specialisations do indeed amount to 
unhealthy developments. If an organism specialises into one kind of 
activity at the expense of capacities it previously had or otherwise could 
have had, and if the lost or underdeveloped capacities would be more 
broadly conditioning than those that are being specialised in, the health 
of the organism has indeed been compromised. If I were to specialise in 
playing video games and become so extortionately obese or frail that I 
can no longer carry myself around—and presuming that the capacity to 
walk is more broadly conditioning and capacitating than the 
dispositions acquired by playing video games—my health would 
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indeed have significantly deteriorated. But in such cases we can safely 
maintain the capacity account of health is confirmed rather than 
challenged in any serious way. The objection that specialisation for 
certain activities may be capacity-diminishing without necessarily being 
health-reducing, can thus be fully incorporated and explained in terms 
of the capacity account of health.  
 
1.3 Pain and Suffering 
Another objection stems from the widely shared thought that accounts 
of health and illness must contain, at the very least, some reference to the 
presence or absence of pain and suffering. An account of health and 
illness turning on the presence of pain and suffering was dismissed 
early on in the previous chapter on the basis of its failure to generalise 
to all forms of life and, hence, its inability to constitute a universal 
account of health. One might object this dismissal was made too hastily 
and insist that illness is in fact fundamentally associated with an 
experience of pain and suffering, and health with an absence of these 
experiences—perhaps even with pleasure and happiness. If organisms 
without a nervous system are incapable of experiencing pain and 
suffering one could just accept that health and illness cannot 
meaningfully be predicated over those regions of life. Health and illness 
would be restricted to forms of life that evolved a nervous system. The 
idea that illness requires an experience of pain and suffering and health 
an absence of pain and suffering would be consistent when construed 
along these lines, and therefore demands a more elaborate reply.  
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To illustrate how common and prevalent the view is, we could 
look at the opening pages of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders. In the fourth edition of this of essential work in 
psychiatric practice we read that: 
 
In DSM IV-TR, each of the mental disorders is conceptualized 
as a clinically significant behavioural or psychological 
syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that is 
associated with present distress (e.g., a painful symptom) or 
disability (i.e., impairment in one or more important areas of 
functioning) or with a significantly increased risk of suffering 
death, pain, disability, or an important loss of freedom.2  
 
And a little further:  
 
The definition of mental disorder in the introduction to DSM-
IV requires that there be clinically significant impairment or 
distress […] The criteria set for most disorders include a 
clinical significance criterion (usually worded [...] causes 
clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning’). This 
criterion helps establish the threshold for the diagnosis of a 
disorder in those situations in which the symptomatic 
presentation by itself (particularly in its milder forms) is not 
inherently pathological and may be encountered in 
                                                             
2 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders: DSM-IV-TR, 4th edition, text revision (Washington, DC: American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000), xxxi. 
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individuals for whom a diagnosis of ‘mental disorder’ would 
be inappropriate.3 
 
In the more recently published fifth edition of the manual we find the 
same idea, although distress is now described as being ‘associated’ with 
disorders rather being a ‘threshold’ for it: 
 
Mental disorders are usually associated with significant 
distress or disability in social, occupational, or other 
important activities.4 
 
The proposed account of health implies that disablement and 
diminution of potential activity is a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition for illnesses and disease, without any mention of distress, 
pain, or suffering. The formulations quoted above state that distress or 
disability are required for a diagnosis of mental disorder, stating that it 
is a necessary condition for disorders that one or the other must obtain, 
hence equally being a threshold for mental disorders.  
Canguilhem, as we already saw, also places a heavy emphasis on 
the suffering in the case of pathology and an absence of suffering in the 
case of health. Recall Canguilhem’s adoption of Leriche’s phrase that 
“health is life lived in the silence of the organs,” and conversely, that 
“disease is what irritates men in the normal course of their lives and 
work, and above all, what makes them suffer.”5 Although Canguilhem’s 
                                                             
3 DSM IV-TR, 8. The emphasis on “threshold” is mine.  
4 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, 5th edition (Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association, 2013), 20. 
5 Canguilhem, Normal and Pathological, 91. Emphasis added. 
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views on health and pathology are more complex, his view ultimately 
also turns on the experience of suffering in the case of disease and an 
organic silence, i.e. absence of pain and suffering, in the case of health.  
The idea that health and illness must at least in part be defined in 
terms of pain and suffering probably has its roots in the ancient old idea 
that pain is the ultimate founding principle of badness and pleasure (or 
absence of pain) the ultimate source of goodness. If that is true, then 
health and illness, as normative concepts, must contain some reference 
to pain and pleasure, as precisely these affects render illness something 
bad and health something good. The identification of goodness with 
pleasure and badness with pain is endorsed most explicitly in 
hedonistic versions of utilitarianism. By means of illustration we may 
quote the famous opening lines Bentham’s of An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation: 
 
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two 
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to 
point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what 
we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, 
on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to 
their throne […] Systems which attempt to question it, deal in 
sounds instead of sense, in caprice instead of reason, in 
darkness instead of light.6 
 
                                                             
6 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(Kitchener: Batoche Books, 2000), 14 
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But Bentham was not the first to base an account of natural goodness on 
the experience of pleasure and absence of pain. The idea pervaded the 
Hellenistic world as well. Epicurus, for instance, already wrote that: 
 
We say that pleasure is the starting-point and goal of living 
blessedly. For we recognized this as our first innate good, and 
this is our starting point for every choice and avoidance and 
we come to this by judging every good by the criterion of 
feeling.7  
 
The idea that health and illness qua normative concepts must make 
reference to an experience of pain and pleasure therefore has a history 
dating back at least to Epicurus’ garden in Ancient Athens.  
In reply to the objection that pleasure and pain were dismissed too 
quickly as necessary criteria for health and illness, the aim is not to 
conclusively demonstrate utilitarianism to be false, Epicurus and other 
Hellenists to be misguided, Canguilhem to be deluded or the DSM to be 
fundamentally flawed. These passages were invoked to support and 
illustrate the objection that pleasure and pain cannot be ignored or 
dismissed in accounts of health and illness, as well as more generally in 
                                                             
7 Epicurus, The Epicurus Reader: Selected Writings and Testimonia, ed. and trans. Brad 
Inwood and Lloyd P. Gerson (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994), 
text 4: 128-9. The passage continues with an important qualification: “And it is just 
because this is the first innate good that we do not choose every pleasure; but 
sometimes we pass up many pleasures when we get a larger amount of what is 
uncongenial from them. And we believe many pains to be better than pleasures 
when a greater pleasure follows for a long while if we endure the pains. So every 
pleasure is a good thing, since it has nature congenial to us, but not every one is to 
be chosen.” (Ibid.) 
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accounts of what is naturally good and bad for living beings. 
Nevertheless, an attempt will be made to defend the capacity account of 
health in light these sources and to argue against the importance 
assigned to pleasure and pain in medical as well as ethical theories. 
It should first be pointed out that an experience of pain and 
suffering tends to coincide with a loss of ability and diminution of 
potential activity. Pain is typically experienced when tissue gets 
damaged or when it is threatened to get damaged, usually resulting in a 
temporary or lasting reduction of potentiality. A temporary or 
permanent loss of ability typically goes hand in hand with an 
experience of suffering.8 An increase in ability, on the other hand, 
normally coincides with positive affects and feelings of pleasure. From 
the perspective of the capacity theory of health we could therefore say 
that a loss of health is generally accompanied by an experience of pain 
and suffering and health improvements generally by feelings of pleasure 
and happiness, so that the difference between the proposed capacity 
account and the challenge of the imagined adversaries is not too great. 
This does not imply, however, that health and illness can be defined in 
terms of a presence or absence of pain and suffering. That is, this does 
not imply that presence or absence of pain and suffering are necessary 
conditions for either illness or health. Besides the failure of pain and 
pleasure to generalise to all forms of life, there are four further reasons 
why pain and pleasure can’t serve as foundational for health and illness. 
                                                             
8 The phenomenon of human suffering is no doubt more complex and intricate 
than just being an emotional response to some objective capacity-reduction. The 
point here is merely that an experience of suffering and loosing abilities often occur 
simultaneously.  
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First, plenty of clear-cut health problems do not cause pain or 
suffering. For instance, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and 
cancers can go unnoticed for long periods of time and may never cause 
an experience of pain and suffering. A fatal heart attack could also take 
place without much pain and suffering while certainly not being a token 
of good health. In cases of a cerebrovascular accident or advanced 
stages of dementia it is also not evident that people are in pain or a state 
of suffering, whereas their health has beyond doubt been severely 
impaired. Even though pain and suffering often accompany health 
impairments, the fact that it is possible to dramatically undermine and 
even annihilate health without experiencing any pain and suffering 
whatsoever, already provide important indications that pain and 
suffering cannot be the defining features of health and illness. In fact, 
health problems could even be accompanied by feelings of pleasure. 
Someone could be addicted to psychostimulant drugs and subsist in a 
state of constant euphoria and elation. Especially over extended periods 
of time regular intake of drugs can be detrimental to health without, 
however, diminishing the sensation of pleasure. The capacity account of 
health as defined in Chapter Three does not rely on subjective 
experience of pain and suffering and can effortlessly explain why 
undetected cancer, COPD, various neurological conditions and vicious 
drug addictions are detrimental to health, even if the feelings of pain 
and suffering are entirely absent.  
Second, if health and illness are defined on the basis of presence 
and absence of suffering the evaluation of health and illness will end up 
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being relative to individual desires and ambitions.9 The desires and 
ambitions of individuals can render one particular state of affairs 
pleasurable, distressing, or affectively neutral. Instead of one’s actual 
state of being, desires and ambitions can turn out to be decisive in 
whether one is healthy or not. Consider for the sake of argument 
someone who has come to terms with some serious medical condition 
and who no longer subjectively suffers from it; this person could not be 
claimed to be limited in health anymore if health is indeed defined in 
terms of absence pain and suffering. And conversely, someone with 
great ability and physical prowess but desires and ambitions that far 
exceed any possible satisfaction and realisation may experience great 
distress and suffering, rendering him comparatively unhealthy on 
hedonistic definitions of health.10 Now, the impaired individual 
embracing fate is certainly more content than the unfulfilled high-flyer; 
perhaps she is even in a better state of what I called ‘attained health’. 
But once health is itself identified with an experience of suffering we 
seem to lose the objective position from which an incapacitated 
individual is at least in the absolute sense of health less healthy than a 
highly capable individual, regardless of who subjectively suffers the 
most.  
                                                             
9 This second rejoinder only applies if health and illness are defined on the basis of 
presence and absence of suffering, not when defined on the basis of presence and 
absence of pain. Pain-sensations are generally not influenced, or at least a lot less 
obviously so, by one’s desires and ambitions. 
10 The management of desires and an acceptance of factual limitations to one’s 
potential are not unimportant to health, also on my account, as will become clearer 
in the next chapter. The point here is only that health does not depend on levels of 
subjective suffering.  
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Third, the experience of pain and suffering for human and non-
human organisms also depends on circumstantial factors. A bird locked 
up inside a small cage may suffer greatly, just as a human being living 
in deprived or imprisoned circumstances may experience great levels of 
distress. If absence and presence of pain and suffering are posited only 
as necessary conditions for health and illness and not as sufficient 
conditions, this recognition poses no real problem for the proponent of a 
hedonistic account of health. Nevertheless, a circumstantial change 
could alter sensations of pain in pleasure in such a way that someone 
would become healthy or ill directly as a result of circumstantial 
changes. And this concern does affect the idea that pain and suffering 
are necessary for illness. Two identical organisms, both impaired by 
some disease, but living under different circumstances, one more 
pleasurable than the other, would end up with differing levels of health. 
If we imagine two identical people, both suffering from cancer and both 
experiencing an equal degree of pain, and only one is administered pain 
relief, it seems plainly wrong to think that the anaesthetised person is 
healthier than the person still experiencing the pain.11 A major problem 
for an account of health based on presence or absence of pain and 
suffering, therefore, is that one’s health can be influenced by changes in 
circumstantial factors. 
Fourth, pain and suffering are in many ways part of and necessary 
for being healthy. Pain serves important functions in life: it provides 
warning signals against potential tissue damage; it imposes rest upon 
the organism during periods of recovery; etc. When pain functions fail 
                                                             
11 I am thankful to Matthew Broome for suggesting this example to me.  
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and people cannot experience pain, a condition known as congenital 
analgesia, people tend to struggle greatly with the basic demands of 
daily life and the management of illnesses. The absence of all pain 
therefore does not constitute an ideal case of health, if anything it 
constitutes the opposite.  
These four reasons provide further motivation to resist a theory of 
health and illness based on the presence or absence of pain and 
suffering. Pain and suffering, I maintain, are only indirectly related to 
health. This fact was already recognised by Nietzsche, with whom we 
can agree when he writes:  
 
Pleasure and displeasure are mere consequences, mere 
epiphenomena – what man wants, what every smallest part of 
a living organism wants, is an increase of power.12  
 
In an unpublished note Nietzsche writes similarly:  
 
The ‘health of the soul’ is a much fuller conception than 
happiness, where all moralist babble about. The wholly 
willing, creating, feeling soul and her health must be the 
purpose—not just accompanying phenomena such as 
‘happiness’, etc.”13 
                                                             
12 Nietzsche, Will to Power, §702. Nietzsche’s use of ‘power’ is notably different 
from the sense in which I spoke of powers and dispositions. As I briefly indicated 
in §2.4 of Chapter Two, Nietzsche’s concept of ‘power’ [Macht] refers primarily to 
feelings and practice of ‘domination’ over others as well as oneself, while on my 
account ‘power’ means nothing more than having a disposition for some activity, 
without involving any sense of domination, control, or exploitation.   
13 Nietzsche, KSA, §11.27 [13]. My translation. 
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Now, so far I have only said that a theory of health positing 
presence and absence of pain and suffering as necessary conditions for 
health and illness are problematic and implausible, suggesting that the 
proposed capacity account of health indeed makes for a better theory of 
health. From the perspective of the capacity theory of health, however, 
there is more to say about pain and suffering, and especially about the 
tendency to identify goodness with pleasure and freedom from 
suffering, and badness with pain and suffering. This tendency, this very 
mode of thinking and valuing can be criticised on the basis of the 
capacity account of health. That is, it would not only be incorrect and 
misguided to identify health with absence of pain and suffering, but 
from the perspective of the account of health it would be even unhealthy 
and thus objectively bad for us to do so. Pursuing this line of 
argumentation moves us even more firmly onto Nietzschean grounds 
and the kind of criticisms he levelled against utilitarianism and 
hedonists like Epicurus.14  
What, then, is unhealthy about the identification of health and 
natural goodness with pleasure, and illness or badness with suffering? 
In short, an idealisation of pleasure and avoidance of all pain and 
suffering easily descends into a life of comfort, complacency, if not 
laziness; the kind of life that Nietzsche calls “decadent.”15 Hedonistic 
ideals can be criticised for reasons of health precisely because they tends 
to reduce one’s action-potential over time: it eventually makes one 
                                                             
14 See for a more complete overview of Nietzsche’s critique of Utilitarianism, see: 
Jonny Anomaly, “Nietzsche’s Critique of Utilitarianism,” The Journal of Nietzsche 
Studies 29 (2005): 1-15. 
15 See for instance Nietzsche, Will to Power, §44; Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, §17.  
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weaker, both physically as well as mentally—especially compared to a 
life in which suffering and pain are utilised to overcome obstacles, to 
work through existing limitations, to create new avenues for action, and 
to expand one’s overall action-potential. Nietzsche writes with precisely 
the same concerns in mind: 
 
If you refuse to let your own suffering lie upon you even for 
an hour and if you constantly try to prevent and forestall all 
possible distress way ahead of time; if you experience 
suffering and displeasure as evil, hateful, worthy of 
annihilation, and as a defect of existence, then it is clear that 
besides your religion of pity you also harbour another religion 
in your heart that is perhaps the mother of the religion of pity: 
the religion of comfortableness.16  
 
An account of health and natural goodness centring on the avoidance 
and elimination of pain and suffering might therefore be itself an 
expression of a kind of vital exhaustion, an inability and lack of desire to 
become healthier and more capacitated, and to pursue what is good for 
oneself as a living being. This diagnosis would be consistent with the 
proposed account of health and be again a distinctly Nietzschean 
thought. The celebration of pleasure and condemnation of pain and 
suffering is not only associated with comfortableness by Nietzsche, but 
also with a kind of exhaustion and inability to act in the world. In one of 
Nietzsche’s notebooks we read:  
 
                                                             
16 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §338.  
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The exhausted want rest, relaxation, peace, calm—the 
happiness of the nihilistic religions and philosophies; the rich 
and living want victory, opponents overcome, the overflow of 
the feeling of power across wider domains than hitherto.17 
 
And similarly: 
 
what they [the exhausted] would like to strive for with all 
their powers is the universal green-pasture happiness of the 
herd, with security, lack of danger, comfort, and an easier 
life for everyone; and suffering itself they take for something 
that must be abolished.18 
 
The equation of non-moral goodness with health-promoting objects and 
behaviours, in combination with the positive account of health, puts us 
in a position to evaluate subjective values, ideals, and even rival 
accounts of health in terms of their health-promoting and health-
inhibiting properties, in similar vein to how Nietzsche criticised the 
prevailing morality of his time, religious beliefs, and systems of value in 
light of how health-promoting and life-affirming he considered them to 
be. An idealisation of pain-avoidance and damnation of all suffering can 
be criticised as unhealthy ways of thinking, valuing, and living insofar 
as it incapacitates people and ends up restricting the multiplicity of their 
potential activities. 
                                                             
17 Nietzsche, Will to Power, §703. Again it has to be emphasised that Nietzsche’s 
notion of power is different from the one we have used, which makes it somewhat 
risky to quote him in this context. See footnote 12 above.  
18 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §44.  
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To be clear, the suggestion is not to glorify pain and suffering or to 
advocate that people or other organisms should actively seek pain and 
suffering as much or intensely as possible, out of some grandeur but 
ultimate juvenile ideal of strength and a feeling of power. This is neither 
Nietzsche’s view nor the one defended here. As Spinoza argued 
extensively in his Ethics, pleasurable objects and events, i.e. those 
inducing joy, are typically those that increase our power for action, 
while pain installs sadness—the affect accompanying a reduction of 
power for action.19 The claim I do endorse, in line with Nietzsche’s later 
philosophy, is that an idealisation of absence of pain, the complete 
avoidance of all possible suffering, and the creation of the optimal 
comfortableness, is likely to be incapacitating and therefore unhealthy 
form the perspective of the capacity account of health. Pain and 
suffering, in the right doses and at the right times, are necessary for 
expansions of one’s action potential and one’s health. Growth pains, 
myalgia after physical training, and stitches during exercise would be 
good metaphors to illustrate the idea that pain is often required for 
health-improvements. Nietzsche himself speaks even of a ‘disciplining’ 
of suffering: an incitement to allow limited experiences of pain and 
                                                             
19 In Spinoza’s words, “Joy is an affect by which the body’s power of acting is 
increased or aided. Sadness, on the other hand, is an affect by which the body’s 
power of acting is diminished or restrained.” Ethics, IV: P41.Dem. However, also 
Spinoza realised that pleasure can be bad, and immediately adds, echoing 
Epicurus’s qualifications, that if pleasure is “so great that it surpasses the other 
actions of the body, remains stubbornly fixed in the body, and so prevent the body 
from being capable of being affected in a great many other ways. Hence, it can be 
evil.” And likewise, pain “can restrain pleasure, so that it is not excessive, and 
thereby prevent the body from being rendered less capable. To that extent, 
therefore, it will be good” Spinoza, Ethics, IV: P43.Dem.  
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suffering in order to attain greater health. In one particularly provoking 
passage, Nietzsche writes:  
 
The discipline of suffering, of great suffering—do you not 
know that only this discipline has created all enhancements of 
man so far? That tension of the soul in unhappiness which 
cultivates its strength, its shudders face to face with great ruin, 
its inventiveness and courage in enduring, persevering, 
interpreting, and exploiting suffering, and whatever has been 
granted to it of profundity, secret, mask, spirit, cunning, 
greatness – was it not granted to it through suffering, through 
the discipline of great suffering?20 
 
Nietzsche speaks here of much more than growth pains, stiches, and 
myalgia. He extends the idea to the thought that the greatest 
enhancements in human life have come through great suffering and the 
strength required to live through serious turmoil. For our purposes, 
however, what matters is that in greater or lesser degrees pain and 
suffering are required for expansions of health and advancements of life, 
rendering events that cause pain and suffering sometimes conducive to 
health. The incentive or ideal to avoid all pain and suffering, in both the 
definition of health and the practice of living, therefore not only makes 
for an implausible account of health, it is also deeply problematic from 
the perspective of the capacity account of health developed here.  
 
                                                             
20 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §225. 
225 
 
1.4 Affluence and Social Advantage 
A fourth objection to the proposed theory of health, an objection specific 
to human health, is that an accumulation of wealth would amount to an 
improvement of health on our account. One could object that the 
wealthier someone is, the wider the variety of activities one can engage 
in and the greater one’s action-potential tends to be. Hence, individuals 
with a higher socio-economic status would necessarily be healthier than 
the less well-off on my account of health—a consequence both counter-
intuitive and inadmissible for prudential reasons. People living in 
deprived areas would be categorically less healthy than the wealthy few 
with access to cars, private jets, restaurants, shopping opportunities, etc. 
Surely wealth as such does not constitute human health, one might 
object, and so the capacity account of health may seem false. 
The reply to this objection centres on the distinction between 
potentials (or dispositions) and circumstances (or conditions). Health 
refers to the quantity of our potential activities, dispositions that may or 
may not be realised depending on circumstantial possibilities. Now, 
anyone with sufficient resources could shop endlessly or fly around in a 
private yet; the potential of the least well-off and the most affluent do 
not differ in these respects, and so their health does not vary in terms of 
these capacities either. The affluent may have infinitely more possibilities 
to realise certain dispositions, but they share the dispositions for these 
activities with most other people. In fact, someone may go through life 
without any material possessions whatsoever but still have a high 
degree of health in virtue of having large set of dispositions realisable 
under a broad range of external circumstances. 
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Nevertheless, in the modern world the well-off do of course tend 
to have better opportunities to expand their health—more so, in any 
case, than the most deprived and least well-off. For one, medical 
technologies and services can be accessed easier, enabling early 
detection and treatment of pathologies. The wealthy generally also 
enjoy better access to education, can afford qualitatively better nutrition, 
sports and physical training are easier engaged in, and so on—resulting 
in the development of an abundance of potentials unavailable to the 
underprivileged. The rich may therefore end up enjoying higher degrees 
of health than the less well-off. But this is a contingent feature of our 
society and does not establish a conceptual or necessary connection 
between health and wealth. A monk living in a monastic order may not 
have any material possessions at all, but through life-long learning, 
reflection, balanced nutrition, training and disciplining of his body and 
mind, could end up acquiring an extraordinary level of health. Wealth 
per se, therefore, does not constitute greater health.  
The same principle holds for any other kind of social inequality. In 
societies where ethnic minorities and homosexuals are discriminated 
against, for instance, the possibilities for these communities may be 
constrained and impeded to a greater or lesser extent. This constitutes 
no reason to regard ethnic minorities or homosexuals as less healthy, 
however, also on my account. Socially disadvantaged may have similar 
or even greater quantities of potentiality, but due to hostile social 
climates remain deprived of the possibilities to realise them. The 
proposed account of health therefore by no means implies that socially 
disadvantaged are by definition less healthy.  
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Here too, however, it must be recognised that discriminatory 
practices could result in significant reductions of health. If minorities are 
deprived of medical services, education, opportunities for labour and so 
on, the totality of dispositions they will develop is likely to remain 
comparatively limited. Unequal or discriminatory societies therefore 
often do inhibit, supress, and violate the health of certain groups. But 
the distinction between dispositions that determine one’s health and 
possibilities granted by material and social environments, enables me to 
set aside the objection that the socially or economically disadvantaged 
are by definition less healthy. 
 
1.5 Technology and Health  
In the context of human life one could object to the capacity account of 
health that technological progress has immensely boosted human 
capacities, while technological progress as such surely does not equate 
with an improve of health.21 The final objection I shall consider is that, 
if, indeed, health refers to the multiplicity of potential activity, and if, 
second, technology increases the multiplicity of our potential activity, it 
follows that all technological progress directly and globally boosts 
human health. If this simple syllogism is sound, people living in pre-
industrial times would de facto and en mass be less healthy than we are 
today, just as we would currently be less healthy than technologically 
more advanced generations of the future, simply due to differing levels 
of technological ability. Since this would be an absurd implication, the 
                                                             
21 I will use ‘technology’ in the everyday meaning of the word, referring to 
technological objects and instruments, both simple and advanced, rather than in a 
Foucauldian sense of ‘technologies of the self’.  
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identification of health with a multiplicity of potential activity could be 
claimed to be wrong-headed from the start. 
The rebuttal to this objection involves denying the second 
premise—the idea that technology indeed boosts the multiplicity of our 
potential for activities. The question, however, is precisely how to deny 
this premise. The line of thought I shall develop here is that only the 
composite or aggregate of human being and technological instrument has 
certain dispositions. Technological progress amounts to the creation of 
new dispositions, but only of dispositions possessed by human beings 
together with the technological item. On this line of thinking, the human 
being itself does not have a disposition to fly at the speed of sound; only 
the sum of human beings and supersonic jets would possess the 
disposition. Similarly, human beings plus telescope would have a 
disposition to observe distant galaxies rather than individuals 
themselves; only the composite object ‘people plus telephones’ would 
have a disposition to communicate with ‘people plus telephones’ on the 
other side of the planet; and only ‘human beings plus street lights’ 
would have dispositions to perceive colours after the sun has set. On 
this conception new dispositions do come into existence when 
technology advances, but the bearer of the new disposition is the 
composite of human being plus the technological instrument, rather 
than the human being herself. Human beings considered in isolation, by 
contrast, do not gain or lose dispositions whenever new technological 
instruments become available. And if we restrict health to the quantity 
of dispositions of human beings themselves, we can maintain that 
technological progress does not affect human health.  
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The guiding thought here is that the dispositions of human beings 
remain confined to the activities we are capable of realising ourselves, 
i.e. without instruments or technological support, and precisely this set 
of dispositions makes up our health. That is, the human being herself 
does not gain or lose any disposition the moment a new piece of 
machinery has been created. The capacity approach of health could 
therefore be preserved: the capacities of human beings themselves 
remain unaffected by technological advancements. Only the compound 
object of a human being plus a piece of technology has capacities that 
were previously inexistent. 
A possible downside of this repsonse, however, is that we must 
endorse, and find a way to make sense of, a metaphysics in which 
dispositions can be attributed to composite objects, like ‘human beings + 
streetlights’, or ‘human beings + supersonic jets’, or ‘rocks + nuclear war 
heads’, or ‘humans + telescopes’. We would have to render intelligible 
the idea that there are dispositional properties belonging to objects of 
which the parts are in distinct places and widely separated by space and 
time. Somewhat odd as this may appear, it seems to me there is nothing 
uncommon about attributing dispositions to objects of which the parts 
are separated in this way. For instance, we can attribute dispositions to 
an army or a fleet—when we speak of their mobility or striking force, 
for instance—even though the components are located in different 
places and individually do not possess the dispositions of the army or 
fleet as a whole. On a grander scale, we could think of the disposition of 
solar systems and star clusters to expand or shrink, even though the 
planets and stars that make up these galactic unities can be separated by 
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light-years of empty space. Similarly, we may think of dispositions of 
cultures to protect or marginalise minorities, or dispositions of 
economic systems to crash and recover, or dispositions of weather 
systems to produce hurricanes: disposition all belonging to bearers 
constituted by parts widely spread out in time and space. In light of 
these examples, why not accept the possibility that ‘human beings + 
telescopes’ have dispositions that human beings as such do not have, or 
that the combination of ‘human beings + streetlights’ gives rise to 
dispositions that neither streetlights nor humans possess individually? 
We may not have words that pick out the composite object of ‘humans + 
telescope’ or ‘humans + supersonic jet’, in a way that we do have terms 
to pick our solar systems and particular human cultures, but this 
provides no reason disregard them as composite objects to which 
dispositional properties can be attributed.  
The way I would suggest to think about the relation between 
human capacities and technological instruments is therefore not that 
technology bestows capacities on human beings themselves, as the 
objection would have it, but, and to put it more simply, that human 
beings with technological instruments have capacities that human 
beings themselves do not have. And since health is restricted only to the 
latter set of capacities, the premise that technology boosts the 
multiplicity of our potential activity can be denied.  
To complicate matters a little further, however, there are cases in 
which it is not entirely clear whether we are considering human beings 
themselves, or human beings with technological support. When a 
human being wears glasses, for instance, it is not clear which set of 
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dispositions we are evaluating when we evaluating her health; do we 
evaluate the human being’s total range of capacities with glasses or only 
its range of capacities without the glasses? Similarly for an amputee 
using prostheses: when evaluating his health are we measuring what he 
is capable of with or without the prostheses? This ambiguity, I will 
argue, follows from the indeterminacy of the referent ‘human being’ 
rather than posing a problem for my our account of health. When 
referring to a specific human being, it is not precisely clear which object 
with which boundaries we refer to. We can easily distinguish between 
‘human being’ and ‘human being + airplane’, and isolate only the 
former’s capacities in assessments of health. It is less clear, however, 
what we are evaluating in cases of human beings with glasses and 
prostheses. When we say that some human being is more capacitated 
when wearing his glasses or that he is greatly incapacitated without 
them, it is the indeterminacy and imprecision of the concept ‘human 
being’ that makes these utterances possible. What we are really saying is 
that two different objects have a different number of dispositions: the 
human being has an MPA of Xd, whereas ‘human being + glasses’ has an 
MPA of Xd + Yd. In natural speech it just isn’t always clear what we are 
referring to when referring to one single human being. Is the human 
being itself only that lump of cells wired to a brain? Or would the 
glasses part of it? Insofar as glasses and prostheses are part of the 
individual they contribute to an individual human being’s health, in the 
same way that well-trained muscles, developed motor skills, and 
cognitive abilities would improve someone’s health. Insofar as glasses 
and prostheses are not part of the individual they do not bear on an 
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individual’s health, just as airplanes and telescopes do not. The 
vagueness of our concept human being, however, is ultimately a 
semantic matter, and must find its resolution within those debates.22 For 
our purposes, and in reply to the objection, I shall maintain that the 
quantity of dispositions of human beings does not alter as a result of 
technological advancements. 
Although this specification of the account should defuse the main 
objection, there are of course ways in which technological progress has 
influenced our health and no doubt will continue to do so. A few words 
on health-promoting technology would therefore be in place, if only to 
further illustrate my response to the objection. There are at least three 
ways to be distinguished in which technology affects human health. 
First, operating and handling technological instruments requires 
dispositions previously not possessed and could therefore constitute an 
increase of our own set of dispositions. Second, medical technology has 
enabled the prevention, diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation of 
various diseases, which directly impacts the level of health of those 
subjected to it. And third, technology enabling the enhancement of the 
human being directly intervenes on the scope of the dispositions that 
makes up our health. A comprehensive discussion of the ways in which 
technological progress impacts our health lies beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but a few remarks on each of these three forms could help to 
provide at least some schematic understanding of the issues at stake and 
the way the proposed account of health plays out in detail. 
                                                             
 22 See for further discussion David Lewis, “Many, but Almost One,” in Papers in 
Epistemology and Metaphysics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 164-
182. 
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Utilising technology requires the development of dispositions that 
previous generations did not possess, e.g. operating a personal 
computer, driving a car, handling a telephone, etc. Insofar technology 
demands specialised capacities, our own overall potentiality would 
increase proportional to the expanse of our handling and operating 
skills. Someone able to ride a bicycle or capable of typing text on a 
keyboard has dispositions no one could have had in the Stone Age. 
However, people in the Stone Age also had capacities to operate certain 
tools and probably possessed skills for securing nutrition and shelter 
that we no longer possess. Even if operating technology requires 
capacities previously unavailable and non-existent, it is thereby not 
settled that the technological age has increased the multiplicity of our 
dispositions compared to previous ages. There is namely also a good 
case to be made for the opposite view—the idea that technology has 
made human beings less capacitated and therefore, on the whole, less 
healthy. Technology makes us less capacitated once we lose the ability 
to carry out an activity without the technological item. For instance, we 
no longer need to be able to walk to get from A to B, as cars, buses, and 
trains effortlessly transport us to B. Once we lose the ability to walk 
from A to B due to frequent use of mechanised forms of transport and 
become dependent on technology to get to B, we would effectively 
reduce our own capacities. The unity of ‘human being + car’ would still 
be able to cover the distance, of course, but we ourselves would have 
lost the capacity. Similarly for mathematical calculations: together with 
calculators and advanced computers we are capable of highly complex 
calculations, but we ourselves are at risk of losing their ability for even 
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the simplest of additions and deductions. Especially once we become 
dependent on technology for basic and broadly conditioning capacities, 
like mobility, memory, communication, orientation, nourishment, and 
so on, we are at risk of drastically reducing our own health. From a 
perspective of health, technology poses a risk to health if we allow it to 
convert us into a state in which we are hardly capable of anything 
anymore without technological support. Only the aggregates and sums 
of which we are parts, and with which we may subjectively identify 
ourselves, increase their range of dispositions; we ourselves, on the 
other hand, gradually diminish the scope of our dispositions and slide 
into a state of complete incapacity. The comforts and ease delivered by 
technology could therefore pose a serious danger to our health. Even 
though utilising technology requires the development of specialised 
capacities, then this does not necessarily imply that our technological 
age has increased our potential activity itself— if anything the opposite 
seems more likely to be the case. 
Medical technology, as opposed to technology more general, 
clearly does affect the multiplicity of human dispositions in some way. 
However, in light of the original objection, the mere existence of medical 
technology does not increase our health in a way that would make us de 
facto healthier than people of previous generations. The fact that we can 
prevent and cure vast amounts of diseases previously debilitating or 
even fatal, qua fact about our medical and technological abilities, does 
not make for an expansion of our own capacities. A new-born child with 
a pathological condition is as unhealthy now as it was in previous 
centuries, even if we now have the technological means to remedy the 
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pathology and re-open the full scope of potential activity to it. The mere 
existence of medical technology and techniques does not render anyone 
more or less healthy. The moment medical techniques are utilised to 
prevent illnesses, cure diseases, limit or delay pathological processes, 
facilitate recovery and rehabilitation, etc., medical technology 
indisputably does have the potential to improve the health of living 
beings. Those with access to medical services will mostly end up living 
longer, more capacitated, and healthier lives. The recognition that 
medical technology can make us healthier is of course little more than 
common sense.  
This naturally brings me to technologies of human enhancement 
and the ways in which technology increasingly enables us to boost our 
physical and cognitive abilities. Here too the distinction between an 
‘individual human being’ and the aggregate ‘human being with 
technological enhancement’ can be maintained, I suggest, and 
evaluations of health are restricted only to the range of dispositions 
possessed by the former. Also in the presence of pharmaceutically 
induced enhancements, brain implants, exoskeletons, and so on, human 
beings themselves do not become more capacitated, just as airplanes and 
streetlights do not make us more capacitated. Only the composite of 
human being plus capacity-enhancing technology would have extra 
capacities. When this type of technology becomes widely available in 
various forms and modifications, the account of health suggests that 
future generations do not necessarily become healthier than we are 
today, somehow establishing a historical divide in levels of health. 
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Whether human beings themselves become healthier when submitting to 
various forms of enhancements remains an open question.  
But there will probably come a point where the meaning of our 
concept ‘human being’ will shift towards an entity that has been 
enhanced in certain ways. If most, if not all, human beings are enhanced 
in some way, it will become pointless to speak of ‘human beings’ 
without those enhancements. It is likely that the meaning of the concept 
‘human being’ will gradually shift in direction of a more enhanced 
entity, in the same way that human beings currently may already refer 
to an individual with glasses and prostheses. If all human beings have 
brain implants supporting their cognitive abilities, our concept ‘human 
being’ will just come to refer to the human being plus brain implant. 
However, this still does not imply that the enhanced human being is 
healthier than non-enhanced human beings in virtue of having better 
cognitive abilities; it is only the ambiguity and indeterminacy of our 
concept ‘human being’ that would enable the comparison between two 
kinds of entities and their respective capacities. The moment we 
compare an enhanced and non-enhanced human being, what we really 
do is compare two different kinds of entities that we both call ‘human 
beings’. The case would be similar to comparing the abilities of ‘human 
being’ and ‘human being + computer’: we would just be comparing two 
different kinds of objects. If certain sections of society do not have access 
to the relevant technologies, or if some parts of the world stay behind in 
terms of enhancements, this would not render them less healthy 
compared to enhanced parts of the world. It is only the indeterminacy 
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of the concept ‘human being’ that would give rise to the suggestion that 
enhanced people are healthier than non-enhanced people. 
This is all to say that technological enhancements of the human 
being, in and of itself, also do not bring about an expansion of human 
health on my view, just as other forms of technology do not. In stages of 
advanced enhancement we may end up with different types of 
organisms, incomparable in terms of dispositions that constitute their 
health. Technological progress as such, therefore, also in the context of 
human enhancement, does not expand our capacities and therefore does 
not impact our degree of health. The objection that technological 
progress boosts our capacities but not necessarily our health is therefore 
one that can be rejected. 
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Implications for Human Health 
 
1. Preliminaries 
 
While the preceding two chapters presented a theory and defence of a 
universal theory of health, the concern of this chapter is to draw out the 
implications for human health. Although I shall maintain that the 
meaning of health itself does not change for human beings, several 
distinctive features of human beings do have important consequences 
for how are to think of human health more specifically. The task of 
finding out which objects and behaviours increase the multiplicity of 
potential activity of human beings is of course an empirical enterprise. 
But on an abstract level more structural claims can be made 
independently from this empirical task. In this chapter I will focus on 
three aspects of human life most relevant to the larger problem-horizon 
of this thesis—the tensions between subjective values and the objective 
nature and value of health. I shall consider the consequences of the fact 
that human potential is, in a sense, limitless and how this gives rise to a 
plurality of ways in which human beings can be healthy; I will consider 
the way in which the human ability for autonomous activity bears on 
the account of health; and I will analyse the human ability to pursue 
goods and ends at the expense of our health.  
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 In specifying the nature of human health claims will be made 
about states and processes that are non-morally good for human beings, 
and in doing so, we shall inevitably enter into the ethical domain. It is 
only in the context of human life that implications of a theory of health 
become genuinely ethical implications, instead of mere evaluative 
statements about when an organism is healthy and unhealthy. Although 
I argued that all living beings have objects and states that are objectively 
good and bad for them, the facts about what is good and bad will not 
affect the ways in which non-human organisms behave, respond to 
events in the world, or in general organise their lives. Human beings are 
unique in that for us the question how to best live our lives—or, to put it 
in Socratic form, “how one should live”—presents itself as a question.1 
That is, for human beings their own life and health are always, in 
important sense, an issue—in a way that it is not for animals, plants, and 
bacteria. Defining the nature of health and determining ways to 
improve it provide us with reasons for acting in certain ways—reasons 
that can be strengthened, counter-balanced, and overridden by other 
considerations, but reasons that nonetheless have an impact on 
questions about how to live a good human life. Only in the context of 
human life does a theory of health have this ethical significance. 
The claim that only human beings are ethical beings might be 
contested, however, as many have pointed out that the kind of 
behaviours typically associated with moral behaviour—altruism and 
                                                             
1 Bernard Williams thinks that Socrates’s question “how should one live?” is the 
most fundamental and general question of ethics, more so than ‘what makes us 
happy?’ or ‘what are our duties?’ and I shall follow Williams’s lead on this. See 
especially Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, chapter 1.   
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mutual cooperation especially—can also be found in the non-human 
world, especially amongst primates. This does not imply, however, that 
non-human organisms displaying altruistic behaviour are moral beings 
or that we can meaningfully speak of an ‘ethics’ for non-human 
organisms. There are good reasons for supposing that a moral and 
ethical being must be able to take a reflective stance on its own life and 
actions—a stance from which certain activities or states can be judged as 
better than others. If it turns out that activities considered as good by 
reflective human beings are also exhibited in the animal and plant 
world, this does not imply the animals ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’ in the same 
way as human beings are.2 Questions about how to live and how to act 
simply do not arise as questions for non-human life; there is nothing 
animals can take a stance on, so to speak. Human beings are unique in 
that there is an openness of our sphere of activity and the way we live. 
Beliefs about what is valuable and what it means to live a good life 
shape the way we actually go about living our lives and affecting that of 
other. I shall therefore proceed on the basis of the traditional belief that 
ethics in the proper sense of the term minimally requires the ability to 
reflect on one’s actions and a responsiveness to reasons, and that this 
minimal requirement is met only in human life. I shall return to the 
ethical significance of the theory of health, or relative lack thereof, in the 
conclusions of this thesis.  
                                                             
2 The claim that non-human organisms are not moral or ethical beings in this sense 
does not mean they are not worthy of respect or decent treatment. In virtue of 
having states that are good or bad for their own sake non-human organisms could 
still be argued to have a moral standing, placing demands on how human beings as 
ethical and moral beings are to treat them. 
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2. Human Beings as Limitless Beings 
 
Health was defined as the multiplicity of potential activity (MPA) 
relative to a maximum potentiality, whereby an increase of MPA 
equates with an improvement of health and a diminution with a decline 
of health. One of the distinctive traits of human beings is the capacity to 
invent ever new activities, however, and in doing so, to continually 
increase the maximum set of capacities they can possibly possess. As a 
species, human beings are in an important sense limitless in what they 
can do and inherently unbounded in the variety of capacities they can 
manifest. This does not mean that human beings can do everything 
imaginable or that no factual limitations obtain in human life. Certain 
activities will always remain beyond the scope of the human potential 
and do indeed fall outside our absolute factual limitations, regardless of 
our inventive and creative prowess. Human beings shall never have the 
capacity to jump over mountains or develop a capacity to walk over the 
surface of the sun. The way in which human beings are limitlessness 
therefore does not imply that factual limitations do not obtain and that 
the reference class is devoid of any content. But the human being’s 
capacity to invent and manifest ever new forms of acting, I would 
suggest, does result in an essential unboundedness of the kind.  
The idea here is not that human capacities always outstrip the 
totality of actual manifestations in the way it was claimed in Chapter 
Three (§2.2a) that the number of dispositions of any type of entity 
always exceeds the number dispositions that get manifested in reality. 
The point is that human potentiality is itself unlimited and unbounded, 
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so that we cannot conceive of any permanently marked off and finite set 
of what would make ‘the’ human potential. The unboundedness of 
human potential is also crucially different from the way in which other 
living beings have factual limitations that cannot be completely known. I 
argued above that factual limitations to what an organism can do can 
only be known by approximation, given that for complete knowledge 
all members of a species would have to be assessed under all possible 
circumstances and with full imagination. The limitlessness of human 
potential does not follow from such epistemic obstructions but from the 
ontological fact that human beings continuously expand and diversify 
in what they are capable of: the constant invention of new activities and 
creation of corresponding capacities does not have an intrinsic or 
necessary endpoint. Even considered under all possible circumstances 
and with full imagination, human potential escapes definitive 
totalisation. Whether we consider new artefacts that we learn to 
manipulate; new forms of physical exercise and sports that we invent 
and learn to specialise in; new intellectual challenges we are confronted 
by and continue to construct for ourselves; the different and ever-
differing forms of artistic expression; novel technologies we learn to 
operate; the way and mediums via which we communicate—in almost 
every sphere of life human beings invent and expand their range of 
activities, constantly requiring the attainment of more or less specialised 
capacities for their execution. It seems to me an indisputable fact that 
the action-potential of the human species is open-ended and unlimited 
in a way that finds no match or parallel in the non-human world.  
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In an important but rather specific sense, then, it is an open question 
what human beings are capable of doing—an open question not in the 
sense that it can be answered only once the relevant data is available, 
but open in the sense of an ineliminable openness. The question what 
human beings are capable of doing, to put it differently, is necessarily 
unanswerable. For every species of plant and animal it is more or less 
set what the maximally realisable set of capacities is, whereas the nature 
of human beings resists the very conception of such a bounded and 
limited set. When Deleuze, in his reading of Spinoza, centralises and 
almost dramatices Spinoza’s assertion that we do not know “of what a 
body is capable,” and that we should take this claim as a kind of 
“model,” it seems Deleuze is hitting on precisely the same point—even 
though for Spinoza the claim is of course not restricted to human 
bodies.3 The question ‘of what is the body capable?’ in the context of 
human life defies a definitive answer and is perhaps, qua question, 
indeed best taken as a model: precisely in the form of a question does it 
bring to the fore the unboundedness of human potentiality.   
The intrinsic limitlessness of the human species has important 
consequences for the way we conceive of human health. The health of 
any organism was claimed to correspond to the quantity of dispositions 
measured against a background of a maximum range of realisable 
dispositions. Now, however, we are confronted with the fact that this 
norm of a maximum range of realisable capacities is for the human 
beings essentially unlimited. The most important implication for our 
                                                             
3 Spinoza, Ethics, EIII.P2: schol; Gilles Deleuze, Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza, 
trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Zone Books, 1992), 255-257 
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conception of health is that human beings cannot be perfectly or 
completely healthy: there will always be a discrepancy between what a 
person can do relative to what is factually possible for a member of 
Homo sapiens.4 In the case of plant and animal life we can say without 
much hesitation that if an individual organism can manifest all activities 
possible for the species under a wide range of circumstances and for an 
extended period of time, it is, as a matter of fact, a healthy plant or a 
healthy animal. In the case of human life, on the other hand, a single 
individual can never manifest all activities possible for the species, as 
what is possible for the species is itself not contained in any demarcated 
and fixed totality. The norm against which an individual human being’s 
MPA is measured is itself open-ended, making it impossible for a 
human being ever to be perfectly healthy in the absolute and individual 
senses of health.   
This does not imply that the account of health does not apply to 
human life: human beings can still be more or less healthy. Certain states 
are more healthy than others: person 1 can possess a greater number of 
capacities than person 2 and therefore be judged as healthier, just as 
person 1 at some t1 can be less capacitated than at t2 and therefore 
judged to be healthier at t2. But human beings cannot be healthy in the 
more straightforward sense in which plants or animals are healthy. 
Human health can therefore only be measured on a continuum with 
death on one extreme, i.e. an MPA of zero, and an open-ended 
possibility for increase of healthiness on the other extreme. In the 
                                                             
4 Maximum attainable health does seem to be possible for human beings. It is 
possible for a human being to optimise her potential for activities within the 
factual limitations that are acquired through life. 
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context of human life, but only in this context, we may therefore side 
with Canguilhem when he writes that: 
 
To say that perfect health does not exist is simply saying that 
the concept of health is not one of an existence, but of a norm 
whose function and value is to be brought into contact with 
existence in order to stimulate modification. This does not 
mean that health is an empty concept.5 
 
The way health was defined still allows it to fulfil its role as a norm or 
ideal, as something to be strived for, and as Canguilhem suggests, 
something that could stimulate modification towards an objectively 
better state of being. Human beings can always get healthier by 
increasing their capacities and widening their potential for activity; the 
problem under consideration is just that they could do so ad infinitum—
at least in theory. The limitlessness of human potential implies that 
there is no species-given limit as to how healthy a human being can 
become and that perfect or complete healthiness is theoretically as well 
as practically impossible for human beings.  
Although the species does not set intrinsic limitations on how 
healthy a human being can become, a number of other factors certainly 
do impose a maximum on how capacitated a human being can become. 
In any given human life there are just so many capacities one can 
develop and sustain, and just a few kinds of activities one can truly 
specialise in. The register of capacities available to the species may be 
essentially unrestricted and open to a constant expanse, the number of 
                                                             
5 Canguilhem, Normal and Pathological, 77.  
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capacities a single human being can practically develop and sustain, let 
alone actualise, certainly is limited in various ways. Due to the finite 
time, energy, cognitive abilities, and bodily powers we have at our 
disposal there are clearly practical limitations to how capacitated and 
healthy we can become. In theory the health of a human being could 
increase ad infinitum; in practice it cannot. In fact, there is a point at 
which efforts to further increase and boost one’s capacities will have 
inverse effects: there is a moment where a pursuit of greater health will 
end up undermining and effectively collapsing one’s health. An attempt 
to become ever-more healthy by developing ever-more broadly 
conditioning potentials realisable under an ever-greater set of 
circumstances will eventually result in an inescapable fatigue, burn out, 
and vital exhaustion—i.e. a temporary or even permanent destruction of 
one’s health. Our finite nature determines that a pursuit of ever-greater 
health will eventually bring about the very opposite of health: the 
complete collapse of our capacity for acting.  
 Perfect health might be unavailable for human beings, but there 
does remain what we could call an optimum state of health for human 
beings. Optimum health is the state in which the pursuit of a further 
increase of capacities would effectively decrease one’s potential for 
activity and thus compromise one’s overall health. This notion of 
‘optimal health’ would be only relevant and applicable in the context of 
human life; at least, it seems impossible for unicellular, plant, and 
animal life to reach a point where the pursuit of a greater capaciousness 
would effectively result in a lessening of potential for activity. The 
limitlessness of human potential combined with our finite individual 
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existence is what generates the possibility for an optimum state of 
health, which is different from the way other kinds of organism could 
be perfectly healthy and possess all capacities available to the species.  
Given that there are optimums of health for human beings, we 
could even push the point further and argue that there it is an ‘art’ to 
living a healthy human life. While non-human organisms can reach a 
state where their action-potential roughly coincides with what is 
possible for the kind, human potential always exceeds and outstrips 
what a single individual can do. Not surpassing an optimum state of 
health requires a certain skilfulness and practical knowledge, i.e. an art 
of knowing how to live healthily. The art of living a healthy life could 
perhaps be illustrated by means of an analogy with physical training 
and the build-up of physical strength. In theory there is no real limit as 
to how fit and strong a body can become. More muscle fibres could 
always be formed so that heavier things could be lifted or pushed 
around, in the same way that a cardio-pulmonary system could always 
be trained to take up and circulate more oxygen per given time-unit. But 
there is a tipping-point at which more training and more self-imposed 
stress becomes overtraining and effectively results in the destruction of 
strength and endurance. In physical training each body has an optimum 
state beyond which one would only weaken it by training and 
subjecting it greater levels of stress. Just as there is an art of physical 
training, in this respect at least, so one could conceive of an art of living 
a healthy life for the human being as a whole. The art of living a healthy 
life would consist in optimising the multiplicity of potential activity 
without surpassing the point where potentiality is undermined and 
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diminished by a striving for even greater health, an even longer life, or 
even greater levels of specialisation. It would involve knowing when 
not to pursue even greater health in recognition of one’s finite nature 
and to embrace the limitations on how healthy and capacitated one can 
practically become.  
A further consequence of the limitlessness of human potential is 
that human beings can be healthy and improve their health in quite 
different ways. Two individual people can have a set of capacities that is 
similar in size but dissimilar in the capacities that it includes. One 
person could have developed her intellectual capacities to a high 
degree, for instance, while another person could have strengthened her 
athletic capacities. If both end up with a similar quantity of capacities 
they are equally healthy, even though they are capable of quite different 
activities and probably live different forms of life. This scenario 
probably requires that both individuals have a similar range of broadly 
conditioning capacities, as otherwise their sets of capacities are bound to 
diverge significantly. But if basic capacities are roughly equal, the 
capacity account of health allows for the possibility that two people are 
capable of quite different activities while enjoying a similar degree of 
health.  
To be clear, this recognition does not render the meaning of health 
itself relative to particular individuals, their values, talents, or forms of 
life, in the way that Nietzsche thinks health is pluralistic due to the 
diversity of human types and wide variety of individual values. Health 
itself remains strictly a matter of quantities of potential activities. If a 
third person would possess both the intellectual and athletic abilities 
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she would be healthier than a physically frail intellectual or a 
thoughtless athlete—at least in terms of absolute health. The capacity 
account of health applied to human life nevertheless gives rise to the 
possibility of plurality and diversity in ways of being healthy while at the 
same time remaining univocal in meaning. Plants and animals 
equivalent in health, by contrast, are bound to be much more alike and 
capable of roughly the same kind of activities. The unboundedness of 
potential activity combined with the impossibility of possessing all 
capacities factually possible for the human species gives rise to the 
possibility that two individuals can be equal in health but dissimilar in 
what they can do. The MPA account of health implies that there are 
different ways in which people can be healthy and diverse directions in 
which health can be improved, without implying that the being and 
value of health itself is relative to the desires and attitudes of 
individuals. On the proposed view, human health is unitary in meaning 
but to some degree pluralistic in ways one can be healthy. The capacity 
account of health, then, allows for a plurality of ways in which people 
can be healthy without the nature of health itself becoming relative to 
subjective factors of the people whose health is being considered.  
One final observation to add to these reflections on the 
limitlessness of human potential is that the capacity to invent and create 
new activities is itself characteristic of human health, and something 
that, on the whole, has great objective value for human life. I argued in 
Chapter Four (§1.1) that the objective value of an organism’s disposition 
depends on how broadly conditioning it is for further dispositions and 
that the most broadly conditioning dispositions are objectively most 
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valuable for any living being. One of the most broadly conditioning 
dispositions a being can have, hence the most valuable, is the 
disposition to create new activities and to invent novel ways of 
executing existing activities. The loss of creativity, in the broadest and 
most generalised sense—so by no means restricted to ‘artistic’ 
creativity—is therefore one of the greatest losses we could suffer, even 
though creativity is itself of course underpinned by more basic 
capacities that would make an even greater loss when deprived off. 
From the proposed account of health it follows that creativity is not 
something that is possible or valuable only when all other capacities are 
in place—the icing on the cake for exceptional and fortuitous 
individuals—but something that it is of central importance and 
objective value for every human being. The ways in which human 
creativity can be inhibited, suppressed, and even obliterated—whether 
it be through stringent educational regimes, political oppression, 
repressive working conditions, or, to side with Nietzsche, moral 
condemnations of mere deviance and abnormality—can therefore be 
regarded as genuine and fundamental violations of human health. The 
value of creativity, in its broadest and most inclusive sense, can itself be 
rooted in the idea of human health once health is understood as a 
quantitative multiplicity of potential activities. 
In sum, the intrinsic limitlessness of human potential for activities 
makes it impossible for human beings to be completely or perfectly 
healthy, but enables the possibility for a plurality of ways in which 
human beings can be healthy, and establishes a closes connection 
between health and human creativity. 
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3. Health and Autonomy 
 
Another essential feature of human life is our ability for autonomous 
activity. The relationship between health and autonomy briefly surfaced 
in Chapter Three when considering whether human potentials were 
somehow different from the potential of other living beings. The claim 
was defended that human potentials are dispositions for activities 
identical to the dispositions of other living beings and inorganic things. 
If volitions are required for the realisation of some capacity, these 
decisions or acts of will should be regarded as circumstances or conditions 
under which human beings manifest their dispositions, in the same way 
that swinging hammers make a condition for the manifestation of 
glass’s brittleness. This account of human potentiality enabled me to 
argue that the proposed theory of health is naturalistic, with human 
health being no exception, as dispositions and powers exist throughout 
the natural world. In this discussion I remained neutral on the question 
whether human beings are free in some sense, but did indicate that 
human beings are self-conditioning if volitions or acts of our will are 
required for the manifestation of our dispositions. This latter 
recognition shelters a theory of autonomy. This theory is worth teasing 
out not only for the sake of formulating an account of autonomy fitting 
the same dispositional picture, but also because it will enable me to 
demonstrate how autonomy is significant to human health. I shall first 
try to formulate an account of autonomy consistent with the previous 
analysis of dispositions, and subsequently try to demonstrate its relation 
and relevance to health.  
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3.1 Two Forms of Autonomy 
All attempts to define autonomy share the ambition to understand what 
it means for an individual or collection of individuals to be self-ruling 
and self-determining, as opposed to being ruled by forces and 
influences outside of one’s will or the collective will of a group.6 The 
account of autonomy I shall develop here applies primarily to 
individuals and follows from the definition of capacities provided 
before. Capacities (or potentials), including those of human beings, were 
defined as dispositions (or powers) that under certain circumstances (or 
conditions) get manifested by the entity possessing the dispositions (or 
powers). I will argue that this definition allows for the identification of 
two forms of autonomy: what I will call a ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ form of 
autonomy. By way of anticipation, the strong form of autonomy is one 
whereby volitions condition the manifestation of dispositions that 
otherwise would not have been manifested, while the weak form of 
autonomy is one whereby volitions endorse or impede activities that 
otherwise would have been carried out anyway.  
The strong form of autonomy, then, describes situations in which 
volitions, or an activity of our will, are a necessary condition for the 
realisation of some disposition. An activity is performed autonomously 
in the strong sense of autonomy if a disposition for the activity gets 
manifested, at least in part, due to one’s own will or volition.7 Whenever 
                                                             
6 See for an overview of existing descriptions and definitions of autonomy: Gerald 
Dworkin, The Theory and Practice of Autonomy (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 5-6. 
7 The idea of ‘will’ and ‘volition’ is understood and used here in line with Harry 
Frankfurt’s account of the will, viz. as a “want to want”, i.e. a second-order desire. 
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volitions are necessary for the manifestation of a disposition, the human 
being is literally self-conditioning with respect to the manifestation of the 
disposition. The will being a necessary condition for the execution of an 
activity implies that if the will were not to play its conditioning role, the 
activity would not come about at the relevant point in time. Volitions do 
not have to be a sufficient condition for strong autonomy; in addition to 
volition, a combination of desires, preferences, and external factors may 
and often must obtain for the relevant manifestation to come about. 
Consider the example of manifesting a disposition to run. The 
manifestation of running would be autonomous in the strong sense of 
autonomy if next to a desire to run, perhaps even desires to the 
contrary, a wish to become fit, combined with the presence of running 
shoes and other enabling conditions, an act of the will is necessary for 
the realisation of the potential. Other conditions may be involved and 
be equally necessary for the relevant manifestation, but as long as an act 
of will is required for the running to actually come about it is performed 
in the strong sense of autonomy. If desires, wishes, and other conditions 
are together sufficient to condition the run, however, the manifestation 
does not meet the conditions for strong autonomy. Similarly, if someone 
were to run away from gunfire or coerced into running by people 
having a power over her, the realisation of the running capacity would 
also not be autonomous in this strong sense, as the will would not have 
conditioned or co-condition the relevant activity. The strong form of 
autonomy could therefore be condensed into the following definition:  
                                                                                                                                                           
This will be explained more elaborately below. See Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of 
the Will and the Concept of a Person,” in The Importance of What We Care About 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 12-25. 
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Strong form of Autonomy: an activity is performed autonomously in the 
strong sense of autonomy, if, and only if, in addition to other 
conditions and circumstances, an act of the will is necessary for the 
manifestation of the disposition for the activity.  
 
Precisely how one’s will could play this decisive role in manifestations 
of dispositions can be understood in a number of different ways. But a 
common way to understand the efficacy of the will, introduced by 
Frankfurt, and the one I shall adopt, is to regard willing as a second-
order endorsement or repudiation of first-order desires or, slightly 
extending his view, external factors that motivate one to act.8 The will 
can facilitate or inhibit the realisation of certain disposition via a second-
order endorsement or rejection of particular motivational states and 
factors. The will does not operate in a vacuum or in complete 
disconnection from first-order desires and external motivators, “ab 
initio” as Dworkin says, but instead, appears to be efficacious precisely 
by supporting and inhibiting existing desires and external motivators 
directed at some particular line of action.9 Two avenues for critique 
towards this view will be discussed shortly. For now I shall proceed 
with the idea that the strong form of autonomy requires volitions 
consisting of a second-order endorsement or rejection of particular 
desires, inclinations, and other motivational factors, resulting in an 
empirical difference in the capacities that are subsequently realised.  
                                                             
8 Frankfurt, “Freedom of Will,” 12-25.  
9 Gerald Dworkin, “Autonomy and Behavior Control,” The Hasting Center Report 
6:1 (1976): 23-28. 
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In addition to this strong form of autonomy there is a weaker form 
of autonomy to be identified. The above definition of autonomy implies 
that if our will does not change or influence one’s activities, the ensuing 
actions would not be properly self-conditioned and thus not performed 
autonomously. This account of autonomy is not satisfactory, as it leaves 
out cases where one reflectively endorses activities that would have 
been carried out also if one hadn’t reflected, or, indeed, cases whereby 
one reflectively disavows activities one would not have carried out also 
if one hadn’t reflected on them. The will may not make an empirical 
difference under these scenarios, but the ensuing activities or 
inhibitions, in virtue of being willed on reflection, still carry an element 
of autonomy. This is what I shall call ‘weak’ autonomy. If it just so 
happens that the will endorses activities one would have carried also 
without the will’s endorsement, or if it renounces activities one would 
not have carried out also without the will’s renunciation, the activities 
or refrainments are autonomous in a weak sense.  
Nevertheless, activities in line with one’s will would only be 
autonomous in this weak sense if one further criterion is satisfied, viz. 
the criterion that if one had reflectively rejected the activity one would 
have had the power and possibility not to carry out the activity. 
Reflective endorsement of some activity, it seems to me, makes the 
execution of the activity autonomous only if reflective disavowal of the 
activity could have resulted in an inhibition of the relevant activity. We 
may return to the running example to illustrate the point. The scenario 
is now one where desires and external factors are sufficient for making 
one run. On reflection, however, one wants one’s desires and external 
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motivators to be the way they are and as effective as they are, and so 
one reflectively approves and wills the running potential to be realised. 
The point is that any subsequent running would be autonomous in the 
weak sense of autonomy only if a reflective disavowal of one’s desires to 
go running or a renunciation of external factors motivating one to run 
could have resulted in an inhibition of the activity. In other words, one 
must be able to refrain from an activity for a reflective endorsement to 
constitute a moment of weak autonomy.   
A brief comparison with political autonomy should help 
demonstrate the difference between the strong and weak forms of 
autonomy, as well as clarify the criteria for weak autonomy. If foreign 
powers determine the laws and policies of a community and practically 
determine the conduct of all its members, this community enjoys no 
autonomy. If the community has, or is being granted, the capacity to 
reflect on the externally imposed laws and policies, then cases in which 
the community reflectively approves of the externally imposed laws 
and policies would make those laws and policies, in a sense, their own, 
and the community would be self-governing in some weak form, 
despite the fact that without the reflective approval the same laws and 
policies would also have been imposed. Yet, the community would only 
be self-governing in this weak form if the community also has, or is 
being granted, the power and possibility to reject the relevant laws and 
policies. Put more simply: without a possibility to opt out the ability to 
opt in does not give the community any autonomy. Essentially the same 
point applies to individual autonomy: reflective endorsement of 
activities one would have carried out also without the reflective 
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endorsement amount to weak autonomy only if reflective repudiation 
could have resulted in an inhibition of the activity. And to make the 
contrast with strong autonomy, the community would be autonomous 
in the stronger form of autonomy if the community formulates laws and 
policies that otherwise would not have been formulated and instituted 
at all. This latter case undoubtedly makes for a greater form of self-
governance and self-determination than the opt-in and opt-out form I 
called ‘weak autonomy’, but both forms, I think, are to be recognised as 
forms of autonomy.  
While for strong autonomy the will is a necessary condition for the 
realisation of a disposition, weak autonomy only requires one to 
reflectively endorse the activity and to have the power to inhibit the 
activity. The involvement of the will is therefore a necessary condition 
for weak autonomy, but strictly speaking not a necessary condition for 
the realisation of some capacity. The weak form of autonomy could 
therefore be summarised in the following definition: 
 
Weak form of Autonomy: an activity is performed autonomously in the 
weak sense of autonomy, if, and only if, 1) one reflectively wills 
the activity; 2) the will could inhibit the activity if it were not to 
endorse the activity; 3) conditions other than the will would have 
been sufficient for the manifestation of the activity.  
 
What strong and weak autonomy have in common is reflective 
endorsement of one’s actions and inactions. The two definitions make 
autonomy simpliciter a matter of having one’s will aligned with how one 
acts and doesn’t act. The difference between strong and weak autonomy 
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is still worth teasing out, however, not only for structural reasons, but 
also—as will become evident shortly—for the distinct ways in which 
strong and weak autonomy bear on human health.  
This dual account of autonomy differs greatly from the most 
famous account of autonomy, viz. Kantian autonomy. Kant’s account of 
autonomy, in keeping with the original Greek meaning of the term, 
centres on the ability to give oneself laws; Kantian autonomy is first and 
foremost a matter of self-legislation.10 According to Kant, one acts 
autonomously if one acts on the basis of principles that are self-imposed 
rather than on the basis of externally imposed laws, or, indeed, on any 
of one’s desires and inclinations. Self-legislation is no arbitrary process 
for Kant, as our rationality commits our will to the self-imposition of the 
one and only moral law: “act only in accordance with that maxim 
through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal 
law.”11 The account of autonomy outlined above is weaker than Kant’s 
account, as it does not invoke subjective principles of action, i.e. 
maxims, by which we are to act. On my definitions of autonomy, the 
will could be inconsistent with respect to the activities it enables and 
inhibits without undermining autonomy as such. In other words, mere 
self-conditioning and mere second-order endorsement with a possibility 
for opting out would suffice for autonomy in my set-up, as opposed to 
Kant’s more stringent view that autonomy requires self-imposition of 
rational laws for action. Moreover, Kant’s view of autonomy is 
substantive, determining which particular kind of actions could 
                                                             
10 Kant, Groundwork, 4:433.  
11 Kant, Groundwork, 4:421. 
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possibly be autonomous, viz. those activities the maxim of which could 
rationally be willed as a universal principle. The definitions of 
autonomy provided above are strictly procedural and content-neutral, 
making no claim on which actions could be autonomous. If on reflection 
one’s will effectively makes one commit a murder, lie to someone, or 
steal their property, those activities would be autonomous activities on 
my score, also if the maxims of these actions cannot be rationally willed 
as a universal principle.  
Another often-cited account of autonomy, much closer to the one 
outlined above, is the ‘coherence account’ defended by Dworkin. He 
summarises his account of autonomy as follows: 
 
Autonomy is conceived of as a second-order capacity of 
persons to reflect critically upon their first-order preferences, 
desires, wishes, and so forth and the capacity to accept or 
attempt to change these in light of higher-order preferences 
and values. By exercising such a capacity, persons define their 
nature, give meaning and coherence to their lives, and take 
responsibility for the kind of person they are.12  
 
Two important differences have to be pointed out here as well. The first 
is that second-order endorsements of first-order preferences, together 
with demands on the conditions under which the endorsements are 
made, suffice to establish autonomy for Dworkin. This seems too weak, 
as situations where one is incapable of resisting a desire or external 
motivator would still qualify for autonomous activity on Dworkin’s 
                                                             
12 Dworkin, Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 20.  
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view. On my definitions strong autonomy requires a genuine 
conditioning of action by the will, while weak autonomy requires an 
ability to resist or inhibit certain lines of conduct. Reflective 
endorsement of some activity without a capacity to refrain from it 
would meet Dworkin’s requirements for autonomy, but fail to meet the 
criteria I defined.  
The second difference with Dworkin’s account brings us straight 
into a discussion of two important criticisms that have been levelled 
against the very idea of autonomy that we too need to address. 
According to Dworkin second-order reflection requires what he calls 
“procedural independence”: the idea that one’s critical faculties are not 
to be influenced by external sources and influences when reflecting.13 
He adopts this principle to avoid cases in which people have their 
reflective will shaped and manipulated by external factors like 
indoctrinations, coercions, hypnosis, subliminal advertising, and so on. 
Although Dworkin recognises that the ability to reflect upon oneself can 
be positively influenced via external factors like education, information, 
and particular incentives, he considers most other influences to 
undermine and restrict the ability for proper reflection.14 It seems to me 
that Dworkin is guided by preconceptions of what autonomous actions 
look like, despite his proclaimed content-neutrality. He seems to be 
directed by presumptions about what a non-interfered and uninfluenced 
reflective agent will choose to do, such that certain external influences 
would contribute to it and others undermine it. Otherwise it is hard to 
                                                             
13 Dworkin, “Autonomy and Behavioral Control,” 25. 
14 Dworkin, “Autonomy and Behavioral Control,” 26. 
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understand why some external factors contribute to second-order 
reflection and others not. More problematic, however—and this hits on 
the first major criticism of autonomy—is the kind of reflective agency he 
presupposes in his appeal to procedural independence, an agent 
stipulated to be uninfluenced by external factors and wholly expressing 
its own second-order preferences. Such an account of agency suffers 
from the same problems that liberal models of subjectivity do. It raises 
questions regarding the nature of this supposedly uninfluenced self or 
will, and flies in the face of the apparent fact that our will or self is 
always shaped and informed by historical, cultural, and social 
processes. The idea that our will or innermost selves are shaped and 
constituted by socio-historic dynamics, meanings carried and 
transmitted by language, gender and class positions, individual 
upbringing, and so on, is far from a novel insight and can be traced back 
at least to Hegel and Marx—with figures like Wittgenstein, Heidegger, 
and Foucault extending the idea in their own distinctive ways. If 
autonomy requires a liberal conception of self or will, unaffected by any 
influences and processes ‘outside’ of itself, then philosophical interests 
in the idea of autonomy is destined to die out sooner rather than later. 
Even though Dworkin recognises that “a notion of the self as isolated 
from the influences just enumerated … is almost foolish,” and that “to 
insist upon this as a condition is to make autonomy impossible,” the 
conception of autonomy he develops still requires an strong 
independence of the will and reflective agency that renders his account 
vulnerable to a critique of precisely this kind.15  
                                                             
15 Dworkin, “Autonomy and Behavioral Control,” 24. 
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It seems to me that there is no need for an uninfluenced, freely 
valuing agent to get a meaningful conception of autonomy off the 
ground. The self or will can perfectly well be shaped by socio-historical 
processes, meanings carried in language, and a host of other factors, and 
still play its role as second-order rejection and endorsement of first-
order motivational items. If I reflect on desires and external factors that 
move me in certain ways and on reflection my will makes a difference 
as to which desires and external factors I come to act on, these 
reflections and acts of my will have still been shaped by the processes 
that have made me the individual that I am: including my upbringing, 
cultural background, language, social position, and so on. Second-order 
reflection is an abstraction from first-order desires, but something that 
does not, probably cannot, and crucially need not escape all ‘external’ 
influence. If somehow a complete escape were possible from such 
influences it would even become quite mysterious which motives 
would inform and direct the reflective endorsements and disavowals of 
first-order desires.16 The will can be thoroughly socio-historically 
shaped and still make a difference as to how one comes to act, or 
reflectively endorse and inhibit certain actions, and that is all that is 
required for autonomy on my dual account. 
Now, further abstractions can always be made from one’s will, 
supposing we indeed have the ability to abstract also from second-order 
endorsements and identifications. For example, if I have a first-order 
desire to buy some new electronic gadget cleverly advertised to me but 
                                                             
16 Kantians would of course answer this concern in terms of demands set by 
rationality.  
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on reflection I decide not to act on the desire and refrain from buying it, 
then this reflection leading to my autonomous refrainment may very 
well be influenced by the ways I have been shaped in my thinking: 
perhaps there are traces of protestant austerity running through me, 
negative opinions of people I respect, a solidarity with the working-
class, and so on. I could, however, abstract further and reflect on 
whether I want my second-order willing to be the way that it is, and 
whether, also on this higher level of reflection, I want my will to be 
different. If so, I could attempt to shrug off the influences of my social 
relations, protestant heritage, and working-class solidarity, and reflect 
differently on my first-order desire to buy the device. Even this higher 
reflection, however, is not immune to reflection and revision. 
Autonomy, as several people have pointed out—and this is the second 
common criticism of autonomy—can lead to an infinite regress; there 
are always higher levels of reflection possible where one could question 
whether one wants one’s will to be the way that it is.17 This is often 
posed as a problem for autonomy and only reluctantly accepted by 
philosophers like Dworkin and Frankfurt.18 It seems to me, however, 
that the possibility for regress captures an essential and important 
aspect of autonomy, one that could further neutralise concerns about 
the ways in which socio-historical processes and other ‘external’ 
influences shape our will. Not only is a socio-historically shaped will 
still my will that can effectively condition the manifestation of some 
disposition, the socio-historic conditioned will can also itself be reflected 
                                                             
17 See for an early and forceful articulation of this criticism: Gary Watson, "Free 
Agency," Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975): 205-220. 
18 Frankfurt, “Freedom of Will,” 21; Dworkin, Theory and Practice of Autonomy, 19. 
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on, and in doing so, be revised in its own willing—even if on this higher 
reflection socio-historical factors still influence the decision making 
process. The possibility of a regress is precisely what gives the self the 
openness for continuous self-evaluation at higher levels of abstraction. 
It provides the space for a self-conditioning of the will itself, even if a 
complete abstraction from all ‘external’ influence is ultimately 
impossible. Provisionally, I would therefore claim that the possibility of 
a regress is precisely what could neutralise the kind of concerns that 
motivate Dworkin to introduce complex standards for procedural 
independence of reflective endorsements.19 Be that as it may, a socio-
historic understanding of the self as well as a possible regress in levels 
of reflections does not seem to threaten the dual account of autonomy.  
On the basis of these considerations we can identify four different 
ways to improve and expand individual autonomy. First, to repeat the 
point just made, one is more autonomous if one is capable of revising 
one’s will at higher levels of reflection; i.e. one is more self-conditioning 
the more one is capable of reflectively transforming one’s own will. 
Second, one is more autonomous if one can perform activities not just in 
the weak form of autonomy but also in the stronger form; if one is 
capable of self-conditioning activities that otherwise would not have 
                                                             
19 This way of incorporating historical selfhood into an account of autonomy is 
different from the way that Christman has proposed. Christman thinks that 
autonomy consist in a person’s “acceptance or rejection of desire formation or the 
factors that gave rise to that formation” and thus focusses on a second-order 
reflection on the process rather than its result. John Christman, “Autonomy and 
Personal History,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 20 (1990): 1. See also John 
Christman, The Politics of Persons. Individual Autonomy and Socio-historical Selves 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 133-163. 
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come about, rather than merely opting in or out of activities that were 
already sufficiently conditioned, the activities would be performed with 
greater autonomy. Third, closely related to the previous point, one is 
more autonomous in performing an activity if fewer first-order desires 
and external motivators are required for its performance; the more the 
will is capable of conditioning an activity on the basis of its own willing, 
independently of other motivating structures, the more autonomous 
one is with respect to this activity. In other words, the more self-sufficient 
one is in realising certain capacities, the more autonomous one is; and 
one is more self-sufficient when fewer conditions other than one’s will 
are required for the realisation of a capacity. And fourth, autonomy is 
greater if one’s capacity for weak and strong autonomy ranges over a 
broader variety of activities. If one’s autonomy is local, i.e. restricted to 
one or only a few activities, one’s autonomy remains relatively limited; 
if a capacity for autonomous activity applies to many if not all activities 
one is capable of autonomy would be more global and thus greater. In 
sum, then, autonomy is greater when it is global rather than local, 
strong in addition to weak, when one is more self-sufficient in 
manifesting one’s activities, and when one has an ability to reflectively 
transform one’s own willing.  
 
3.2 The Value of Autonomy 
With this conception of autonomy in place we can now turn to the value 
of autonomy and the way autonomy relates to human health. 
Throughout history the ability for self-governance and self-
determination have been attributed the highest of values, both in 
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personal as well as political life. Plato and Aristotle already argued that 
the rational part of a soul should be trained and developed to the effect 
of controlling the appetites and guiding practical life, just as the city-
state could be best run by its most rationally equipped members. In the 
Hellenistic world abilities for self-determination and self-control were 
equally considered of key importance to living a virtuous life. 
Autonomy is one of the cornerstones of European enlightenment and 
ever since celebrated as one of the greatest goods. The reasons why 
various permutations of autonomy were so strongly valued, however, 
diverge widely. The relation between autonomy and human health is 
even less straightforward and has hardly ever been thematised in the 
history of philosophy. The central question to be raised here, and to 
which the discussion shall also be restricted, is whether capacity for 
autonomy affects human health—defined as the multiplicity of potential 
activity vis-à-vis factual limitations—and if so how. If a capacity for 
autonomy positively affects human health, autonomy would be 
objectively valuable already in virtue of being health-promoting, 
independently of other reasons people might consider it valuable.  
Autonomy, I have argued, concerns the conditions under which 
human beings manifest or refrain from manifesting their dispositions. 
Autonomy therefore does not affect the quantity of capacities of human 
beings per se—even though in a superficial way a capacity for autonomy 
would of course amount to having an additional capacity. But the real 
importance of autonomy and the way actually impacts someone’s 
health follows from the fact that the range of circumstances under 
which an autonomous being can manifest its dispositions becomes more 
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variable. In Chapter Three (§2.2c) I argued that an organism’s 
potentiality could increase in three ways; first, by having more 
dispositions; second, by having dispositions that are non-exhaustive; 
and third, by having a wider range of circumstances under which 
dispositions are manifested. Autonomy does not increase potentiality in 
the first two ways, but a capacity for strong autonomy does affect the 
range of circumstances under which dispositions can be manifested. 
Whereas weak autonomy does not broaden the set of circumstances 
under which an individual can manifest its capacities, strong autonomy 
does. If one can be self-conditioning, one is less dependent on other 
enabling conditions and therefore capable of carrying out activities 
under a wider range of external conditions. A capacity for strong 
autonomy therefore directly translates into a higher degree of health.  
Let me try to spell this idea out more clearly. If, for the sake of 
argument, we imagine someone lacking any discernible level of 
autonomy: a Homo Pavlovian who only acts on the basis of first-order 
desires and activity-provoking external factors. The conditions for 
realising any potential would be restricted to conditions and 
circumstances under which he or she just happens to exhibit some 
capacity, similar to salt dissolving whenever it happens to be 
surrounded by water and glass shattering whenever it happens to get 
struck. An individual capable of acting autonomously in the strong 
sense of autonomy, by contrast, would be able to manifest dispositions 
in a much more variable set of external circumstances, including those 
where activity-provoking external factors are entirely absent. Now, the 
crucial point is that a person capable of autonomous activity in the 
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strong sense has a potentiality that is greater than the non-autonomous 
person. The ability to perform an activity autonomously makes for a 
greater potential to perform that activity because the manifestation is 
possible in a much wider range of external circumstances and 
conditions. The reason why a capacity for strong autonomous activity 
amounts to improved health is because autonomy broadens the 
circumstances under which a human being can manifest its capacities.  
A more indirect way in which autonomy could result in greater 
health follows from the fact that a capacity for autonomous activity 
enables one to manifest precisely those activities that will end up 
making one more capacitated. Here weak and strong autonomy are 
both relevant and equally function as conditions for improvements of 
health. In the absence of any form of autonomy one is handed over to 
external circumstances and the desires that happen to move one 
through life. As Frankfurt says, he would be “a helpless bystander to 
the forces that move him.”20 One acquires and develops the capacities 
one just happens to develop, and one’s health will for the most part 
depend on how fortunate one is in one’s external circumstances and the 
desires that happen to reign. With a capacity for autonomy, however, 
the will can condition the realisation of potentials that will result in the 
acquirement of new and broadly conditioning potentials.21 A capacity 
for weak autonomy would enable one to refrain from activities that are 
likely to result in some capacity reduction. A capacity for strong 
                                                             
20 Frankfurt, “Freedom of Will,” 21.  
21 The will can also condition the realisation of potentials that will effectively 
undermine one’s health. The problems generated by this possibility will be 
discussed in the next section, §1.3.  
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autonomy would enable one to manifest capacities that would directly 
result in an expanse of capaciousness; via an act of will one could 
subject one’s body to physical training, for instance, or engage in 
studies, learn new crafts, and so on, also when the external conditions 
and first-order desires are not sufficiently strong to realise the relevant 
dispositions.  
Autonomy is therefore, in and of itself, both constitutive of health, 
as well as an important condition for health-improvements. Given the 
identification of objective non-moral goodness with objects that improve 
one’s health, it follows that autonomy is an objective non-moral good 
for human beings. To briefly repeat the stages of argument: all living 
beings have objects and states that are objectively good and bad for 
them in a non-moral and relational sense; what is objectively good for a 
living being is what promotes its health; health consists in a multiplicity 
of potential for activities; developing a capacity for strong autonomy 
directly translates into a greater potential for activity; strong autonomy 
is therefore part of health and objectively good.  
The claim, then, is that developing autonomy is good for human 
beings for the same reason that nutrition and exercises are good for us, 
and in the same way that sunshine is good for plants and grass is for 
cows. That is, the value of autonomy is grounded in life and what is 
naturally good for all living beings; it constitutes an increase in what we 
as living beings can do. This idea is not to be mistaken for any 
humanisation of life itself: the idea is not that autonomy is possible for 
all forms of life, or that non-human health should be evaluated in terms 
of autonomy. The thought is only that for living beings capable of self-
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conditioning, cultivating and strengthening strong autonomy is 
objectively good for exactly the same reason that all other things are 
objectively good or bad for any living being: it increases one’s health, i.e. 
one’s overall potential for activity.  
The strong form of autonomy that I identified above must thus be 
understood as a central part of human health, while strong and weak 
forms of autonomy make an important condition for health-
improvements. If all this is true, this implies that inhibitions to the 
cultivation of human autonomy amount to nothing less than an 
impoverishment of human health. Speculating briefly where such 
inhibitions to individual autonomy originate, we may be inclined to 
look at political and legal systems, perhaps to coercive working 
conditions, authoritative systems of education or even a lack of 
education; factors like excessive parental control, gender inequality; and 
possibly even the brain-washing brought about by widespread 
exposure to advertisements. Although truth could probably be found in 
all of this, it is worth pointing out that obstacles to the development of 
autonomy could also come from the opposite direction, viz. from life 
lived under extremely favourable circumstances. If someone is never 
forced into reflection by an experience of hardship, or if one is required 
to manifest strong acts of will-power to overcome internal and external 
obstacles, one’s degree of autonomy could remain relatively 
underdeveloped. Self-sufficiency and self-control do not come natural to 
most of us. Periods of hardship, adversity, isolation, and oppression—in 
the right doses of course—may turn out to be conducive to the 
development of autonomy, maybe more so than a life-long tailwind, a 
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wide range of external incentives and rewards, and reliable systems of 
social support. The suggestion, then, is that not just oppressive 
circumstances but precisely situations in which people enjoy great levels 
of comfort, social support, and external incentives, human autonomy 
may remain relatively underdeveloped. The question under which 
conditions human beings tend to expand and strengthen their 
autonomy is of course an empirical question. But it is worth pointing 
out that a threat to human health is the life we described earlier as 
‘decadent’: that unconcerned, uneventful, balanced, comfortable, 
relaxed, peaceful, and stretched-out life that is so commonly associated 
with health. In any case, the central claim defended is that autonomy is 
to be viewed as part of human health as well as an important condition 
of possibility for the cultivation of health. Rather than thinking that one 
has to be healthy in order to live an autonomous life, I have argued that 
the opposite is true: a human being has to be autonomous in order to be 
healthy. 
 
 
4. Human Health and Final Goods 
 
A third distinctive feature of human life I shall examine more closely is 
our ability to strive for goals and ends at the expense of our health. 
Human beings have an ability to adopt and pursue, what we may 
loosely call, ‘final goods’: objectives, in any case, that can diverge from, 
and that may require means that directly undermine, the maintenance 
of our health. Final goods could be defined along Aristotelian lines as 
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states pursued for their own sake rather than for the sake of something 
else.22 Whether it concerns sacrifices we make for the welfare of others, 
the pursuit of a career, writing a difficult book, the achievement of 
demanding physical challenges, forms of creative expression: we can 
and often do adopt final goods where the means to realise them 
undermine and occasionally even destroy our health.  
The very possibility for a discrepancy between pursuing final 
goods and maintaining health gives rise to a number of questions we 
shall confront. First, is health itself is to be viewed as a final good for 
human beings, perhaps as one amongst others? Or does health merely 
contribute and provide conditions for the realisation of final goods? 
Second, does the nature of human health change according to the final 
goods people adopt? Or does the nature of human health remain 
unaffected by the things we pursue as ends? And third, is an ability to 
strive for final goods that undermines our health somehow part of 
living a healthy human life, or does this just straightforwardly oppose 
what is healthy for us? In order to get a handle on these questions we 
first have to understand more clearly what underlies the possibility for a 
discrepancy between health-promotion and the pursuit of final goods. 
In an effort to answer these questions I shall return to recent work by 
Christine Korsgaard, as she has written extensively on the nature of 
final goods and their relation to health—even though her position is one 
I shall in the end come to disagree with.  
 
 
                                                             
22 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1094a18.  
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4.1 Korsgaard and Health Relativism 
Korsgaard defends the view that final goods for human beings depend 
on the kind of lives we find worth living and choose to live, and the 
practical identities we take on in doing so. Her conception of final 
goods—and I shall follow her lead on this—is one that depends on what 
individuals decide or experience as “desirable or valuable for its own 
sake.”23 And she allows for variation in what people experience as 
desirable and valuable in that way—more so, in any case, than Aristotle 
did. Korsgaard thinks we see final goods “as things to go for” and they 
will “include whatever promotes and constitutes our practical 
identities.”24 She explicitly and repeatedly distinguishes final goods 
from the kind of goods that are health-promoting, which she calls the 
“motherly sense” of goodness in one paper and the “evaluative sense” 
of goodness in another.25 Initially, Korsgaard keeps these two senses of 
goodness apart—final goods and health-promoting goods. As long as 
they are kept apart the possibility for a discrepancy between the two can 
easily be explained. If final goods are choice-dependent and health-
promoting goods are not, an opposition becomes possible between the 
two depending on the choices we make. If one chooses a way of life that 
involves compromises to one’s health, a tension can emerge between the 
                                                             
23 Korsgaard, “On having a Good” 3.  
24 Korsgaard, “On having a Good” 28.  
25 In ‘On Having a Good’ she speaks of the way in which some things are good in a 
‘motherly’ sense of goodness, by which she means things that are health-
promoting, and contrasts this with the ‘final’ sense of goodness. In ‘The Origin of 
the Good and Our Animal Nature’ she expresses the same distinction in terms of 
‘evaluative goodness’ in contrast to the ‘final sense’ of goodness. When explaining 
the motherly sense and the evaluative sense of goodness she turns in both papers 
to Aristotle’s function argument, which I already discussed in §2.6 of Chapter Two. 
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two kinds of goodness. Although this is roughly the view I shall adopt 
below, Korsgaard’s view is on closer inspection rather different. 
 First it is important to recognise that the possibility for a tension 
between health and pursuing final goods is reserved for human life 
alone. For non-human organisms the maintenance of species-typical 
capacities, including their reproductive capacities, does not appear to 
serve any further end or good. That is, the maintenance of health just is 
the final good for non-human organisms. Korsgaard agrees with this 
verdict, as we already saw in §2.6 of Chapter Two, and defends the 
thesis that Aristotle did so as well. She writes that “Aristotle’s theory of 
the final good for an organism is essentially to be healthy,” or more 
specifically, “to lead a healthy life of its kind in circumstances 
favourable to its leading such a life and continuing to lead such a life.”26 
There is of course a question to be raised whether final goods can be 
attributed to non-human organisms at all, especially if final goods are 
by definition choice-dependent and intertwined with practical 
identities. This is a question that we touched on before and one I shall 
not elaborate on further.27 I shall presume more tentatively that insofar as 
bacteria, plants, and animals indeed have final goods, their final good 
coincides with the maintenance of health. 
Human beings do have the ability to adopt final goods other than 
the sustenance and development of health. This is also Korsgaard view: 
she writes that an identification of health with final goods “may be a 
plausible thing to say about the good for a plant or an animal, it may 
                                                             
26 Korsgaard, “Origin of the Good,” 22.  
27 See for a further discussion: Korsgaard, “The Origins of the Good,” sections 6-8; 
and Korsgaard, “On Having a Good,” Section 6.  
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seem to be too thin as an account of the human good.”28 Korsgaard 
argues that the nature of animals and plants determines that well-
functioning for them means nothing other than attaining and 
maintaining a state of health. The nature of human beings, by contrast, 
determines that well-functioning involves choosing “a way of life” and 
making something “valuable” and “worthwhile” out of oneself.29 
Phrased in Aristotelian terminology, she argues that the “forms” of 
plant and animals determine that attaining a state of health is their final 
good, whereas we “choose our own forms,” in virtue of being capable to 
decide for ourselves “what is worth doing for the sake of what.”30 The 
very form of human life, she argues, is constituted by the choices we 
make and the final goods we adopt; according to Korsgaard we are self-
constituting beings in the fullest sense of the term.  
In line with Kant, Korsgaard argues that human life is distinct 
from the rest of life primarily due to our self-consciousness and capacity 
for reasoning. She states that while animal life is governed by instincts 
that seek out and track the kind of objects that would benefit their 
health—objects that are non-morally good in an objective but relational 
way—human beings are expulsed from such an instinct-governed 
garden.31 Human beings are self-conscious, which, she claims, “opens 
                                                             
28 Korsgaard, “Origin of the Good,” 22. 
29 See Korsgaard, Self-Constitution 128; Korsgaard, “Origin of the Good,” 22. In 
order to support the view we should make something valuable out of ourselves she 
turns to Kant’s formula of humanity. See Christine Korsgaard, Sources of 
Normativity, ed. Onora O'Neill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 131-166. 
30 Korsgaard, Self-constitution, 127-128. 
31 The chapter in which she describes the human condition is entitled “Expulsion 
from the Garden.” Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, Chapter 6.  
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up a space between the incentive and the response”—a space she calls 
“reflective distance.”32 Within this reflective distance we can question 
which incentives give us reasons for actions, reasons that are to 
determine “what is worth doing for what.”33 The space opened up by 
self-consciousness gives human beings the possibility to determine their 
own final goods, and in doing so, constitute their own individual form. 
The properties that Korsgaard puts forward as underpinning our ability 
to adopt ends other than health are therefore precisely what we 
described previously as our capacity for autonomy. Our ability for self-
conditioning and self-control not only allow us to realise capacities that 
maintain and improve our health, but also to pursue ends with opposite 
implications. Organisms lacking the ability for self-determination and 
self-control are dominated by instincts that, indeed, fairly reliably seek 
out those objects that sustain their health. Human autonomy constitutes 
a break with instinct-driven life and gives us the ability to pursue ends 
other than the maintenance of our health.  
When the pursuit of final goods coincides with an expansion of 
health the two different kinds of goods cause no friction. More 
interesting are cases in which the pursuit of some final good results in a 
lessening of one’s health. If, for example, ascending the world’s most 
treacherous mountain—one that will almost certainly take one’s life—is 
adopted as final good, the summum bonum one decides to live and die 
for, then pursuing one’s final good practically implies an annulment of 
health. Or a little less extreme: if one’s final good is to push the frontiers 
                                                             
32 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 116 
33 Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 116 
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of experimental jazz and finds that a regular intake of harmful doses of 
narcotics are necessary to get into the right mindset, this too involves 
means to realise one’s final good that are health-undermining. Or more 
down to earth: if someone in old age wishes to continue living in his 
family home and makes this his final good, the true end of all his efforts 
and strivings, even though living in his home environment implies 
depriving himself of necessary care and support, a quicker deterioration 
of health, and possibly an earlier death, the living at home would also 
take its toll on the health of senior. However, in describing the means 
towards the realisation of these final goods as health-undermining, it is 
presupposed that health itself remains the same thing for the 
mountaineer, the aspiring jazz musician, the senior home-dweller, and 
everyone else—irrespective of the final goods they indeed pursue. 
One could question whether what is healthy alters according to 
one’s final goods and thereby call into question my central assumption 
that the meaning of health remains stable when predicated over 
different human beings and different types of organisms. Would it not 
be healthy for the mountaineer to practice at high altitudes and 
challenging ridges and to ignore activities that would secure his future 
existence, just to maximise his chances of achieving his ultimate goal? 
And similarly, would the narcotics not precisely be healthy for the 
zealous jazz-musician precisely because they promote him in his 
practical identity and help him achieve his final good? As we already 
saw in Chapter One (§1.5), Nietzsche’s view is that the meaning of 
health changes according to one’s aims, goals, and ends. Nietzsche, to 
repeat, thinks that “it is only sensible to speak of ‘health’ and ‘illness’ 
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with an eye to an ideal that has to be reached.”34 What is healthy would 
differ for each of the hypothetical subjects on Nietzsche’s official view. 
Korsgaard is more ambiguous on the possibility of a health-
undermining pursuit of final goods. The two senses of goodness, health-
promoting goods and final goods, are on closer inspection less far apart 
than she initially suggests. In summary of her own views, she writes 
that “the final sense and the motherly [health-promoting] sense of ‘good 
for you’ mention the same set of facts, but from two different 
perspectives.”35 And, she continues, “it is because these two 
perspectives can come together that there is such a thing as the good.”36 
As long as the two senses of good come together there is little to worry 
about. The question is what happens if they don’t and whether this 
indeed a possibility on her way of thinking. In other words, we have to 
question whether Korsgaard thinks that final goods and health-
promoting goods necessarily refer to the same set of facts. It seems to me 
this is precisely what she thinks. The reasons why Korsgaard is 
committed to this view shall be discussed shortly. But if she is indeed 
committed to the view that final goods and health-promoting goods 
necessarily refer to the same set of facts, this would leave two options: 
either health-promoting goods are relative to final goods or final goods 
must be in line what is simultaneously health-promoting in order for 
them to be final goods. The first option is Nietzsche’s official position 
again: whether one is healthy, and what promotes one’s health, depends 
on one’s self-chosen final goods. The second option is that final goods 
                                                             
34 Nietzsche, KSA 9, 11[112]. My Translation. 
35 Korsgaard, “On Having a Good,”19. My emphasis 
36 Ibid. 
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are limited to those things that would simultaneously be healthy when 
pursued. On this second option, people pursuing goods that undermine 
their health would not be pursuing any final goods at all since final 
goods would have to be congruent with what is health-promoting.  
Of these two options, Korsgaard favours the first: Nietzsche’s 
official view. Korsgaard writes that “the functional [health-promoting] 
sense of good-for and therefore the final sense too will include whatever 
promotes and constitutes our practical identities.”37 If our choices of final 
goods and our practical identities really constitute us as what we are, 
including the very forms of human life, then whatever helps one function 
in accordance with one’s practical identity is to be regarded as healthy. 
If practical identities imply a reduction of overall potentiality for an 
individual this still means one is healthy, if we take her on her word. 
The semi-suicidal mountaineer would function healthily by practising 
on perilous crests and actualise his self-chosen and self-constituted form 
by dying on his favoured mountain. For the jazz-musician it would be 
literally healthy to use narcotics, as these too would help him to sustain 
his practical identity as a cutting-edge jazz musician. Failing to 
recognise the hazardous mountain quests and psychoactive drugs as 
health-promoting in these cases would be to fall short in appreciating 
who these individuals are and as what they have constituted themselves. 
Judging their behaviours as unhealthy would be to mistake them for 
people without the final goods and practical identities that define them; 
it would be to take them for beings they are not.38  
                                                             
37 Korsgaard, “On Having a Good,” 28. My emphasis 
38 For Korsgaard’s account of empathy see: Korsgaard, Self-Constitution, 201-202.  
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There might be aspects in Korsgaard’s work that guard against 
this kind of health-relativism, but putting together the various premises 
she defends throughout her work seems to make the relativism of 
health inescapable. If final goods are choice-dependent and those 
choices constitute one’s practical identity, and if what is health-
promoting depends entirely on one’s practical identity, it follows that 
what is healthy for human beings depends on one’s self-chosen final 
goods. And this is where I take issue with her position: self-constitution 
and our practical identities don’t cut all the way down and aren’t 
wholly decisive in what is good for us, precisely when it comes to 
matters of health. Certain things are healthy and unhealthy for us 
regardless of our final goods and subjective preferences; they are good 
in virtue of us being a living being. If the narcotics of the jazz musician 
destroy his liver and kidneys, make his teeth fall out, erode central parts 
of his brain, prevent him from forming productive human relationships, 
significantly reduce his life-expectancy, and so on, the narcotics are 
simply unhealthy, no matter how innovative his improvisations are and 
how much he values his identity as a pioneering jazz musician. And if 
the senior home-dweller is not capable of nourishing himself and basic 
hygienic measures, continuing to live at home would require means that 
are unhealthy for him, regardless of the final good he has adopted. The 
relationship between health and final goods must therefore be different 
from the way I have interpreted Korsgaard as conceiving of it.  
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4.2 Final Goods as Necessary for Health 
How are we to think of the relationship between health and final goods 
then? I shall follow Korsgaard in taking final goods to depend on what 
people choose or experience as worthwhile pursuing for its own sake. 
Final goods, that is, are subjectively chosen ends that can vary between 
individuals and even differ within the lifetime of one individual. Final 
goods are therefore not grounded in the way I argued health-promoting 
goods are objectively grounded in the nature of life. Final goods depend 
on what one subjectively chooses to pursue as a final good and nothing 
other than one’s choices grounds or objectifies these ends. 
Retaining the distinction between the two senses of goodness 
opens the possibility for evaluating the means to a self-chosen final end 
as health-promoting or not. On my account of health pursuing a final 
good is healthy if results in a proliferation of capacities and unhealthy if 
it brings about an irreversible reduction of total capacities. This does not 
mean that final goods as such are healthy or unhealthy: living at home, 
playing jazz, or climbing mountains could be health-promoting for 
other individuals or neutral with respect to their health, depending how 
the means to realise these ends affect someone’s health.39 A final good 
can be health-promoting for one individual and health-undermining for 
another. But once we keep health-promoting goods and final goods 
apart we can evaluate whether the means required for the realisation of 
some final good for some particular individual are beneficial to his or 
her health or whether they are not. And precisely this possibility is 
unavailable to Korsgaard and Nietzsche official view, as for both 
                                                             
39 On this point I am indebted to conversations with Andrew Tyler.  
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philosophers health-promoting goods are relative and instrumental to 
the realisation of one’s self-chosen final goods and practical identities. 
Resisting their relativistic position on the nature of health makes it 
possible to argue that for specific individuals pursuing certain final 
goods is healthier than pursuing certain others.  
This relationship between health and final goods is not to be 
confused with the idea that health itself is the final good for human life. 
Final goods, to repeat, are states of affairs people experience as valuable 
or desirable for their own sake rather than for the sake of something 
else, whatever they might be. The claim that the means and pursuit for 
subjectively chosen ends can be healthy or unhealthy for an individual 
does not imply health itself is to be regarded as the ultimate final good. 
People may experience health as a final good and decide to adopt the 
development of health as the ultimate aim of their strivings. Especially 
after a period of severe illness it is not uncommon to hear expressions of 
the belief that health is the greatest good and the most valuable aspect 
of life. Regaining and maintaining health may therefore be adopted as a 
final good and as the end of one’s efforts and strivings. But the 
recognition that the means to realising final goods can be evaluated in 
terms of how health-promoting they are for specific individuals and 
insisting that these evaluations are objective, does not amount to 
postulating health itself as the ultimate final good.   
In fact, pursuing health as a final good would under most 
circumstances and for most people not even make for a very healthy 
final good. Broadening one’s capacity only for the sake of broadening 
one’s capacities would strike most of us as a rather futile enterprise, one 
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for which we would quickly loose the motivation and inspiration. Final 
goods may be ultimately groundless, relative only to one’s choices and 
practical identity, but pursuing health as a final good is likely to be 
experienced as fairly pointless and meaningless, especially if there are 
alternative ends available that one could pursue.40 We typically aim to 
realise objectives that have meaning outside the contours and 
limitations of our own lives: goals that give us a sense of purpose and 
meaning in life. The pursuit of health is not likely to generate this sense 
of meaning. Final goods that would more effectively facilitate our health 
are likely to be objectives that aren’t primarily directed at one’s health, 
but ends of which the pursuit would simultaneously make one more 
capacitated. If one’s final good is to raise a family, for instance, to 
contribute to an institution’s success, to write a book, to reach athletic 
targets, etc., one has to develop a range of capacities and sustain them 
over extended periods of time. These sorts of subjectively chosen ends 
are more likely to give us the motivation to develop and keep on 
developing ourselves in various dimensions of life, and in doing so, to 
maintain and improve our overall health. Experiencing a lack of 
meaning in one’s activities and pursuits can be paralysing and 
extremely incapacitating, rapidly resulting in the deterioration of one’s 
health.41 Precisely striving for self-chosen ends that give us a sense of 
meaning and purpose enables us to maintain and expand our capacities 
                                                             
40 Pursuing ends other than maintaining minimal levels of health may not be 
available for people living in deprived parts of the world. 
41 Nietzsche would call such a condition passive nihilism: “a sign of weakness” 
where “the strength of the spirit may be worn out, exhausted, so that previous 
goals and values have become incommensurate and no longer are believed […].” 
Nietzsche, Will to Power, §23. 
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and thus to improve our health. In order to live a healthy life, therefore, 
we have to adopt final goods different from the promotion of our health 
if we have the option to do so; that is, we have to adopt goods we deem 
worthwhile pursuing for their own sake. Adopting final goods and 
dedicating ourselves to realising them is precisely how we sustain and 
improve our health. The ability to adopt final goods and to experience 
certain states of affairs as worthwhile pursuing for their own sake, I 
would suggest, are therefore crucially important to human health. 
How about final goods requiring means that undermine our 
health? Contrary to Korsgaard’s view, it seems perfectly possible to 
adopt final goods requiring means that significantly reduce the 
multiplicity of one’s total potential for activities and thus undermine 
our health. Things get more complicated, however, when we dig a little 
deeper and question with respect to what these health-undermining 
pursuits would be unhealthy. I just advanced the idea that human 
beings have to set themselves goals and targets in order to maintain and 
develop their health. It would be naïve to think that final goods 
requiring means undermining someone’s health could be evaluated vis-
à-vis a state in which they would not pursue any final goods at all, as if 
living without final goods would provide better conditions for health. 
Not only are we always engaged in various projects and directed 
towards certain ends, without such ends we would not be doing—or 
even be capable of doing—much at all. A health-undermining pursuit of 
a final good is therefore unhealthy only insofar other final goods could be 
adopted by an individual involving means that would condition better 
health. 
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But adopting a final good that withstands some level of reflective 
scrutiny is not like picking an apple from a tree. Choosing and 
subsequently experiencing something as worthwhile for its own sake is 
an extremely complex affair. Giving up on some final good is equally 
exceptionally demanding. Informing the jazz musician that his ways to 
achieving his end are unhealthy for him will probably not make him 
change paths, and even if he were to try so it is not a given he would be 
able to devote himself to alternative ends that would better sustain his 
health. We can easily fall into a state in which we get fixated on 
achieving some particular goal, subsequently becoming unable to 
redirect our energy and attention elsewhere and to strive for different 
ends. If no other end could be experienced as worthwhile pursuing then 
the required alternative compared to which the particular means 
towards some final good were judged as health-undermining would be 
unavailable. A seemingly unhealthy pursuit of some final good might 
therefore not always be unhealthy on a closer assessment of an 
individual’s options and psychological make-up: it might just be as 
healthy as it could possibly get for someone. If the senior desiring to 
continue living in his family home would not be able to experience 
anything as worthwhile doing in the nursing home and fall into 
complete and irredeemable passivity, perhaps his health would be 
better served by continuing to live at home. The pursuit of some final 
good is therefore health-undermining only if an adoption other final 
goods would be possible for the individual by means of which his or her 
health would be better served. Once one’s psychological state has 
become fixated on the pursuit of one particular final good, even if the 
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means towards its realisation are health-undermining in a self-evident 
and irreversible way, it may turn out that pursuing this final good will 
bring about the state of health that is empirically the best possible for 
this individual. The adoption of final goods can therefore set a 
contingent constraint on how healthy one can become. In other words, 
the maximum attainable health can be limited by one’s self-chosen final 
goods, especially if the choice for final goods has become rigidified. 
Individual health as well as absolute health, however, would continue 
to be undermined if the means to some end are unhealthy: one could 
have been healthier given the individual one is and the species one 
belongs to. So attainable health can be influenced and limited by a final 
good, whereas individual and absolute health cannot.  
Pushing the latter point further, we could argue that a degree of 
non-attachment to one’s self-chosen final goods is generally conducive to 
our health. A level of flexibility in the kind of things one can experience 
as worthwhile pursuing for its own sake contributes to one’s overall 
health for at least two reasons. First, if one can no longer continue to 
pursue some end for one reason or another, flexibility in what one can 
experience as worthwhile will enable the adoption of a new final good 
and thereby facilitate the maintenance of one’s action-potential. And 
second, if one actually achieves one’s final good and realises the deeply 
desired state of affairs, flexibility in what one can experience as final 
goods will allow one to adopt new final goods that could sustain one’s 
health. There is also a risk of not being attached enough, however, which 
could prevent one from trying hard to accomplish one’s final good.42 
                                                             
42 I am indebted to Senthuran Bhuvanendra for pointing this out to me. 
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Non-attachment could also descend into a kind of indifference, laziness, 
and decadence that would prevent one from developing the capacities 
necessary for realising one’s ends. Even though a degree of non-
attachment is conducive to health, commitment and resilience in 
pursuing one’s final goals are equally characteristic of health, since 
without it, one’s action potential is bound to be constrained. 
 
4.3 The Great Health 
Having argued, contra Korsgaard and Nietzsche’s official view, that it is 
possible to undermine one’s health in the pursuit of a final good and 
that striving for ends other than the maintenance of one’s health enables 
us to maintain and expand our health, we can now return to the 
question whether a health-undermining pursuit of a final goods is part 
of health or indeed simply opposed to it. The question I want to raise is 
this: would holding on to the prospect and expectation of a long life not 
precisely signify a lack of strength and health? Would avoiding health-
threatening activities not precisely be incapacitating and therefore 
symptomatic of unhealthiness; perhaps even an unhealthy attachment 
to life? Does the ability to climb perilous mountain crest not precisely 
indicate a greater potential for activities possessed by the mountaineer? 
Does the ability to completely devote oneself to one cause and sacrifice 
one’s health in doing so not precisely exemplify greater health; a greater 
health, in any case, than one in which someone were just to remain 
endlessly capacitated? 
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In short, I think the answer to these questions is ‘yes’, and that the 
capacity account of health can help explain why these question have to 
be answered in the affirmative: being able to give up on one’s future 
health directly results in a significant expansion of one’s current 
potential for activity. If one is not limited by interests and concerns 
about one’s future health a whole range of potential activities opens up 
that otherwise would remain precluded, including a one-way ascend to 
a mountaintop. With an ability to sacrifice one’s health one is capable of 
carrying out a large number of activities and realising a much greater 
variety of ends than if one were to lack this ability and remain attached 
to one’s own health. The capacity account of health therefore implies, 
paradoxically, that one can achieve a state of greater health the moment 
one is capable of undermining and even relinquishing one’s health in 
the pursuit of one’s ends. The paradox is that in giving up the concern 
for one’s future health one precisely reaches a state of greater health, i.e. 
a state in which one has a greater potential for activities.43 A soldier with 
a capacity to storm out onto an open battlefield, to pick an obvious 
example, has a greater action-potential than one who is forced to stay 
behind in the trenches due to a lack of courage, even though the former 
may destroy his health through his act of bravery and the latter will 
preserve it.   
                                                             
43 Similar paradoxes appear in the context of freedom and autonomy: one is freer if 
one is capable of giving up one’s freedom and limited in freedom if one cannot; 
likewise, one’s autonomy is greater if one is able to autonomously give up one’s 
autonomy, for otherwise there is an aspect of one’s life, viz. one’s own autonomy, 
over which one has no power of self-determination. Health seems to follow the 
same pattern: health is greater if one is capable of engaging in activities that entail 
subsequent loss of health.  
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There is a risk of falling into contradiction here, however, for how 
can something be simultaneously health-undermining and health-
improving? The basic idea I am driving at is that lacking the ability to 
sacrifice one’s health restricts the scope of what one is capable of doing 
and significantly constrains the ends one can adopt and realise. When 
specifying the nature of capacities and dispositions, I drew attention to 
the fact that to have a capacity or disposition does not mean one has to 
realise the capacity and manifest the activity. If the relevant conditions 
do not arise the disposition will remain dormant. In order to possess the 
‘greater health’ currently under consideration, one therefore does not in 
actuality have to risk and undermine one’s health in the pursuit of some 
end. But when adopting a final good that requires one to sacrifice one’s 
health, someone possessing greater health would be able to realise such 
an end, which is precisely what renders this person healthier. And if 
someone were to lose her health in doing so, temporarily or even 
permanently, this would be nothing other than an expression of precisely 
this greater health. A mother who sacrifices herself for the welfare of her 
children, a jazz musician sacrificing his health for the sake of musical 
excellence, the mountaineer climbing a treacherous mountain, the 
soldier displaying bravery on the battlefield: all exhibit greater health 
by being able to do more due to their ability to sacrifice their health in 
the pursuit of their ends.  
Not every pursuit or activity that undermines one’s health is an 
expression of greater health, however, for otherwise we would have 
eliminated the possibility of ever doing something unhealthy. 
Constrictions on when health-undermining activities amount to greater 
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health must therefore also be identified. If people could pursue and 
realise their ends also without impairing their health, the ability to 
sacrifice one’s health would not generate additional capacities. If the 
jazz-musician could improvise equally virtuosically without the 
detrimental quantities of psycho-active drugs, he would not gain 
additional capacities by sacrificing his health; he would just be 
undermining his health. If the senior desiring to live at home could 
realise his final good without becoming undernourished, he would 
equally gain no further capacities in becoming undernourished: he 
would just be damaging his health. Realising ends at the expense of 
health make for an expression of greater health only if these goods could 
not be realised via health-preserving or less health-undermining means. 
Actively relinquishing one’s health in the pursuit of a final good is 
therefore expressive of greater health only if the ends could not have 
been achieved via alternative and less health-compromising means. 
The idea that an ability to give up one’s health enables the 
realisation of a much larger range of activities and that this ability 
constitutes ‘greater health’ is not only consistent with the proposed 
account of health, it is also a distinctly Nietzschean idea. In fact, the 
label ‘greater health’ is one that I directly adopted from one of his 
aphorisms. In an aphorism entitled “the great health” Nietzsche writes: 
 
The great health—that one does not merely have but also 
acquires continually, and must acquire because one gives it up 
again and again, and must give it up.44  
                                                             
44 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 382. 
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Like the rest of the aphorism, Nietzsche’s words are elusive and open to 
a variety of interpretations. But the idea that one acquires health by 
being able to give up one’s health comes out very clearly in this passage 
and is associated by Nietzsche precisely with ‘the great health’. The 
passage also suggests that acquiring greater health requires a certain 
practice, viz. continually giving up and risking one’s health in one’s 
activities and pursuits. In the same aphorisms Nietzsche speaks of 
living “dangerously healthy,” and specifies this is as an ability to inflict 
harm upon oneself and to risk “suffering shipwreck.”45 A high level of 
self-discipline is no doubt required to cultivate a will capable of 
conditioning health-undermining and possibly even life-threatening 
activities. Instead of safeguarding one’s future existence by living 
securely and comfortably, Nietzsche point seems to be that actively 
risking one’s health and future existence benefits our health. Nietzsche’s 
insight here is consistent with the idea I just advanced: being able to live 
without a concern for one’s health constitutes greater health, as it 
conditions a greater potential for activities. In full agreement with 
Nietzsche, I therefore conclude that the ability to adopt and pursue final 
goods involving a decline of health and possibly even suffering 
shipwreck, is indicative of being in a state of great health.  
                                                             
45 Ibid.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Associated and Rival Theories of Health 
 
1. Nordenfelt: The Action-Theoretic Approach 
 
1.1 Summary of Nordenfelt’s Theory   
An account of health that shares several important features with the 
theory of health defended above is Lennart Nordenfelt’s ‘action-
theoretic’ account of health, which he has spelled out in great detail and 
relatively consistently over a number of publications.1 More clearly and 
decisively than anyone else in the philosophical literature Nordenfelt 
has defined health and illness at the level of abilities of human beings as 
a whole. In the literature his view is sometimes referred to as “the 
capability approach” to health, or “the holistic welfare theory of 
health.”2 One commentator labels Nordenfelt’s theory of health even as 
                                                             
1 For the discussion of Nordenfelt’s views I rely on: Lennart Nordenfelt, Quality of 
Life, Health and Happiness (Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1993); 
Lennart Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health: An Action Theoretic Approach, 2nd 
revised & enlarged ed. (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995); Lennart 
Nordenfelt, Action, Ability and Health: Essays in the Philosophy of Action and Welfare 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000); Lennart Nordenfelt, Health, 
Science, and Ordinary Language (Amsterdam: Rodopi B.V. Editions, 2001); and 
Lennart Nordenfelt, “Understanding the Concept of health,” in Strategies for Health: 
An Anthology, ed. Per Nilsen (Linköping: Linköpings Universitet, 2007): 4-15. 
2 Thomas Schramme, “A Qualified Defence of a Naturalist Theory of Health,” 
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 10 (2007): 11.  
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one of only two theories of health that are “of utmost importance in the 
philosophy of medicine”—Boorse’s bio-statistical theory being the 
second one.3 Nordenfelt’s theory equally arises out of dissatisfaction 
with the view that health consists in an absence of disease and 
functional abnormality, and the continuous efforts to construe this as a 
strictly descriptive and value-free account of health. He too recognises 
that dysfunctions of functional parts must be measured against a 
conceptually distinct level of abilities of an organism considered as a 
whole, and that pain and suffering cannot be guiding in evaluations of 
health.4 In his works he attempts to provide clear definitions of the 
concepts ‘ability’, ‘happiness’, and ‘health’, and to demonstrate their 
inherent conceptual relations. In its simplest form, Nordenfelt defines 
health as a state in which one has the ability to realise the goals required 
for one’s own happiness. More precisely, he claims that “A is healthy if, 
and only if, A has the ability, given standard circumstances, to realize 
his vital goals, i.e. the set of goals which are necessary and jointly 
sufficient for his minimal happiness.”5 In order to show how his account 
falls short compared to the account advanced in this thesis, his 
definitions and theorising have to be spelled out more comprehensively.  
Nordenfelt’s starting point is that health refers to an ability of a 
special kind. He distinguishes between first-order and second-order 
abilities: first-order abilities refer to the abilities one presently has and 
second-order abilities refer to abilities necessary for acquiring first-order 
                                                             
3 Ibid. 
4 See for instance Nordenfelt, Action, Ability and Health, 78-80. 
5 Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health, 90.  
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abilities.6 In his words “A has a second-order ability with regard to an 
action F, if and only if, A has the first order ability to pursue a training-
program after the completion of which A will have the first-order ability 
to do F.”7 Nordenfelt identifies health with an ability of the second-
order kind: “to be healthy is to have, at least, a second-order ability to 
perform a certain set of actions. To be ill is to have lost or, in general, to 
lack one or more of these second-order abilities.”8 He believes the 
identification of health and illness with second-order abilities is 
necessary to make health less dependent on one’s particular 
environment, even though “it does not and cannot completely free us 
from the relativity of an action to an environment.”9 Whereas first-order 
abilities are relative to an environment, second-order abilities are 
introduced to capture how one can acquire abilities in new 
environments.10 Note that this distinction is different from what I have 
called basic and broadly conditioning capacities versus more specific 
capacities. Nordenfelt’s distinction contains a temporal aspect: second-
order ability allows one to go through some type of training so that one 
will have the relevant first-order abilities afterwards. Basic or broadly 
conditioning capacities are distinguished hierarchically: one cannot 
                                                             
6 Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health, 49-53; Nordenfelt, Action, Ability and Health, 
73-74. 
7 Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health, 50. 
8 Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health, 53. 
9 Nordenfelt, Action, Ability and Health, 73. 
10 Nordenfelt’s favourite example is someone migrating to another country who 
does not have the first-order abilities required for earning a living, but who does 
have the second-order ability to undergo training that will enable him to acquire 
the first-order ability op speaking the language. See for instance: Nordenfelt, On 
the Nature of Health, 49. 
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have certain specific capacities without possessing the underlying and 
more basic capacities. Moreover, Nordenfelt’s second-order abilities are 
in part defined in terms of the first-order abilities they are required 
for—they are abilities for learning specific first-order abilities—whereas 
basic capacities are not defined in terms of more specialised capacities, 
or a guarantee that one can acquire the more specialised capacity.  
Having identified health with second-order abilities, Nordenfelt 
attempts to demarcate the relevant first order abilities for health, the 
second-order ability for which will determine whether someone is 
healthy or not. Not all first-order abilities are relevant or necessary for 
health according to Nordenfelt. Only abilities necessary for the 
realisation of specific goals are relevant, viz. the goals that will produce 
happiness for an individual once realised. Of the totality of goals and 
wants that a person may have there is a subset of goals that can bring 
about a minimum level of happiness when realised. This subset of goals 
Nordenfelt terms ‘vital goals’, a notion he defines as follows: “P's vital 
goals constitute the set of those states of affairs which are necessary and 
together sufficient for P's minimal happiness.”11 Minimal happiness is 
stipulated by Nordenfelt as corresponding to the “lowest degree of 
happiness:” a person who has not reached this state is “at least to some 
degree unhappy.”12 To be healthy, then, is to have the ability to realise 
the kind of goals that, taken together, will bring about a state in which 
one is, on the whole, not unhappy. In other words, “to be healthy is 
tantamount to having the ability, given standard circumstances, to 
                                                             
11 Nordenfelt, Quality of Life, Health and Happiness, 8.  
12 Nordenfelt, Quality of Life, Health and Happiness, 48. 
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realise one's minimal happiness.”13 Given the distinction between first 
and second-order abilities, however, he should have said that health is 
tantamount to having an ability to acquire abilities necessary for the 
realisation of goals that will bring about a minimal level of happiness.  
Despite the close connection between health and happiness 
Nordenfelt emphasises that the two are not identical. He thinks health is 
compatible with unhappiness as well, since, first, a certain environment 
may prevent one from realising one’s vital goals, and second, one may 
abstain from realising one’s vital goals and choose not to be happy. 
Whether someone is healthy, on Nordenfelt’s view, depends therefore 
strongly on one’s vital goals, and thus on what makes someone happy. 
Individual goals and deeply held desires are built into the meaning of 
health itself. Of two identical people differing only in vital goals one can 
be healthy and the other one ill, on Nordenfelt’s account.  
The implications of this view become apparent at the extremities: 
cases in which one has extremely demanding vital goals and cases in 
which one has very easily satisfied vital goals. Starting with the former, 
cases in which someone’s minimal happiness requires practically 
impossible or unattainable goals will make one per definition unhealthy 
on Nordenfelt’s view, and he is willing to bite the bullet on this point.14 
However, he claims that the ‘illness’ resulting from extremely 
demanding goals does not consist in a lack of ability vis-à-vis the 
demanding vital goals, but in a failure to set realistic goals.15 This move 
seems ad hoc, however, just as it is rather peculiar to call someone with 
                                                             
13 Nordenfelt, Quality of Life, Health and Happiness, 98. 
14 Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health, 74. 
15 Ibid. 
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ambitious and unrealisable vital goals, per definition, ill. Moreover, an 
additional criterion would now have to be added to Nordenfelt’s 
definition of health: health is the ability to acquire abilities necessary for 
the realisation of vital goals and the attainment of happiness, but only if 
one’s vital goals are realistic. This last caveat generates a host of 
epistemological problems, however, and inevitably renders health 
relative to sociological, economic, and cultural conditions, since what is 
realistic in one place and time may not be at another. In addition to 
one’s own state of being, contingent and variable environmental 
conditions will influence whether goals are realistic and therefore will 
partly come to determine whether someone is healthy or ill.  
Cases at the other extreme also expose the problematic 
implications of Nordenfelt’s account. If someone has vital goals that are 
very easily realised such that even serious injury won’t threaten their 
realisation, it seems Nordenfelt’s definition of health is too lax. Rather 
than just accepting that an unambitious, little desiring, but generally 
content and happy person is simply healthy, regardless of any injuries 
and inabilities—insofar as it would still be legitimate to speak of 
injuries—Nordenfelt chooses to keep his account of health floating via a 
different route. He argues that such cases should not count as “real 
happiness.”16 An “external observer” may question subjective reports of 
happiness, he writes, “if the conditions of happiness are so poor or on 
the ground that the behaviour displayed by the agent is 
unconvincing.”17 So on Nordenfelt’s view someone like a monk who has 
                                                             
16 Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health, 96. 
17 Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health, 96. For a similar turnaround see also page 74. 
298 
 
liberated himself from most wordly desires and who lives a 
harmonious, equanimous, and deeply happy life, despite physical 
frailties and injuries, may be judged unhappy by an external observer, 
just because the desires and goals would not have been ambitious 
enough to establish ‘real happiness’, which apparently must involve 
wide-ranging and demanding desire-satisfaction. This too is a most 
problematic move. It implies that individuals have no authority over 
whether they are happy or not and which goals are indeed vitally 
important to them. This immediately raises questions concerning the 
criteria on the basis of which external observers are to determine 
whether the goal-satisfaction base was substantive enough to bring 
about ‘real happiness’. How many vital goals does one need to fulfil or 
be in the process of fulfilling, and how difficult do they have to be, to 
qualify for ‘real happiness’? What kind of behaviour must be exhibited 
to render reported happiness ‘unquestionable’? Nordenfelt’s use of 
external observers effectively undermines the framework designed to 
incorporate subjective values and goals into the meaning of health. 
Moreover, the disjunction also complicates the definition of health 
further. In light of Nordenfelt’s qualifications about ‘real happiness’, his 
account of health must now read: health consists of having second-order 
abilities to acquire first-order abilities necessary for the realisation of 
vital goals and the attainment of happiness, but only if one’s vital goals 
are realistic, and only if conditions of happiness are not poor or 
supported by questionable behaviour in the eyes of external observers.  
The final element of Nordenfelt’s theory of health is an explication 
of happiness. Nordenfelt espouses that what a healthy person must be 
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able to do, or, presumable, what someone must have second-order 
abilities for, ultimately “rests on the notion of happiness.”18 Nordenfelt’s 
account of happiness is also most problematic, however, containing 
various ingredients, twists, and turns that barely add up to a coherent 
account. His theory of health could therefore best be evaluated with a 
non-technical desire-based account of happiness on the background. To 
do justice to his overall position, however, I will also outline the central 
tenets of his account of happiness.  
From our discussion so far it is clear that Nordenfelt does not 
work with a hedonistic account of happiness but with an account that 
combines elements from goal- or desire-fulfilment view of happiness 
with an objective list theory, especially given his remarks about external 
observers being able to assess someone’s real happiness. The core of 
Nordenfelt’s account of happiness is the idea of an agreement between 
the way reality is and the way one desires it to be. He states that “a 
person P is happy with life, if and only if P wants his or her conditions 
in life to be as they are.”19 And in slightly different phrasing: “A is 
completely happy, if and only if A wants everything in the world to be 
just as she finds it to be.”20 The account of happiness centres on an 
agreement between reality and one’s desires, i.e. “the degree of 
agreement between the state of the world – as P sees it – and his or her 
                                                             
18 Nordenfelt, Action, Ability and Health, 86. 
19 Nordenfelt, Quality of Life and Happiness, 7. 
20 Nordenfelt, Action, Ability and Health, 86. He introduces this definition as an 
intuitive starting point, but in subsequent discussion he does not call it into 
question or revise it. 
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wants.”21 He takes this to mean that “if one's life as a whole is 
characterised by the fact that one's most important goals are fulfilled or 
are in the process of being fulfilled, then this life is with great 
probability a life in happiness or harmony.”22 This latter claim generates 
problems, for wanting the world to be the way that it is—or at least 
wanting it to be as one perceives it to be—is something quite distinct 
from having one’s personal goals fulfilled. We can fulfil a wide range of 
personal goals in a world full of injustices, poverty, wars, cultural 
decline, environmental catastrophes, etc. It is perfectly possible to fulfil 
goals without wanting the world to be the way that it is. An agreement 
between the state of the world and the way someone wants it to be no 
doubt has some bearing on happiness, but this is hardly connected to 
fulfilment of personal goals. They would coincide only if personal goals 
include making the world precisely the way someone wants it to be, 
which, presumable, amounts to an overambitious vital goal, so an 
illness on Nordenfelt’s view.  
On a more charitable reading, though, we may simply suppose 
that personal goal-fulfilment is more important for happiness than the 
state the world is in. But the question remains which personal goals are 
to be fulfilled in order to reach ‘real happiness’. The easiest answer to 
this question would be to revert back to what makes one emotionally 
happy: happiness would then consist in the fulfilment, or process of 
fulfilment, of wants and desires that are most effective in generating 
emotional or experiential happiness. But Nordenfelt chooses a different 
                                                             
21 Nordenfelt, Quality of Life and Happiness, 7. 
22 Nordenfelt, Action, Ability and Health, 86.  
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strategy, and draws a distinction between ‘high priority’ and ‘low 
priority’ desires, whereby only the former are significant for happiness. 
High priority is not attributed to a desire on the basis of the intensity or 
longevity of happiness the fulfilment will generate, but on the basis of a 
cognitive principle. Nordenfelt is adamant about the fact that happiness 
is—what he calls—“a cognitive state,” as opposed to a feeling. He writes 
that “to be happy with life one must have a certain set of beliefs (or 
possibly some stronger cognitive states, such as conviction or 
knowledge).”23 And, he continues, the conviction or knowledge 
involves knowledge about what one would choose if one were 
presented with a binary choice. A desire has a high priority for the kind 
of happiness Nordenfelt has in mind if one would choose its fulfilment 
over the fulfilment of another desire: “P's want for X at t has a higher 
priority than P's want for Y at t, if and only if P, in a situation of choice 
at t, where P can choose either X or Y but not both, would choose X, 
unless prevented by external or internal force.”24 The hierarchy of 
desires that results from such either/or decisions determines which 
desires have the highest priority. And the upshot is that one’s real 
happiness is greatest if most of the cognitively preferable desires are 
fulfilled. The quantity of fulfilled, cognitively preferred, and high-
priority wants is what constitutes happiness, according to Nordenfelt—
to the point, even, that he claims that “a person may be very happy 
without feeling happy at all.”25 
                                                             
23 Nordenfelt, Quality of Life and Happiness, 50. 
24 Nordenfelt, Quality of Life and Happiness, 57. 
25 Nordenfelt, Quality of Life and Happiness, 62. 
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To this basic picture of happiness Nordenfelt adds a second 
dimension, which he calls the ‘richness’ of happiness. If two people 
have all their high priority wants satisfied they should enjoy equal 
levels of happy on Nordenfelt’s view. But if one would have fulfilled 
more ambitious wants than another, Nordenfelt still wants to claim the 
former is overall happier. And he fleshes this out in terms of happiness 
being ‘richer’. Happiness is not richer if someone has fulfilled 
numerically more high priority desires, but only if one has fulfilled 
more ambitious desires. He thinks it is necessary to include the degree 
of difficulty of desire-fulfilment into the richness of happiness.  
In addition to richness, Nordenfelt asserts that happiness 
generated by the fulfilment of vital goals must be a long-term and 
lasting kind of happiness, precisely because having abilities for their 
fulfilment makes one healthy. He writes that “the concept of happiness-
in-the-long-run identifies […] those states of affairs—indeed deeply 
wanted by the subject—which last for a long time or contribute to a 
development over time, which in its turn is still wanted by the 
subject.”26 With this claim, Nordenfelt seems to be reverting back to 
long-term happiness experience rather than the more objective account of 
cognitively chosen, ambitious, and high-priority wants. And this is not 
an accidental mistake or permissible oversight. Nordenfelt is aware that 
cognitively chosen wants may only give rise to temporary happiness, 
since people tend to give preference to short-term happiness over more 
long-lasting fulfilment in their prioritisations of wants. Cognitive choice, 
he thinks, is insufficient to select and demarcate the kind of goals that 
                                                             
26 Nordenfelt, Action, Ability and Health, 91. 
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people may choose as vital goals—the second-order ability for which 
would render them healthy. Long-term interests may not be sufficiently 
accounted for in this set-up, especially in light of the fact that we 
generally consider long-term interests important in evaluations of 
health. Nordenfelt concludes, in any case, and taking all considerations 
into account, that “A is completely healthy, if and only if A is in a 
mental and bodily state which is such that A has a second-order ability, 
given accepted circumstances, to realise the states of affairs which are 
necessary and together sufficient for A's minimal happiness in the long 
run.”27 
 However, taking all disjunctions and qualifications into account, 
Nordenfelt’s theory of health would add up to the following definition: 
health consists in having second-order abilities to acquire the first-order 
abilities necessary for the realisation of realistic vital goals, which, once 
fulfilled, will result in a state whereby, also in the long-term, one wants 
one’s conditions to be the way they are, and this happiness should 
withstand the critical scrutiny of external observes and their judgements 
about whether the goal-fulfilment giving rise to it was sufficiently rich 
and ambitious. And importantly, in case these criteria are not satisfied, 
one is not just less healthy on Nordenfelt’s view, one would actually be 
ill.28 With this final formulation, then, we have covered the most 
important aspects of Nordenfelt’s action-theoretic account of health.  
 
                                                             
27 Nordenfelt, Action, Ability and Health, 93. 
28 He writes that “’Illness’ (as a general predicate applicable to a person as a whole) 
and ‘being ill’ will in my own theory be used as synonyms for ‘non-health’ and 
‘being unhealthy’. Nordenfelt, Quality of Life, 95. 
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1.2 Further Critique and Comparative Notes 
The problems found in Nordenfelt’s account of health are no accidents 
or easily corrigible mistakes; they follow directly from his attempt to 
define health in terms of abilities required for the attainment of 
happiness. By hinging health on the idea of happiness conceived of as 
desire and goal-satisfaction, Nordenfelt imports the problems inherent 
to desire and goal-based accounts of happiness into his theory of health. 
People with few or easily fulfilled desires and goals are bound to be 
healthy, while very ambitious people are guaranteed to come out as 
unhealthy. To counter these counter-intuitive consequences Nordenfelt 
includes disjunctions about vital goals having to be realistic; happiness 
having to be based on the fulfilment of many and challenging goals; 
external observers being able to judge someone’s real happiness, and so 
on. Without these disjunctions someone with few desires and goals 
would simply be healthy, independent of other facts about one’s 
physical or mental state, just as ambitious individuals would de facto be 
ill. The various specifications and disjunctions, then, only highlight the 
difficulties one enters into when trying to delimit the range of abilities 
constitutive of health to those that will generate individual happiness 
once fulfilled. The fact that a series of blatantly problematic disjunctions 
are necessary for maintaining the thesis that ‘abilities for attaining 
happiness’ captures the nature of health, demonstrates that the 
prospects for such a theory are not very promising.  
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In addition to the problems arising out of a desire and goal-based 
account of health and happiness, there is an epistemic problem to be 
added to the list of concerns. The kind of happiness that health should 
enable, as we saw, is not a temporary or fleeting sense of happiness, but 
precisely a future and lasting sort of happiness. The question is how one 
can ever know what will generate this kind of happiness. It is difficult 
enough to know what makes one happy in the short term, but it seems 
almost impossible to know what will generate future and lasting 
individual happiness. Given the near impossibility of knowing how 
individuals are going to be happy in the long run, it is nearly impossible 
to determine what people’s vital goals are, and thus nearly impossible 
to know whether one currently has the abilities required for realising 
one’s vital goals, and thus nearly impossible to know whether someone 
is healthy or ill. The epistemic difficulties inherent to normative theories 
relying on happiness were already recognised by Kant. In his famous 
passages on the indeterminacy of happiness, Kant writes that someone 
pursuing happiness “is not capable of any principle by which to 
determine with complete certainty what would make him truly happy, 
because for this omniscience would be required.”29 If health requires 
knowledge of what will make someone truly happy, omniscience would 
also be required for evaluations of health. 
The advantage of defining health as a range of capacities vis-à-vis 
a maximum is that it does not rely on someone’s individual goals and 
desires and that it does not depend on a state as elusive and 
indeterminate as human happiness. My proposed capacity account 
                                                             
29 Kant, Groundwork, 4:418. 
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allows for the possibility that one can be healthy without being happy 
and happy without being healthy, and these options do not have to be 
explained in terms of unfavourable circumstances or failures to realise 
certain second-order abilities. It also implies that someone can be 
relatively healthy without having the ability to realise goals that will 
generate a lasting and true sense of happiness. And it also avoids the 
epistemic problems involved in determining what will generate this 
kind of happiness. On my proposed account of health, we may simply 
say that we may become aware of the restrictions to our health the 
moment we lack the abilities required for attaining happiness. This 
recognition is crucially different from the idea that being able to become 
truly happy is constitutive of health. Lacking abilities for attaining 
happiness, on my view, at best, only reveals constraints to health—
constraints to health that would also obtain if they didn’t happen to 
obstruct one’s path to happiness.  
One final disadvantage of Nordenfelt’s view worth pointing out is 
its failure to capture the meaning of health for non-human organisms. 
Rather surprisingly, Nordenfelt agrees that one of the requirements of a 
viable theory of health is that it “should be able to account for the 
similarities as well as the differences between human health and the 
health of animals and plants.”30 Nordenfelt may of course retort that 
health was defined as the ability to realise ‘vital goals’, whereby ‘vital’ 
could also refer to the abilities enabling individual survival for non-
human organisms. In the context of plants and animals, health would 
then only require having the abilities necessary for self-preservation. 
                                                             
30 Nordenfelt, On the Nature of Health, 5. 
307 
 
But since this would play on two distinct and unconnected senses of 
‘vital’, this would be a fallacious equivocation and turn his theory into a 
complete theoretical hodgepodge. Vital goals were stipulated as goals 
that will generate happiness once fulfilled, whereby happiness was 
defined as a cognitive notion involving certain beliefs about the world. 
It is impossible for organisms other than human beings to have vital 
goals understood on this definition. My capacity account of health that 
does not rely on happiness or individual goals, by contrast, but purely 
on the quantity of dispositions does not face these difficulties and can 
capture the nature of health for every possible living being. 
 
 
2. Sen and Nussbaum: The Capabilities Approach 
 
2.1 Summary of the Capabilities Approach 
A theory prominent in political philosophy and welfare economics that 
shares even more similarities with my proposed capacity account of 
health is the so-called ‘capabilities approach’ developed by Nobel 
laureate Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum.31 Their view is worth 
                                                             
31 For the present discussion I shall rely on the following selection of Sen’s works: 
Amartya Sen, “Equality of What?” in Tanner Lectures on Human Values, ed. Sterlin 
M. McMurrin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 195-220; Amartya 
Sen, The Standard of Living: The Tanner Lectures, ed. Geoffrey Hawthorn 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Amartya Sen, “Capability and 
Well-Being,” in The Quality of Life, ed. Martha C Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 30-53; Amartya Sen, Commodities and 
Capabilities (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999); Amartya Sen, Development 
as Freedom (New York: Knopf, Random House, 1999); Amartya Sen, The Idea of 
Justice (Cambridge Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
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considering in some detail not just to identify convergences with the 
account of health defended here, but mainly because the capabilities 
approach faces a number of similar difficulties and challenges. After 
introducing the most important features of the capabilities approach, I 
will suggest various ways in which the capabilities approach could 
benefit from the arguments presented in this thesis. 
Perhaps the best question to start with is what Sen’s and 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach is actually an approach to, as this 
question has no immediately available answer. Sen has presented the 
capabilities approach as an approach to describe the ‘interests’ of 
people, their ‘standard of living’, their ‘well-being’, their ‘quality of life’, 
their ‘freedom’, as well as being a theory of ‘welfare’, ‘justice’ and 
‘human development’. Nussbaum unites these target-concepts, at least 
to some extent, when she states that the capabilities approach is an 
approach to “comparative quality-of-life assessment” and “to theorising 
about basic social justice.”32 In asking what someone’s quality of life or 
standard of life is, the question to ask is “what is each person able to do 
and to be?”33 The approach, then, is concerned with assessments and 
comparisons of inequalities and socials justice, as well as identifying a 
task to governments and public policy makers to improve people’s 
quality of life framed precisely in terms of people’s capabilities.34 
                                                                                                                                                           
2009). For Nussbaum’s contributions I will rely on Martha Nussbaum, Creating 
Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011).  
32 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 18.  
33 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 18. 
34 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 19. 
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The capabilities approach has been designed as an alternative to 
more common ways in which quality of life is assessed in welfare 
economics, especially measures of wealth and utility, and arises out of a 
critique of these more commonly used approaches. The arguments Sen 
and Nussbaum provide against measuring the quality of life on metrics 
of wealth are fairly straightforward. The first point of critique is that 
measures like GDP per capita generally do not take distribution of 
wealth into account and therefore risk concealing inequalities and low 
living standards of large segments of a given society. Also if these 
shortcomings were corrected with more fine-tuned measures of wealth, 
however, it is quite obvious that quality of life will depend on what 
someone is able to do with their possessions and the kind of life 
material wealth actually makes possible. For if there are no possibilities 
for utilising commodities, being wealthy or having a large number of 
possessions is useless and will not impact one’s quality of life. 
Moreover, nations equal in wealth, distribution of wealth, and 
possibilities for using commodities, may still diverge in terms of 
standards of health care, public education, levels of security, availability 
of leisure time, and so on, and therefore diverge widely in the quality of 
life enjoyed by its citizens. And finally, one’s ‘internal’ states will also 
influence quality of life, including one’s medical condition.35 To 
adequately measure quality of life the mere assessments of wealth, on 
                                                             
35 Sen offers the example of someone rich enough to be able to buy and consume 
food but who also happens to have a high metabolic rate and some parasitic 
disease, and compares this person to someone who is poorer but who does not 
have the parasitic disease and high metabolic rate. Despite being richer, the former 
may find herself more undernourished and debilitated than the latter. See for 
further discussion: Sen, The Standard of Living, 15-16 
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individual as well as aggregate levels, will therefore not suffice.36 Sen 
concludes that “the standard of living is not a standard of opulence, 
even though it is inter alia influenced by opulence. It must be directly a 
matter of the life one leads rather than of the resources and means one 
has to lead a life.”37 Sen quotes Marx on the “commodity fetishism” that 
continues to dominate economic theory and argues in favour of a 
general reorientation in welfare economics, even for a shift of paradigm, 
towards functionings and capabilities of people.38 In a nutshell, being 
well and being well-off are simply not the same “and may possibly 
diverge a good deal.”39 
Sen and Nussbaum’s critique of measuring quality of life and 
well-being in terms of utility is more complex, mainly because of the 
different strands within utilitarianism itself.40 Sen claims that goal or 
preference satisfaction is the strongest and most defensible form of 
utilitarian approaches to well-being. But also this strongest form of 
utilitarianism falls short in two important respects: first, it is completely 
dependent on the mental attitudes of people; and second, it avoids 
reference to people’s own values. The first shortcoming he calls the 
“physical-condition neglect” and the second the “valuation neglect.”41  
The physical-condition neglect comes out clearest and most 
problematically in interpersonal comparisons of well-being. Sen writes 
                                                             
36 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 50. 
37 Sen, The Standard of Living, 16. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Sen, The Standard of Living, 15. See also Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, 19. 
40 For a more extensive discussion Sen, see: “Equality of What?,” 198-213; and The 
Idea of Justice, 272-282. 
41 Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, 14. 
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that “a person who is ill-fed, undernourished, unsheltered, and ill can 
still be high up in the scale of happiness or desire-fulfilment if he or she 
has learned to have ‘realistic’ desires and to take pleasure in small 
mercies.”42 Someone who enjoys a much better quality of life and higher 
standard of living, by contrast, may have less personal desires fulfilled 
and therefore end up lower on utility scales. Utility conceived of as 
desire-fulfilment therefore falls short in covering the relevant factors of 
someone’s well-being. Sen’s argument evidently echoes the concerns I 
raised earlier about Nordenfelt’s action-theoretic account of health: 
having modest, easily fulfilled, and overall unambitious desires almost 
automatically renders one healthy on Nordenfelt’s view and in a state of 
well-being according to the utilitarian view that Sen criticises, while in 
actuality people may be relatively unhealthy, low in well-being, and 
suffering from poor standards of living. And, as Sen highlights, contrary 
to Nordenfelt, having ‘realistic’ desires exemplifies the shortcomings of 
desire-based accounts of welfare. The ways in which people adopt 
‘realistic’ goals and desires expose the mechanisms by which desires 
and preferences adapt to one’s circumstances, rather than compensate 
for the weakness of desire-based accounts of welfare in the way that 
Nordenfelt thinks.43  
                                                             
42 Ibid. Sen writes similarly, “A poor, undernourished person, brought up in 
penury, may have learned to come to terms with a half-empty stomach, seizing joy 
in small comforts and desiring ‘no more than what seems ‘realistic’.” Sen, 
Commodities and Capabilities, 20. 
43 In Sen’s words: “The utilitarian calculus based on happiness or desire-fulfilment 
can be deeply unfair to those who are persistently deprived, since our mental 
make-up and desires tend to adjust to circumstances, particularly to make life 
bearable in adverse situations. It is through ‘coming to terms’ with one’s hopeless 
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The valuation neglect of utilitarian approaches to well-being arises 
out of a distinction that Sen draws between values and desires. He 
writes that “valuing is not the same thing as desiring, and the strength 
of desire is influenced by considerations of realism in one’s 
circumstances.”44 Although it is not obvious this distinction holds up 
under all circumstances, especially if valuations are understood as 
based on our desires, Sen seems right that desire-fulfilment as such does 
not necessarily mean one can engage in the kind of activities one 
values.45 And Sen believes that quality of life is greatly influenced 
precisely by the ability and possibility to live the form of life one values. 
Sen’s argument is that utilitarian approaches to well-being do not 
necessarily correspond to the kind of activities and forms of life people 
would value if they were to engage in the valuational exercises. 
Utilitarian approaches neglect facts about whether people succeed in 
doing and being what they would value to do and to be if they would 
have had the possibility to reflect on what they actually value. And the 
conclusion he draws from this arguments is, again, that ”how well a 
                                                                                                                                                           
predicament that life is made somewhat bearable by the traditional underdogs […] 
The hopelessly deprived people may lack the courage to desire any radical change 
and typically tend to adjust their desires and expectations to what little they see as 
feasible. They train themselves to take pleasure in small mercies.” Sen, The Idea of 
Justice, 282-283. 
44 Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, 14. 
45 One possible way to draw the distinction between desires and subjective values 
is to regard values as ‘desires for certain desires’. Even though valuations would be 
based on desires, they would be distinct from first-order desires. Such an account 
could support Sen’s distinction between desires and values while maintaining that 
values depend on desires, viz. on second-order desires. See for further discussion 
David Lewis, “Dispositional Theories of Value,” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, Supplementary Volume 104 (1989): 113-137. 
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person is must be a matter of what kind of life he or she is living, and 
what the person is succeeding in ‘doing’ or ‘being’.”46  
The alternative to wealth and utility measurements that Sen 
proposes centres on what individual human beings are capable of 
‘being’ and ‘doing’, which he refers to with the technical term 
‘functionings’. In my conceptual set-up I limited the use of ‘functioning’ 
to the functioning of parts and organs of an organism, and reserved the 
terms ‘capacity’—specified as ‘dispositions’ and ‘powers’—to describe 
properties of the organism as a whole.47 Sen and Nussbaum use 
‘functioning’ also at this higher and more general level, and in a sense 
that is even wider than my usage of capacities and dispositions. 
Functionings do not just refer to the activities people have the potential 
to carry out, but also to factors like “escaping morbidity and mortality, 
being adequately nourished, having mobility,” and complex matters 
like “being happy, achieving self-respect, taking part in the life of the 
community, appearing in public without shame.”48 Functioning is what 
Sen calls an ‘achievement’ of a person: “that what she manages to be or 
to do.”49 Functioning is distinguished from having goods or wealth, to 
which functioning is posterior, as Sen points out, and also from utility, 
to which functioning comes prior.50 Functionings are directly related to 
one’s living conditions; in fact, they capture virtually all aspects of one’s 
living condition. People’s well-being, then, must be viewed and 
                                                             
46 Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, 19. 
47 See §1.3 of Chapter Three.   
48 Sen, “Capability and Well-being,” 36-37. 
49 Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, 7. 
50 Ibid.  
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measured in terms of the kinds of functioning they have managed to 
achieve—a functioning resulting from a combination of their own 
abilities, social and economic circumstances, commodities, and external 
opportunities. ‘Functioning’ captures the full matrix of factors involved 
in what one has achieved to be and how one manages to act, and only 
this complete matrix of factors captures how well one is doing, 
according to the central thesis of the capabilities approach. 
Functionings are only one part of the picture, however, and 
although it is the most elementary concept, Sen and Nussbaum argue it 
has to be supplemented by a second concept. In some texts Sen calls this 
additional concept ‘advantage’ while in others he calls it ‘capabilities’.51 
The additional element, in either case, refers to the “alternative 
combinations of functionings the person can achieve, from which he or 
she can choose one collection.”52 The idea is that someone’s functioning 
achievement—that which determines their degree of well-being—is 
only one way in which someone could function given their own abilities 
and external circumstances. Capabilities refer to the various alternative 
kinds of life available to an individual; it refers to the scope of options 
one can choose one’s actual mode of functioning from. Capabilities 
capture what Sen and Nussbaum call one’s degree of ‘freedom’: the 
                                                             
51 On page 30 of Commodities and Capabilities Sen defines ‘advantages’ as “the set of 
potential achievements and not just the actual one”—a term he employs similarly 
in The Idea of Justice, for instance on page 231. In most other works he refers to 
potential achievements and alternative functioning achievements with the term 
‘capabilities’. As far as I can discern capabilities and advantages have exactly the 
same meaning. For the sake of simplicity, I shall use only ‘capabilities’ and will 
make no further mention of ‘advantages’.  
52 Sen, “Capability and Well-Being,” 31.  
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freedom one has to choose one life over another, i.e. one way of 
functioning instead of another. A functioning achievement is therefore 
nothing other than the realisation of just one combination of capabilities 
that one can choose from; or in Nussbaum’s words, “a functioning is an 
active realisation of one or more capabilities.”53 Now, crucially 
importantly, Sen and Nussbaum think one’s interests, standard of 
living, and quality of life are determined not just by one’s actual 
functioning achievement but also by the capabilities one has, i.e. the 
alternative ways of functioning one can choose from. To illustrate the 
point, Sen considers a case in which someone can choose between 
different forms of life—A, B, C, and D—from which the person happens 
to choose A. The functioning achievement will then be of a certain kind, 
namely A, and determines the degree of well-being. However, if the 
other options—B, C, and D—somehow become unavailable to her 
without losing the opportunity to choose A, something important has 
been lost, even though her functioning achievement remains identical. 
And the loss would be extremely significant in their view, as it 
effectively reduces the quality of life and standard of living. One would 
lose capabilities; that is, non-actualised functionings that one could have 
realised had one so chosen. The focus of the capabilities approach, Sen 
emphasises, “is thus not just on what a person actually ends up doing, 
but also on what she is in fact able to do, whether or not she chooses to 
make use of that opportunity.”54 And precisely at this point, it should be 
clear, Sen and Nussbaum’s theory converges strongly with the account 
                                                             
53 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 24-25. 
54 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 235.  
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of health developed and defended over the last three chapters. I have 
argued that having a relatively large range of capacities constitutes 
good health, also if certain dispositions never get manifested and also if 
one subjectively attaches little value to the non-actualised dispositions. 
Sen and Nussbaum have defined the capabilities approach on the basis 
of the same basic principle, but in their terminological set-up one has a 
better ‘quality of life’ if one has greater ‘freedom’, that is, if one has 
more capabilities to choose one or more forms of functioning from.  
The question why Sen and Nussbaum think more capabilities and 
alternative functionings indeed increase the quality of life, however, 
does not have an easy answer. Nussbaum and Sen also seem to disagree 
on this matter. Nussbaum states unreservedly that “capabilities [i.e. 
alternative functionings] have values in and of themselves, as spheres of 
freedom and choice.”55 And similarly, “options are freedoms, and 
freedom has intrinsic value.”56 Sen does not think this claim is 
sustainable. He thinks it would imply that “freedom must be valued 
independently of the values and preferences of the person whose 
freedom is being assessed.”57 The value of freedom would concern “just 
the ‘range’ of choice a person has—not how she values the elements in 
that range of what she chooses from it.”58 The size of the range of which 
one can choose does not have independent value according to Sen, in 
the way that Nussbaum claims it does. The main reason behind Sen’s 
resistance is an idea that we encountered before, viz. the idea that the 
                                                             
55 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 25. 
56 Ibid.  
57 Sen, “Capability and Well-Being,” 34.  
58 Ibid.  
317 
 
value of the elements included in the range of options matters more than 
the mere number. If someone can choose between three alternatives that 
one considers terrible, while someone else can choose between three 
alternatives that she sees as excellent, Sen thinks the freedom of the 
latter must be greater than the freedom of the former.59 This is a strange 
claim to make, however, as the freedom and scope of choice is clearly 
identical. One does not have greater freedom the moment one likes the 
choices one has, nor does one become less free if one disvalues the 
available choice. At most, the freedom to do what one values is smaller if 
one’s options are subjectively judged as poor. Nevertheless, Sen’s point 
does demonstrate that freedom does not have intrinsic value in the way 
that Nussbaum claims, and in the way that I have argued as well. On 
Sen’s view more capabilities and greater spheres of choice—which 
amount to the same thing—are valuable and add to the quality of life 
only if the capabilities are valuable.  
Sen’s position on the relation between values and capabilities 
generates important questions. If one could be functioning in a way that 
includes all valuable capabilities, or at least an optimal combination of 
the most valuable capabilities, why would having more capabilities still 
have value and significance for one’s quality of life, especially given the 
fact that having more capabilities does not have intrinsic value? One 
answer Sen provides to this question is that people change their view 
over time about which capabilities they find valuable. Having a wider 
capability set allows one to reconsider which capabilities one values and 
                                                             
59 Ibid. 
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wishes to realise in one’s future functioning achievements.60 The 
uncertainty of one’s future values and tastes bestows value on having a 
wider range to choose from, without thereby admitting that a wider 
range of capabilities is valuable in and of itself, and independently of 
how the capabilities in the set are valued. Nevertheless, as Sen points 
out, if, hypothetically, one would already know one’s future values and 
preferences, this would still eliminate the value of having a wider set 
than the set that includes the capabilities one would value over one’s 
complete lifetime. Only the capabilities one will value and seek to 
realise in the course of one’s life would have to be included in one’s 
capability-set; having a greater range to choose from outside of this set 
would have no additional value or increase the quality of one’s life. Sen 
thinks that having valuable options to choose from still has value, 
however, also under this hypothetical scenario, and therefore proposes 
an alternative explanation why this is so.  
The route Sen suggests is to think of freedom and substantial acts 
of choosing as itself belonging to the doings and beings that comprise 
one’s functioning achievement. He suggests that aspects of freedom are 
to be incorporated among the valuable functionings.61 This does not 
make the approach any more transparent however, for now functioning 
is no longer just a matter of realising one or more capabilities: 
capabilities themselves are to be regarded as part of one’s functioning. 
So the idea Sen proposes is that choosing A when B, C, and D are 
available is a different form of functioning—one that is more valuable—
                                                             
60 Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, 42.  
61 Sen, Commodities and Capabilities, 44-45. 
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than choosing A when B, C, and D are not available. But, to be clear, this 
would be the case only insofar as B, C, and D are capabilities that are 
positively valued, for otherwise we would fall back to the view that 
freedom and more capabilities have intrinsic value. Sen writes that 
“among the beings and doings are activities of choosing, and thus there 
is a simultaneous and two-way relationship between functionings and 
capabilities.”62 In resisting the idea that a larger range of capabilities to 
choose from, i.e. a bigger capability-set, is always more valuable and per 
definition beneficial to quality of life, Sen practically collapses the 
distinction between functionings and capabilities. And, as he is fully 
aware, the question why having of wider capability-sets is valuable is 
still not fully resolved. For if certain choice-capabilities are included in 
one’s functioning, we may still question whether alternative and wider 
capabilities outside the sphere of choice would benefit the person and 
increase the quality of his or her life. Although going to the heart of the 
capabilities approach, Sen deems these problems “ultimately not very 
important” and rests content with the thought that freedom-type 
considerations are relevant in evaluations of conditions of life.63   
Given the way Sen formalises the capabilities approach, it is clear 
that the value of capabilities must be determined independently from 
the scope, range, quantity, or number of capabilities people have, and 
that the value of the options included in the capability-set will ultimately 
                                                             
62 Sen, Standard of Living, 37. Elsewhere Sen writes similarly that “if choosing is 
seen as a part of living […] then even ‘well-being achievement’ need not be 
independent of the freedom reflected in the capability set.” Sen, “Capability and 
Well-being,” 39. 
63 Ibid.  
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determine the quality of life—more so than the scope of choice. As I will 
elaborate below, this is where the biggest disagreement lies between the 
capabilities approach to well-being and my proposed theory of health. 
Sen writes resolutely that “the arbitrariness of choosing the number of 
elements as a reflection of the ‘extent’ of choice [would] make this a 
very limited approach, since the ‘quality’ of the elements must also 
make a difference.”64 How one may go about valuing capabilities and 
determining which capability sets constitute a minimally acceptable 
quality of life is left completely open by Sen. He recognises that some 
capabilities are more ‘basic’ than others, but does not develop this 
thought further. He maintains that valuations may come from the 
person whose quality of life is being assessed, from accepted social 
standards, as well as from public reasoning, but he does not provide 
any further indications about which capabilities are valuable and to be 
promoted. Sen thinks that the capabilities approach only specifies “an 
appropriate ‘space’ in which the valuation has to be performed, rather 
than doing the valuation itself.”65  
Further developments of the capabilities approach will have to 
state which capabilities are valuable and which capability set 
corresponds to minimal standards of living, if the approach is indeed 
going to be helpful in promoting well-being and social justice. 
Nussbaum has developed the capabilities approach precisely in this 
direction and has provided a list of capabilities that would make 
                                                             
64 Sen, Capabilities and Commodities, 44.  
65 Sen, Standard of Living, 107-108. 
321 
 
possible, what she calls “human dignity.”66 She has specified a list of ten 
capabilities aimed to promote and protect areas of freedom so central 
that, as she says, “removal makes a life not worthy of human dignity.”67 
The list consists of 1) being able to live to a normal age; 2) having good 
health; 3) maintaining bodily integrity; 4) being able to use one’s senses, 
imagination and thought; 5) being able to have and express emotions; 6) 
being able to critically reflect on conceptions of the good; 7) having 
social affiliations; 8) being able to live with concern for animals and 
plants; 9) play and enjoy leisure time; and 10) having control over 
political and material environment.68 Although the items on 
Nussbaum’s lists are no doubt vitally important for people’s quality of 
life and almost impossible to disagree with from a first-order normative 
point of view, the key question remains why this list of capabilities 
covers the minimal standards of living rather than any other list. What 
grounds or justifies these capabilities as central and minimally required 
for a dignified life? If someone from another part of the world were to 
disagree that a dignified life has to include these capabilities, would 
there be any ground or reason to favour this list over any alternative? If 
someone were to claim that a dignified life consists in constraining 
emotional expressions, for instance, or that play and leisure are just a 
waste of time and resources and therefore opposed to the dignity of life, 
on the basis of which considerations could Nussbaum defend the list? 
Nussbaum and Sen are clear about the fact that a list of essential or basic 
capabilities follows from a free-standing valuational exercise, but what 
                                                             
66 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 29. 
67 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 31. 
68 For the full descriptions, see Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 33-34.  
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provides the justification of the outcome of this valuational exercise? 
Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities is but one way in which the 
capabilities approach has been developed, of course, but it points 
directly to the Achilles heel of the approach: how it is possible to 
determine which functionings and capability sets are valuable? Only 
once this has been resolved, either substantially or methodologically, 
can the approach be employed to measure and promote quality of life 
and standards of living.  
 
2.2 Four Key Differences 
The similarities between the capabilities approach to quality-of-life 
assessment and my capacity account of health are numerous and 
striking. Most importantly, both theories share the conviction that the 
relevant items in evaluating a person’s state of being are facts about 
what the person is capable of doing. Rather than subjective values, 
experience of pain and pleasure, measures of desire-satisfaction, 
material wealth, or social advantage, common ground is found in the 
idea that the scope of people’s potential for activities captures best how 
well a person or organism is doing.69 More interesting and illuminating, 
however, are the discrepancies between the two views, of which I will 
describe four. Working out these differences will throw the capabilities 
approach and the MPA account of health into sharper relief, which will 
enable me to point out some of the merits of the theory of health 
defended in the present thesis. 
                                                             
69 Nussbaum thinks the capabilities approach also lends itself to analyses of the 
standards of living of non-human animals. See Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 28-
29; 160-161. 
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The first and most important difference is that the capabilities 
approach is a compound theory, involving capacities of human beings 
themselves as well as possibilities and opportunities afforded by material 
and social environments. The MPA account of health, on the other hand, 
is strictly limited to the range of dispositions of human beings and 
organisms themselves. Nussbaum makes it clear that capabilities are 
“not just abilities residing inside a person but also the freedoms or 
opportunities created by a combination of personal abilities and the 
political, social, and economic environment.”70 She does allow for a 
distinction between ‘combined capabilities’ and ‘internal capabilities’, 
but also the latter are reserved for abilities that are developed—effectively 
excluding what she calls “innate equipment.”71 The distinction between 
combined and internal capabilities serves to identify two different tasks 
for governments and societies: the promotion of internal capabilities 
and opportunities to utilise these capabilities. A society should not only 
provide education to its members, for instance, but also provide 
opportunities by which to utilise the capabilities acquired through 
education—e.g. by allowing freedom of speech on political matters. The 
dispositions referred to in our theory of health, by contrast, consist of 
innate and acquired internal dispositions alone, with the explicit 
exclusion of the possibilities provided by material, political, social, and 
economic environments. Significant though this discrepancy between 
the two theories is, it ultimately follows from the fact that the 
capabilities approach is an approach to well-being and quality of life, 
                                                             
70 Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities, 21. 
71 Ibid. 
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aimed at the promotion of standards of living and social equality—
while the capacity account defended in the present thesis aims to 
capture the nature of health. Possession of material goods and 
opportunities to utilise them may bear on someone’s well-being and 
quality of life, and no doubt should be included in evaluations of 
standards of living, social justice, and analyses of social inequalities—
but it does not affect one’s health, as I already argued in §1.4 of Chapter 
Four. Likewise, living in a society where one can express one’s emotions 
and political views will no doubt contribute to one’s quality of life, but 
is not something directly related to, or constitutive of, one’s health. The 
capability to appear in public without feeling shame may be important 
for social justice and equality, but lacking the opportunity to do so does 
not impair one’s health. Living in a society where minorities are 
discriminated against reduces the well-being, standard of living, and 
quality of life of the disadvantaged communities, but it does not render 
them less healthy. What emerges, then, is a useful and clear-cut 
distinction between ‘health’ and ‘well-being’: while health refers to the 
scope or quantity of capacities possessed by human beings themselves, 
well-being depends on the scope or quantity of capacities possessed by 
ourselves in combination with the possibilities and opportunities 
provided by a material, economic, and social environment. If we accept 
this distinction between health and well-being and push it to its 
extreme, it is possible to claim that someone could be in superlative 
health while being deprived of many possibilities and opportunities, 
when being imprisoned for instance, while one’s well-being and quality 
of life would be greatly impoverished under such circumstances.  
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The idea that health only refers to capacities of an organism itself 
and not to opportunities provided by an environment renders the MPA 
account of health immune to some of the criticisms that have been 
levelled against the capabilities approach. Bernard Williams, for 
instance, argues that there is a danger of trivialisation if one can 
generate capabilities from commodities. Every time commodities 
multiply, so would our capabilities. Williams’s example is the creation 
of a new washing powder named ‘Bloppo’, which would automatically 
create a new capability, viz. “choosing Bloppo.”72 Contrary to what 
advertisers want us to believe, Williams points out that our freedom 
isn’t extended by this additional choice. Sen responds to Williams’s 
objection that a valuational exercise of capabilities is called for in such 
instances, which would enable us to distinguish important capabilities 
from trivial ones like choosing Bloppo.73 On my account of health, by 
contrast, and in line with the reply given to a similar objection in §1.4 of 
Chapter Four, I could maintain that the creation of Bloppo only makes 
for a change of circumstances (or conditions) without affecting the 
capacities (or dispositions) that we ourselves have and that constitute 
our health. Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, incorporating 
circumstances (or conditions) within its set of relevant capabilities, must 
invoke valuative differentiations in order to render the invention of 
ever-more washing powders insignificant to well-being and quality of 
life. My MPA account of health rules out inventions like Bloppo as 
                                                             
72 Williams, “Interests and Capabilities,” 98. 
73 Sen, The Standard of Living, 108.  
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increases of potential activity from the very start, regardless of how 
washing powders are subjectively or collectively valued.   
It should be clear that Sen and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
therefore cannot serve as a model for health—other than pointing to 
facts about what someone is capable of doing are the appropriate 
informational focus. Nevertheless, in a recent paper and well-received 
book publication, Sridhar Venkatapuram has suggested precisely this; 
viz. that the capabilities approach could be used as a theory of health.74 
Venkatapuram argues that Nordenfelt’s theory of health comes close to 
a viable account of health but that the vital goals invoked by Nordenfelt 
form an empty set: they are dependent on people’s goals and desires, 
and have no further content outside of these goals and desires. 
Venkatapuram thinks we are better off replacing this empty set of vital 
goals by “a core, stable, species-wide definition of vital goals.”75 He 
argues that Nussbaum’s list of essential capabilities could fill in the 
blank spaces of Nordenfelt’s vital goals. On Venkatapuram’s view, 
health consists of “having abilities to achieve a certain cluster of 
capabilities and functionings,” a cluster that “arises out of the values of 
human liberty and equal dignity.”76 This suggestion makes for an 
absolute non-starter, however, and hopelessly confuses the difference 
between measures of health and measures of quality of life. If someone 
cannot express one’s political opinions due to oppressive political 
                                                             
74 Sridhar Venkatapuram, “Health, Vital Goals, and Central Human Capabilities,” 
Bioethics 27 (2013): 271-279. For a more elaborate discussion, see Sridhar 
Venkatapuram, Health Justice, (Cambridge: Polity press, 2011), 64-72 and 148-172.  
75 Venkatapuram, “Health, Vital Goals, and Capabilities,” 275. 
76 Venkatapuram, “Health, Vital Goals, and Capabilities,” 276. 
327 
 
circumstances, one is not automatically less healthy; if one is not free to 
wear the clothes one wishes to wear in public without shame, quality of 
life may be compromised but people would not ipso facto be unhealthy 
on nation-wide scales; and if people are discriminated against on the 
basis of their skin colour or sexual orientation, those discriminated 
against are not less healthy. Furthermore, health and bodily integrity 
are listed on Nussbaum’s list of ten essential capabilities, which would 
create an obvious circularity: individuals would have to be healthy in 
order to be healthy. And finally, if Venkatapuram were right, being ill 
or disabled would be a loss of human dignity, which is downright 
offensive to incapacitated and impaired individuals: one certainly can 
live a dignified live while suffering from a disability or disease. The 
capabilities approach has been designed to expose, analyse, measure, 
and counteract social inequalities and injustices. If the most important 
and essential capabilities are lacking people live in poverty and 
undignified conditions, not in a state of ill-health or illness. Sen makes it 
clear that deprivation of capabilities amounts to poverty, not to 
unhealthiness or disease—although poverty could of course precipitate 
and increase the likelihood of disablements and diseases.77 If 
Venkatapuram were to argue that health consists in having various 
essential capacities that are species-wide and cut across societies, then 
this would indeed be a claim compatible with my MPA account of 
health. But importing Nussbaum’s list of essential capabilities to fill in 
the openness of Nordenfelt’s vital goals is a radically different thesis. In 
any case, the first key difference between the capabilities approach and 
                                                             
77 See Sen, Development as Freedom, 87-110; and Sen, The Idea of Justice, 254-257. 
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the MPA account of health is that the latter evaluates only the range of 
capacities possessed by organisms themselves, disregarding the 
freedoms and opportunities afforded by social, economic, material, and 
political environments—factors that do in fact play a pivotal role in the 
capabilities approach, and rightly so. 
A second key difference between the capabilities approach and my 
theory of health is the way in which the value of capacities is to be 
determined. Especially Sen makes it unmistakably clear that on his view 
valuations of capabilities are to be conducted independently from the 
scope or range of capabilities. He argues that the source of valuations 
must involve “a mixture of ‘nature’ and ‘convention’.”78 The valuation 
of capabilities must involve the values of the persons whose quality of 
life is being assessed as well as forms of, what he calls, “public 
reasoning” and the “reach of public discussion.”79 He thinks the 
capabilities approach is consistent with “partial rankings and limited 
agreements,” and that it does not need any “given weights” of 
functionings or “fixed lists of relevant capabilities.”80 Many have taken 
his quietism about the values of capabilities as a weakness of the 
approach—a weakness that Nussbaum tried to overcome by proposing 
a relatively fixed list of essential capabilities. In specifying the MPA 
account of health I argued that the value and rank of capacities could be 
determined on the basis of the scope or range of capacities they make 
possible, thereby avoiding an additional and free-standing moment of 
valuation and escaping the reliance on socially relative preferences. 
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79 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 242. 
80 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 242-243.  
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Capacities for specific activities require the possession of more basic 
activities, and these more basic activities take priority in rankings of 
capacities. What I have suggested, then, is a principle to determine 
which capacities are most valuable, without constructing the ranking 
from scratch, anchoring it in another normative notion like ‘dignity’, or 
resorting to the outcome of public debate. Certain capacities are just 
more basic, independently of consensus or subjective preference. 
Individuals and societies can subjectively or collectively decide to value 
one capacity over another, but what is most basic and thus objectively 
valuable can be determined on the basis of a hierarchical analysis of 
capacities, whereby the most broadly conditioning capacities and least 
conditioned capacities are most basic, and thus most valuable. 
This solution to the valuation problem, it seems to me, could also 
be employed by defenders of the capabilities approach. The capabilities 
most fundamental and important for social justice and social equality 
are those that condition the biggest range of further capabilities for 
members of any given society. Equal opportunity, education, safety 
from violence and crime, escaping morbidity, freedom of speech, and 
decent health care, for instance, are basic and highly valuable 
capabilities not because public reasoning happens to converge towards 
them in certain societies, as Sen thinks, nor because a first-order 
normative exercise on the nature of human dignity would favour these 
capabilities, as Nussbaum claims, but because these capabilities provide 
the widest range of further capabilities in any form of social 
arrangement. If someone were to disagree with this verdict on the basis 
of certain cultural prejudices, I could say their prejudices are simply off 
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the mark and misguided, rather than merely non-consensual or based 
on misunderstandings of the nature of human dignity. What is most 
basic, for an individual organism as well as for a society, is a factual 
matter and follows from an analysis of which capabilities enable and 
condition the largest quantity of further capabilities. The capability to 
choose Bloppo is insignificant because it does not condition any further 
capabilities, not because of consensus or subjective normative 
considerations. I would therefore suggest that the capabilities approach 
could benefit from adopting the principle developed in the context of 
the capacity account to health, and in doing so, not only work towards a 
relatively fixed list of essential capabilities, but also gain a ground and 
justification for why precisely these capabilities are most valuable. 
Phrased in the terminology of the capabilities approach: the capabilities 
most basic for social justice are those that secure the greatest range of 
freedom for individuals in a society; or, conversely, capabilities most 
basic for social justice are the capabilities that if eliminated would most 
significantly reduce and undermine the freedom of citizens. 
The third key difference is related to the previous idea and has to 
do with the value of the range, scope, and quantity of capacities as such. 
According to Sen, as we saw, the number or quantity of capabilities has 
no value per se: the value of a capability-set is determined by the value 
of the items it includes, not by its size—even though he thinks a larger 
set of valuable capabilities is preferable over a smaller set. On the view I 
developed in §1.1 of Chapter Four, however, two sets cannot be 
identical in scope while containing elements radically different in value. 
The objective value of the capacities included in the capacity-set, I 
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argued, is determined by the extent to which they enlarge the size of the 
set itself. So if a capability-set is significantly larger than another it must 
contain more valuable items on my view, since otherwise it could not 
have been a significantly larger capability-set. A set containing only 
worthless capabilities must be a small capability-set, as that is what it 
means for capabilities to be worthless. The consequence of this view is 
that a wider set of capacities is indeed always better than a smaller 
capability-set, independent of how a subject or society happens to value 
the items included in the set. Nevertheless, this view does not imply, as 
Sen protests, that freedom is valued independently of the capabilities 
one can choose from.81 On the view I suggest the degree of freedom and 
the objective value of capabilities are intertwined: if one has more 
objectively valuable capabilities to choose from one is automatically 
freer, since objectively valuable capabilities are objectively valuable 
because they imply a greater degree freedom—i.e. a greater number of 
potential activities one can engage in.  
This proposal could eliminate the problem Sen faces in trying to 
account for the value of additional capabilities, which he tried to solve 
by making capabilities part of one’s functioning. A capability set is 
widened most significantly, I would suggest, when objectively valuable 
capabilities are included in it. The greater the width of the capability-set, 
the more valuable functionings one can achieve. A set comprising only 
unimportant and worthless capabilities, by contrast, is per definition a 
small or narrow set of capabilities. Analysing the scope of one’s 
capabilities and the value of one’s capabilities are not two distinct and 
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unrelated exercises; the scope gives an indication of whether basic 
capabilities are available, and the value of one’s capabilities tells 
something about the scope of the doings and beings that are possible. 
My suggestion that the objective value of a capability depends on the 
range of other capabilities it makes possible therefore not only provides 
a method by which to rank capabilities, it also explains why a wider 
range of capabilities—or greater degree of freedom—is always 
preferable: the greater the capability-set, the more objectively valuable 
capabilities it includes, and vice versa.  
The fourth and final difference worth pointing out relates to a 
more specific statement of Nussbaum’s. She writes that the capabilities 
approach sees the task of government as the promotion of spheres of 
freedom, rather than making “people lead healthy lives, do worthwhile 
activities, exercise religion, and so on.”82 She claims that “there is a huge 
moral difference between a policy that promotes health and one that 
promotes health capabilities—the latter, not the former, honours the 
person’s lifestyle choices.”83 On the account of health put forward in the 
present thesis, however, the ‘huge moral difference’ has collapsed 
entirely. Improving health means increasing the multiplicity of potential 
activity, i.e. increasing the range of activities one can engage in. Health-
improvements consist in widening the scope of activities that people can 
engage in, so the promotion of human health is tantamount to enlarging 
individual freedom and autonomy—insofar as freedom is determined 
by one’s own potential for activities and not by external possibilities and 
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333 
 
opportunities. The final point of disagreement is therefore that health 
and health capabilities mean precisely the same thing on my proposed 
account of health. Paternalistic and petty forms of ‘health-promotion’ 
that Nussbaum thinks are challenged by the capabilities approach have 
already been overcome in my account of health: health-promotion is 
always a matter of increasing one’s potential for activity—or, if one 
prefers, an expansion of individual freedom and autonomy. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
1. Value 
 
Of all the things that can be considered good or valuable I have argued 
one subset allows for a naturalistic reduction, meaning that certain 
values are grounded in a combination of natural facts. Amongst the 
totality of things that we can call good there are things that are good for 
our own sake and that serve our own interests. Amongst these ‘egoistic’ 
goods there are things and events that are good because they benefit our 
health. If, as I have argued, health consists in a quantity of dispositions 
or capacities, then a species of the good can be reduced to objects and 
events that increase the quantity of dispositions and capacities of 
organisms. That is to say, when an object or event is non-morally good 
for an organism there is nothing extra going on than it maintaining or 
expanding an organism’s quantity of capacities—by increasing the 
diversity of activities it can perform, the variety of conditions under 
which it can perform these activities, or the period of time in which it 
can perform the activities. The reduction of goodness to a quantity of 
capacities and dispositions is therefore a double reduction, with health as 
an intermediate concept. The reduction of goodness to health is a 
reduction of one normative concept (good) to another (health), while the 
reduction of health to capacities and dispositions reduces a normative 
concept (health) to non-normative concepts (quantity of capacities). 
Because of this second reductive step one category of the good has been 
reduced to a combination of natural facts.  
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Perhaps a less technical and more intuitive way of stating what it 
means to reduce a subset of goods to naturalistic features of organisms 
and their material environments in this two-stage way, borrowed from 
Kripke, is the metaphor of God creating the world and thinking about 
what he would have to create in order to determine the features that we 
are trying to understand.1 Creating the material universe without living 
beings is not sufficient for anything to have value. The material universe 
would have to contain beings organised in such a way that they are 
alive. If God creates all the material elements of a universe in which 
some beings are indeed living beings, then the mere creation and 
ordering of the material elements would suffice for fixing the facts 
about what is good-for and bad-for organisms in a non-moral health-
promoting way. There would be no need to create anything in addition 
to the material world to fix these facts. There would also be no need to 
endow living beings with consciousness (insofar as this would require 
endowing) so that certain objects or events can be experienced as 
valuable. What is valuable in a relational and non-moral way, therefore, 
is fixed by the creation of the material world alone. Moreover, when 
there are living beings there are kinds or species to which each 
organism belongs, and so there would also be facts about species-bound 
maximal capaciousness. Facts about the health of organisms are 
therefore also determined by the very same act of creating the material 
universe. So facts about organisms’ health and facts about what is non-
morally valuable for an organism would come automatically with the 
creation of the fundamental elements of the material world.  
                                                             
1 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1981), 153-154. 
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This does not mean that the same objects and events are good for 
everyone in the way that morality traditionally designates the same 
actions as morally good, independently of individual differences and 
situational factors. The objectivity of non-moral values does not lie in a 
universal validity of certain actions or objects being good, but in the 
source of values, viz. an organism’s as a whole, including its functional 
parts, in relation to objective features of external reality. Insofar as 
organisms are identically constituted, similar things will be non-morally 
valuable. Insofar as organisms are differently constituted, different 
objects and events will be objectively valuable. Yet, objects and events 
are objective valuable in a non-moral way only if they promote the 
health of the organism as a whole.   
Although I argued that a subset of non-moral goods can be 
reduced in this way, I maintained this does not entail that other values 
are similarly grounded in natural facts. Not only subjective non-moral 
values, but also the moral values that contemporary philosophers are 
typically interested in fall outside of the reductive picture. When God 
creates the material universe this may determine the facts about what is 
non-morally good for a living being, but it does not automatically 
determine the facts—if there indeed are any—about what is morally 
right and wrong. Whether typically moral claims like ‘one ought not to 
kill’ can be grounded in the nature of life, perhaps in a more indirect 
way, is something that I left open. But the groundedness and objectivity 
of non-moral goods does not, in any case, entail that there are moral 
facts equally grounded in a combination of natural facts and therefore 
similarly objective.  
337 
 
It should therefore also be recognised that a tension is possible 
between what is objectively non-morally good for a human being 
(health-promotion) and what could be considered to be the morally 
right way of acting. Nietzsche recognised the possibility of a tension 
between these two types of goodness as well and expressed it in terms 
of an opposition between moral ‘good and evil’ (gut und böse) and non-
moral ‘good and bad’ (gut und schlecht)—a tension he portrayed as two 
opposing forces engaged in a historical struggle: 
 
The two opposing values ‘good and bad’, ‘good and evil’ have 
been engaged in a fearful struggle on earth for thousands of 
years; and though the latter value has certainly been on top for 
a long time, there are still places where the struggle is as yet 
undecided.2 
 
Nietzsche’s portrayal of moral goodness and non-moral goodness as 
engaged in a ‘fearful struggle’ results from his concern that morality can 
form a threat to human health. And we must conclude in agreement 
with Nietzsche that if morality results in the elimination of human 
capacities, morality is indeed inimical to health and something that can 
be criticised for reasons of health. Nietzsche is probably right to point 
out that morality can have disabling effects and oppose what is 
naturally good for us as living beings: it can weaken us and make our 
capacities for activities dwindle, especially capacities for activities and 
ways of thinking typically considered immoral.  
                                                             
2 Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals, §1.16.   
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To be clear, the idea is not that practicing moral constraint is 
unhealthy or that acting on the basis of a conception of what is morally 
right is necessarily antagonistic to life; the idea is that if morality 
transforms us, collectively or individually, so that we cannot carry out 
certain activities anymore—also if these activities are generally 
considered to be morally bad—morality will have reduced the total 
range of human capacities and thus compromised our health. With this 
in mind, we could perhaps appreciate Nietzsche’s warnings for the 
physiologically and psychologically degenerating effects of morality:  
 
These are the blessings of Christianity!—Parasitism as the sole 
practice of the Church; with its ideal of green-sickness, of 
‘holiness’ draining away all blood, all love, all hope for life; 
the Beyond as the will to deny reality of every kind; the Cross 
as the bade of recognition for the most subterranean 
conspiracy there has even been—a conspiracy against health, 
beauty, well-constitutedness, bravery, intellect, benevolence of 
soul, against life itself.3  
 
The claim that objective non-moral goods are distinct from conceptions 
of moral goodness, and the Nietzschean idea that the morality can 
oppose the cultivation of health, do not, however, render the conception 
of objective non-moral goodness anti-moralistic; that is, I do not think 
that the conception of health is inherently morally bankrupt in its 
proclaimed non-moral status. There are three reasons I would point to if 
the charge of immoralism were indeed levelled against the present 
                                                             
3 Nietzsche, Anti-Christ, §62.  
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thesis. First, health has been identified at the level of capacities for 
activities and therefore does not make a claim on which actions one 
must realise. Second, capacities for activities usually deemed morally 
good are also part of health; the account of health favours neither moral 
nor immoral conduct within its own definition. And third, a capacity for 
behaving immorally seems prima facie a condition of possibility for 
morality itself: someone who has the capacity to act immorally but 
chooses not to exercise it is a morally better person than someone who 
does not have the capacity to start with; a person who can be cruel but 
who does not exercise it is benevolent and merciful—virtues unavailable 
to someone lacking the capacity for cruelty. The account of health and 
non-moral value is therefore not necessarily objectionable from a moral 
point of view; it is, indeed, an entirely extra-moral account. 
A more general conclusion following from the enquiry into the 
nature of health is that different values have different ontological and 
epistemological characteristics. One subset of non-moral values is 
grounded in the constitution of living beings and its relation to an 
environment, and captures what promotes an organism’s health. 
Subjective non-moral values, by contrast, depend on subjective attitudes 
and preferences and the objects that are subjectively valued. The status 
of moral values I have made no claim on. But all three kinds of values 
can be evaluated in terms of one another, and indeed, stand in direct 
conflict to one another. The common presumption in meta-ethics that 
one set of terms, so-called ‘value terms’, or ‘moral concepts’, have an 
identical ontological and epistemological status, I therefore conclude, is 
one that is better abandoned.   
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2. Health 
 
I have argued that health consists in an organism’s range of capacities 
relative to a maximum of realisable capacities, and specified this in 
terms of an organism’s multiplicity of potential activity vis-à-vis its 
factual limitations. The greater an organism’s range of capacities, or the 
greater its multiplicity of potential activity, the greater the organism’s 
health. This account of health captures the normativity of health by 
stating that health consists in an organism’s potential activities relative 
to a norm—the norm being the factual limitations to potential activities 
set by the species, the individual organism, or the individual organism 
at some stage in its life. The account of health captures the objectivity of 
health by relying on properties and norms that do not depend on 
subjective attitudes, preferences, or cultural standards. And it is 
naturalistic in that capacities and dispositions are properties that also 
figure in, and are required by, scientific explanations of the world.  
For non-human life this means that an organism is healthy if it is 
capable of performing all species-specific activities, and it was in this 
relatively simple context that the capacity account of health most clearly 
suggested itself. But I argued that human health can be understood on 
the basis of the same principle; a human being is healthy if it is in a 
physical and mental condition such that it is capable of carrying out the 
largest possible range of activities under the widest set of circumstances. 
Homo sanus is therefore not characterised merely by an absence of 
disease or illness, nor by functioning within the bounds of statistical 
normality, but in a sense, closer to the Renaissance ideal of a Homo 
universalis: a versatile human being with expertise, knowledge, and 
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skills in virtually all domains of life, who excels in creativity, and who 
demonstrates a high degree of self-sufficiency and resilience in his or 
her pursuits. At the same time, I claimed this ideal will always be out of 
reach and impossible to completely realise as a result of the intrinsic 
limitlessness of human potential. The human condition is characterised 
by the possibility of always being able to become healthier in virtue of 
always being able to acquire more capacities, realisable under a wider 
range of circumstances, and sustainable for a longer period of time. Due 
to the possibility for an ever-greater potential for activity, it is possible 
for human beings to expand their health in diverging and even opposite 
ways; people can be equally capacitated on a quantitative scale but yet 
be capable of different activities. Although health is conceived of as 
uniform in meaning, human life permits of a plurality of ways in which 
one can be healthy. Especially when it comes to more specialised 
capacities, i.e. those that do not form a pre-condition for many other 
kinds of activities, people can differ significantly in what they are 
capable of and yet possess comparable degrees of health. Despite this 
element of pluralism inherent in human heath, the having of basic and 
broadly conditioning capacities does form a universal requirement for 
healthiness, and variations in these more fundamental capacities do 
invariably signify substantial disparities in health. Although human 
health can be realised in different ways and take on different forms, 
there are many basic requirements for health that apply equally to all 
human beings. And the development and maintenance of these basic 
capacities does require a roughly similar and uniform regime of 
education, bodily training, nutrition, and so on.  
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In allowing for a degree of variation in the way that human beings 
can be healthy, the proposed account of health circumvents Nietzsche’s 
concern that a universal theory of health inevitably becomes a 
homogenising and normalising force, constricting the diversity in ways 
of living that he considers so important for individual flourishing and 
cultural vitality. At the same time, the account of health steers away 
from the unreserved health-relativism that Nietzsche and Korsgaard 
endorse, first, by not having the nature of health depend on subjective 
factors, and second, by setting relatively clear limitations to the ways in 
which people can differ from one another while being healthy. The 
proposed account of health nevertheless contains a number of 
distinctively Nietzschean features: self-preservation and reproduction 
are not considered to be the defining features of health; pain and 
suffering are viewed as a requirement for health rather than its analytic 
opposites; health involves an ability to fall sick and convalesce; morality 
can pose a threat to human health; human health is characterised by 
autonomy and self-sufficiency; pursuing subjectively chosen ends is 
necessary for health; and being able to give up on one’s concerns for 
future life and health conditions greater health. This does not mean, 
however, that the account of health can retrospectively be attributed to 
Nietzsche. His meta-normative subjectivism and his commitment to 
individual variation in his middle period writings thwart any attempt to 
formulate a universal account of health. And the reduction of life to will 
to power put forward in his later works takes health into quite a 
different direction, viz. one where health corresponds to levels of power 
and domination over one’s material and social environment. 
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A further consequence of identifying human health with the full 
range of one’s potential for activities is that every possible capacity and 
all potential activities are constitutive of health. This may be taken to 
imply that all aspects of human life are drawn within the scope and 
purview of medical knowledge, practice, and power—effectively 
medicalising all of human life.4 That is, the proposed theory of health 
may be taken to facilitate what some have called the “the tyranny of 
health” or even a “medical nemesis”: a dystopia where medicine and 
psychiatry permeate, control, and legislate virtually all dimensions of 
human life.5 Concerns about medicalisation following the proposed 
account of health can be countered with four reasons, however. First, I 
argued that a lessening of health does not necessarily signify the 
presence of illness or disease; diseases and illnesses are but one way of 
losing one’s health. If medicine and psychology are restricted to the 
prevention, curing, or alleviation of pathology, there is no direct 
                                                             
4 ‘Medicalisation’ here may be defined as “a process by which nonmedical 
problems become deﬁned and treated as medical problems, usually in terms of 
illness and disorders.” Peter Conrad, The Medicalization of Society: On The 
Transformation of Human Conditions into Treatable Disorders (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2007), 4. 
5 Daniel Callahan, “The WHO definition of ‘Health’,” in The Roots of Bio-Ethics: 
Health, Progress, Technology, Death. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 68. Ivan 
Illich, Limits to Medicine, Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (London: 
Marion Boyars Publishing, 1976). Among the numerous authors expressing 
concerns about the ways in which medicine and psychology have infiltrated areas 
of human life, the most trenchant articulations can still be found in the works of 
the post-war social critics Ivan Illich and Thomas Szasz. See especially Illich, Limits 
to Medicine, Chapter 2; Thomas Szasz, “The Therapeutic State: The tyranny of 
pharmacy,” The Independent Review 5:4 (2001): 485-521; Thomas Szasz, The 
Medicalization of Everyday Life: Selected Essays (New York: Syracuse University 
Press, 2007).  
344 
 
concern about medicine and psychology infiltrating other spheres of 
life. Second, I argued that health consists in the dispositions that human 
beings possess without technological or pharmaceutical aid. Good health 
is characterised precisely by an independence from medical power and 
medical technology and therefore directly opposes any reliance on it. 
Third, perhaps most importantly, on the proposed theory of health the 
study and the promotion of health are extricated from the monopoly of 
medicine and psychology; if health consists in a range of dispositions 
and capacities a much wider range of disciplines must be recognised as 
contributing to the understanding and improvement of human health, 
including fields like sociology, anthropology, pedagogics, history, art, 
political science, etc. Instead of a ‘medicalisation’ of everyday life, 
therefore, the theory of health could provide the basis for what we may 
loosely call the humanisation of medicine and psychology—the idea that 
medicine and psychology belong to a larger number of humanistic 
disciplines engaged with the study and promotion of our health. And 
fourth, I argued that autonomy is essential to human health. If 
promotion of health is tantamount to promoting individual autonomy 
and independence from medical power and technology, any form of 
medical paternalism would be self-defeating: it would only promote its 
own undoing. The proposed positive account of health, which does 
indeed encompass the full spectrum of human capacities, therefore 
neither reinforces the medicalisation of human life in any 
straightforward way nor justifies the intensification and proliferation of 
medical power; if anything, it supports the emancipation from any such 
medical forces and powers.  
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3. Ethics 
 
Relatively little has been said about the ethical ramifications of the 
proposed theory of health, other than that an account of objective non-
moral goodness has ethical significance only in the context of human 
life. Only for human beings can beliefs about what is valuable and what 
it means to be healthy influence the way we go about living our lives, 
and so only for human beings does non-moral goodness translate into 
ethical goodness. There are nevertheless also reasons why a theory of 
health has limited ethical significance and why it cannot simply be 
inflated into a wholesale ethical theory. The first reason is that health, 
also on the expansive definition that I have argued for, does not enjoy 
hegemony over the good. In addition to health-promoting goods there 
are objects, events, and ways of living that people subjectively value 
and that are good from a subjective point of view. Furthermore, the 
account of health leaves entirely open which ends one is to pursue, and 
asserts only that adopting and pursuing ends as such is an important 
condition for health and hence objectively valuable. Moreover, the 
account of non-moral goodness does not rule out the possibility of there 
being moral goods or moral constraints to be imposed on one’s conduct. 
A comprehensive ethical theory, answering the question how to live a 
good human life, should probably accommodate subjective values and 
moral constraints as well, and nothing in what has been said so far 
implies that values unrelated to health should not be allowed to play an 
integral role in our ethical theorising and practical deliberations. 
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But perhaps the biggest obstacle to deriving a full-fledged ethical 
theory from the account of non-moral value and theory of health is that 
health and health-promoting goods are, in virtue of being objective, not 
of superior importance than things that are subjectively valued or 
morally required. The objectivity of health-promoting goods does not 
imply that other values and considerations cannot be, or should not be 
allowed to be, overriding in one’s practical deliberations—or vice versa. 
Even if error theory is true for all moral statements, this does not imply 
that moral considerations are less important than the sustenance of 
one’s individual health in reflections on how to act. The objectivity of 
the being and value of health only means that truth about the goodness 
of health-promoting objects, the positive value of being in a state of 
health, and what it means to be in a state of health, all do not depend on 
subjective attitudes, preferences, or experiences. In other words, 
objectivity refers to the metaphysical and epistemological status of, in 
this case, health and health-promoting goods, not to a hierarchy of what 
is, or should be, most important in practical deliberation. 
Are we then entirely duped in thinking that a positive account of 
health has ethical significance? Not at all, but the limitations to what has 
been claimed must be recognised from the outset. I think the ethical 
ramifications of the theory of health come out strongest when it is 
applied to the various aspects of human life that ethical theory 
traditionally seeks to be instructive about. Only when working out the 
consequences of the proposed account of health, and so, in a sense, only 
post hoc, are we in a position to assess what the conception of health can 
offer in terms of a genuinely ethical theory.  
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A few examples could demonstrate what a health-based ethics 
would involve, although these should not be taken as anything more 
than speculative thoughts on the matter. We could for instance consider 
what a healthy social life would look like, or healthy friendships in 
particular. On the capacity account of health, a healthy friendship 
would be one whereby both parties promote the growth of each other’s 
action-potential while simultaneously preventing a dependency on each 
other for realising the various activities—and in general, one whereby 
autonomous decision making is both promoted and respected. We 
could also consider the implications for our comportment towards our 
own individual future, and our own finitude in particular. The account 
of health implies, as we saw, that overcoming the anxiety and even 
concern for one’s own death gives rise to a substantial expansion of 
MPA and to a state we called ‘greater health’. Although overcoming 
anxiety for death has been degraded to a mere platitude of popular 
psychology by now, it was a central theme in ancient ethical thought, 
and no doubt requires a complex practice of self-discipline, reflection, 
meditation, and perhaps even actively risking one’s health from time to 
time—a practice, in any case, that would traditionally be viewed as a 
distinctly ethical practice.  
We could further think of our individual and collective histories, 
and the ways in which historical narratives can either promote or inhibit 
our potential for action—presenting us with a task of working through 
experiences that continue to exert an inhibitory effect on us, and 
equally, as Nietzsche points out, a task of forgetting, as he seems right to 
claim that “the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal 
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measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture.”6 
Likewise, we could consider the role and importance of knowledge—self-
knowledge as well as knowledge of the external world. It is obvious that 
understanding the workings of the external world increases one’s 
potential for acting in the world, in the same way that self-knowledge is 
an important requirement for individual autonomy and self-control. At 
the same time, as Nietzsche was keen to point out, ever-increasing 
knowledge can also be hostile to life and our powers for action: too 
much self-knowledge can make us “gravediggers of the present”, he 
writes, in the same way that ever more scientific knowledge of the 
world could destroy the conditions required for adopting and pursuing 
subjective ends.7 That is to say, forgetfulness, biases, and illusions may 
equally turn out to be conducive to one’s potential for action, and an 
ethics based on an ideal of human health probably requires the setting 
of limitations to our striving for ever more truth and self-knowledge. 
What these comments suggest, I think, is that a rich ethical picture 
can be built on the basis of the proposed account of health, but that its 
strengths and potential appeal, together with its limitations, will only 
become visible once the details are worked out. Although Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is very instructive and a rich source for a health-based 
ethics, the details cannot be determined by armchair philosophy alone; 
the task of discovering under which conditions we develop the largest 
action-potential is first and foremost an empirical task.  
                                                             
6 Friedrich Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” in 
Untimely Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983), 62. 
7 Ibid. 
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The ethics we might be able to develop on the basis of the 
proposed account of health would be an ethics directed at the 
cultivation of oneself and one’s own capacities, i.e. it would be an ethics 
oriented towards the betterment of one’s own state of being, in both 
physical and mental respects. Such a health-based ethics could therefore 
best be viewed as standing in a lineage with the ancient conception of 
ethics, now standardly referred to as ‘virtue ethics’. Rather than 
returning to the Aristotelian virtues or the ways of life professed by the 
Hellenistic schools, I think the proposed account of health enables us to 
approach this tradition of ethical theorising afresh, and determine 
which virtues and forms of living are indeed conducive to health, with 
individual autonomy and the ability to adopt and pursue self-chosen 
final goods as corner stones. This is all to say, then, that the proposed 
account of health holds a promise for a rich ethical theory, but that all 
the substantial work still remains to be done. And it is only with a more 
detailed and worked out picture that we can assess the precise nature 
and scope of the ethical implications of the capacity account of health.   
An ethics based on an ideal of health would nonetheless face some 
of the challenges that virtue ethics in general faces. By disconnecting 
non-moral goodness from individual desires, attitudes, and preferences 
there is no direct link between the good and motivational structures for 
acting. If there are mind- and desire-independent facts about goodness, 
as I have argued, then there is no direct connection between these facts 
and one’s motivations to act in certain ways. If the claims about non-
moral value and health are to be extended into an ethical theory, merely 
stating something as good does not suffice; a further argumentative step 
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is required to support the idea that we indeed have reasons to act in 
accordance with the species of the good that we have discovered. Or 
more simply, if someone were to ask why he should invest in his own 
health, merely stating that health is objectively good is not a fully 
satisfactory answer. Philippa Foot overlooks this rather essential step, it 
seems to me, and jumps from recognising something as good to the 
conclusion that we must indeed act accordingly. She writes: 
 
For surely human begins, who are capable of judging which 
states of affairs are better and which worse, could never be 
right to choose to produce a worse state of affairs when they 
could produce a better? Mustn’t they always choose the better 
over the worse? To this one should reply roundly that it is no 
doubt a truism that they should act as well as they can.8 
 
The truism she refers to is not a truism at all, however, and is question-
begging with regard to the question why we should act in accordance 
with what we judge to be a good or better state of affairs.9 A moral 
psychology is required to support the claim that we must indeed act in 
                                                             
8 Foot, Natural Goodness, 49. 
9 In her famous paper “Modern Moral Philosophy”, inaugurating the rebirth of 
virtue ethics in 20th century Anglophone philosophy, Elizabeth Anscombe also 
underscores this point. She writes: “In this sense the notion of ‘norm’ brings us 
nearer to an Aristotelian than a law conception of ethics. There is, I think no harm 
in that; but if someone looked in this direction to given ‘norm’ a sense, then he 
ought to recognize what has happened to the notion ‘norm’, which he wanted to 
mean ‘law—without bringing God in’—it has ceased to mean ‘law at all; and so the 
notions of ‘moral obligation’, ‘the moral ought’, and ‘duty’ are best put on the 
Index, if he can manage it.” G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 
Philosophy 33 (1958): 15.      
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accordance with what is judged to be a better state of affairs. A moral 
psychology of this kind can be found in Kantian ethics, especially in the 
‘Doctrine of Virtue’, in which Kant argues that we have an imperfect 
duty to promote our own powers and capacities, which, on my account, 
would be tantamount to having an imperfect duty to cultivate one’s 
own health. According to Kant, our rational nature obliges us to 
develop our capacities, and so our rationality would explain why we 
must invest in our health. 
 
A human being has a duty to himself to cultivate (Cultura) his 
natural powers (powers of spirit, mind, and body), as a means 
to all sorts of possible ends.—He owes it to himself (as a 
rational being) not to leave idle and, as it were, rusting away 
the natural predispositions and capacities that his reason can 
some day use. […] It is a command of morally practical reason 
and a duty of a human being to himself to cultivate his 
capacities (some among them more than others, insofar as 
people have different ends), and to be in a pragmatic respect a 
human being equal to the end of his existence.10  
 
Kant’s argument supporting the claim that our rational nature obliges 
us to develop our capacities is notoriously complex and relies on deeply 
controversial assumptions about the nature of the human will. If an 
ideal of healthiness is indeed to serve as the basis for an ethics of self-
                                                             
10 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy: The Cambridge 
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 6:444-5. 
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cultivation, I think ultimately the best way to present it, in keeping with 
ancient Greek forms of ethics, is as a fundamental choice: either live in 
accordance with what is naturally good for you as a living being, 
develop your capacities and powers in the broadest possible manner, 
attain a high degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency in your actions, in 
short, live a flourishing human life, or forego this opportunity and let 
your natural powers and dispositions whither and rust away. 
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